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“All industries are different, but some are more different than others.  
The pharmaceutical industry fits the latter category” 
 
(SCHERER, Industry structure, Strategy and Public policy, New York, Prentice 
Hall, 1997, 336) 
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Abstract 
 
 
Il presente lavoro di ricerca si propone di indagare la relazione tra istituti di 
proprietà intellettuale previsti nell’ordinamento internazionale ed europeo e 
la regola di trasparenza dei dati derivanti da sperimentazioni farmaceutiche 
contenuta all’art. 8,4 del Regolamento UE sulle sperimentazioni cliniche n. 
536/2014.  
Scopo ultimo della tesi è quello di giustificare soluzioni di trasparenza e 
accesso alle informazioni riguardanti le proprietà di efficacia e sicurezza dei 
prodotti farmaceutici immessi in commercio, sulla base dell’individuazione 
della ratio economica e giuridica dell’eccezione di riservatezza commerciale  
posta dall’art. 81,4 del citato Regolamento.  
Il tema, ampiamente esplorato in letteratura, dell’accesso ai farmaci è 
analizzato in questa sede da un punto di vista non già quantitativo, bensì 
qualitativo: l’accesso alle informazioni derivanti da sperimentazioni cliniche 
viene difatti letto come una precondizione essenziale ad un più sicuro e 
consapevole accesso, e dunque consumo, di prodotti ad alto impatto sulla 
salute individuale e collettiva. 
 
Punto di partenza dell’analisi è la considerazione del duplice valore dei dati 
desunti dai processi di ricerca e sviluppo farmaceutico. Tali dati sono difatti 
da un lato fonte di vantaggio competitivo per le società che li hanno 
prodotti, e dall’altro materiale informativo altamente prezioso per la 
comunità scientifica, la cui conoscenza appare direttamente funzionale al 
soddisfacimento di diritti fondamentali dell’Unione Europea, quali il diritto 
alla informazione e alla salute di pazienti e consumatori.  
 Il duplice valore, al contempo commerciale e informativo, dei dossier di 
sperimentazione clinica, è stato cristallizzato nell’art. 81,4 del Regolamento 
sulle sperimentazioni cliniche, ove ad una regola di trasparenza viene 
opposta una eccezione di riservatezza commerciale, sulla scia dello schema 
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normativo già fatto proprio dal Regolamento EC 1049/2001 sull’accesso ai 
documenti delle istituzioni europee, e più specificamente dalle Regole di 
attuazione dello stesso Regolamento riguardanti l’accesso ai documenti 
dell’Agenzia Europea del farmaco.  
 
La prassi amministrativa e giurisprudenziale ha fino ad oggi risolto il 
contrasto interpretativo tra i due opposti interessi quasi sempre a favore 
delle ragioni di riservatezza commerciale, ratificando così sul piano 
propriamente giuridico le pratiche di distorsione informativa (reporting biases) 
perpetrate dalle società farmaceutiche, con conseguenti esiti di grave 
compressione del diritto alla salute di cui all’art. 35 della Carta dei diritti 
fondamentali dell’Unione Europea, e all’art. 12 dell’International Covenant on 
social and political rights.  
Come dimostrato anche dalla controversia tra il gruppo di ricercatori danese 
Cochrane Collaboration e l’Agenzia europea per i medicinali (EMA), 
definitivamente risolta con la pronuncia del difensore civico europeo nel 
2010, le richieste di accesso ai dossier clinici sono state in gran parte 
rigettate dall’agenzia di regolazione.  
A completamento del quadro, in due noti casi del 2013- Abbvie e Intermune- 
la Corte di Giustizia dell’Unione Europea si è pronunciata ponendo in 
evidenza le notevoli difficoltà tecnico-interpretative sottostanti alla 
creazione di meccanismi di trasparenza di dati commercialmente sensibili.    
 
I richiami a politiche di maggiore trasparenza riguardanti i dati di 
sperimentazioni cliniche provenienti da numerosi documenti internazionali, 
quali la Dichiarazione di Helsinki on Ethical Principles for Research Involving 
Human Subjects promossa nel 2008 dalla World Medical Association, e lo 
Statement on Public Disclosure of Clinical Trials Results emanato nel 2014 
dall’Organizzazione Mondiale della sanità, sono stati alla base delle recenti 
istanze di cambiamento in seno alle stesse istituzioni europee.  
La necessità di un pubblico scrutinio da parte della comunità scientifica 
circa gli esiti delle sperimentazioni farmaceutiche, insieme alla opportunità 
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del re-impiego dei dati da queste prodotti ai fini del progresso della 
conoscenza scientifica, hanno condotto nel 2014 l’Agenzia europea per i 
medicinali alla revisione delle proprie policy di accesso ai dossier 
farmaceutici.  
Sulla scia di questo indirizzo, l’Unione Europea ha cercato di assumere 
posizioni più decise anche sul piano legislativo, con la emanazione della 
Clinical Trials Regulation EU n. 536/2014- Regolamento sulla 
sperimentazione clinica dei medicinali per uso medico-, ove all’art. 81, 4 si 
prevede proprio l’istituzione ad opera dell’Agenzia europea per i medicinali 
di un database pubblicamente accessibile al fine di “consentire ai cittadini 
europei l’accesso alle informazioni sui prodotti farmaceutici”. 
 
Tuttavia, sia le nuove politiche di accesso annunciate dall’Agenzia europea 
per i medicinali, sia la istituzione di un database pubblicamente accessibile e 
contenente tutte le informazioni sottomesse all’agenzia di regolazione 
necessitano di essere meglio valutate in punto di effettività.  
 
Infatti, ad un più attento vaglio, le condizioni d’uso dei dati derivanti da 
sperimentazioni cliniche, messe a punto dalla stessa Agenzia europea per i 
medicinali, risultano essere animate da principi ben diversi rispetto a quelli 
posti alla base della trasparenza sull’informazione scientifica, mentre la 
tenuta della regola di trasparenza di cui all’art. 81, 4 del Regolamento sui dati 
clinici potrebbe essere ampiamente svigorita per effetto di 
un’interpretazione eccessivamente generosa della eccezione posta a tutela 
della riservatezza commerciale.  
 
La prospettiva del bilanciamento tra opposti interessi, implicitamente 
deferito agli organi amministrativi e giudiziali dallo stesso Regolamento EU 
n. 536/2014, si è dimostrata particolarmente debole rispetto al fine del 
perseguimento di politiche di maggiore accesso ai protocolli di 
sperimentazione clinica. 
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Il presente studio si propone dunque lo scopo di pervenire a soluzioni di 
contemperamento maggiormente risolutive dal punto di vista sistematico: la 
problematicità interpretativa del rapporto tra regola generale di trasparenza 
e la eccezione di riservatezza commerciale contenute nell’art. 81,4 del 
Regolamento sulle sperimentazioni cliniche, diventa spunto per un più 
profondo esame sul rapporto strutturale tra normative europee di accesso ai 
dossier clinici sottoposti all’Agenzia Europea del Farmaco, e le normative 
poste a tutela della segretezza commerciale, quali la Proposta di direttiva sui 
segreti commerciali in attesa di definitiva approvazione e la regola di data 
exclusivity di cui all’art. 10 della direttiva 2001/83/CE recante un codice 
comunitario sui medicinali ad uso umano.  
Contrariamente alle aspettative, proprio nell’ambito della disciplina della 
proprietà intellettuale farmaceutica sono da rinvenirsi le tracce di un 
paradigma giuridico in grado di soddisfare le esigenze di pubblica 
trasparenza senza intaccare il vantaggio competitivo che le società 
farmaceutiche hanno conseguito mediante gli investimenti in attività di 
ricerca e sviluppo. 
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Introduction 
  
The issue of pharmaceutical’s intellectual property protection tools raises 
traditionally two very broad concerns, regarding their effects on free 
competition mechanisms and on the level of access to medicines generally 
assured.  
These two separate fields are deeply intertwined1, given that the degree of 
the pharmaceutical products available on the market largely depends on the 
legitimate- or illegitimate- uses of the intellectual property protections 
schemes by pharmaceutical companies2. 
More directly speaking, the misuse of the intellectual property safeguards- 
mainly of the patent system-by pharmaceutical companies3, hinders free 
competition mechanisms from ensuring an efficient functioning of the drug 
market in terms of quantity and affordability4.  
The complex economic and legal implications become even more evident 
by considering the two-folded nature of drugs: they are at the same time the 
result of a long5 and expensive6 R&D process worthy of economic reward 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For a general assessment see GHIDINI, Innovation, Competition and Consumer Welfare in Intellectual 
Property Law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2010, 13 ss. and ID., Intellectual property and Competition Law- 
The innovation nexus, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2006, 23 ss., and 99 ss.. 
2 BERGER, Advancing public health by other means: using competition policy, in ROFFE-TANSEY-VIVAS 
EUGUI, Negotiating Health- Intellectual Property and Access to medicines, London, Earthscan, 2006, 181 ss.. 
On the point also GHIDINI, Innovation, Competition and Consumer Welfare in Intellectual Property Law, 
supra, 239 ss.. 
3 One must think for example of secondary patenting, patent related agreements and disputes, 
settlements, litigations, interventions. ADAMINI-MAARSE-VERSLUIS-LIGHT, Policy making on 
Data exclusivity in the European Union: from industrial interests to legal realities, in Journal of Health Politics, 
Policy and Law, 34, 6, 2009, 979 ss., 1003. Cf. also AREZZO, Strategic patentig e diritto della concorrenza: 
riflessioni a margine della vicenda Ratiopharm-Pfizer, in Giurisprudenza commerciale, 2, 2012, 404 ss., and 
ULLRICH, Strategic patenting by the pharmaceutical industry: towards a concept of abusive practices of protection, in 
DREXL-LEE, Pharmaceutical innovation, competition  and patent law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2013, 
241.  
4 See ROSENBERG, Market concentration of the Transnational Pharmaceutical Industry and the Generic 
Industries: trends on Mergers, Acquisitions and other Transactions, in ROFFE-TANSEY-VIVAS EUGUI, 
Negotiating Health- Intellectual Property and Access to medicine, supra, 65 ss.. 
5 The average R&D time is considered to be between ten and fifteen years. See LYBECKER, The 
Economics of Access to Medicines: meeting the challenges of Pharmaceutical Patents, Innovation, and access for Global 
Health, in Harvard International Law Journal Online, 53, 2011, 26 ss., 28.  
6 The effective costs of a R&D in the pharmaceutical industry are highly controversial, as …. states, 
attention must be paid to the distinction which reflects itself also in a cost distinction between 
chemical and biotechnological drugs. See DIMASI-GRABOWSKI, The cost of biopharmaceutical R&D: 
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by means of an appropriate legal defence7 , and a vital good for the 
wellbeing of people, and of society as a whole8. 
Hence, the need to strike a balance between the necessity to promote 
“technological innovation and the dissemination of technology”9, and to 
preserve the “economic and social welfare”10 “to the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of technological knowledge”11.  
However, what art. 7 of the TRIPs Agreement mandates as a “balance of 
rights and obligations”12, turns out to be a serious conflict involving on the 
one side the demand of further incentives13 for pharmaceutical research14, 
which is governed by an increasing degree of risk and uncertainty15, and on 
the other side, short term public health aspirations16.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
is biotech different? 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 2007, 469, 476-477, estimating biotech 
R&D around 1.3 billion USD.  
7 “The research-based pharmaceutical industry tends to be firm in its defence of intellectual property 
rights because they are lifeblood of our industry- we literally could not exist without them”. That is 
the remark of the former Chairman and CEO of Glaxo Wellcome, Sir Richard Sykes, as quoted by 
PUGATCH, The international Political Economy of intellectual property rights, Edward Elgar, 2004, 101. The 
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) has also pointed out 
how the development of pharmaceutical industry crucially relies on intellectual property rights”, and 
that “any small change, positive or negative in the IP rules could dramatically make our 
pharmaceutical companies more or less advantageous in developing new, risky and costly 
technologies”. Ibid.. Cf. also EISENBERG, Patents, product exclusivity and information dissemination: how 
law directs biopharmaceutical research and development, in 2 Fordham L. Rev. 2003-2004, 477ss., 479. 
8 On this point see MATTHEWS, Intellectual property, human rights and development-The role of NGOs and 
Social Movements, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2011, 15 ss.  
9 As literature points out, this is the ratio of the intellectual property protection as a whole. See 
GOREN, Pharmaceutical innovation and intellectual property rights: a global public good?, in PUGATCH, The 
intellectual property debate- Prospectives from Law, Economics and Political Economy, Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar, 2006, 159 ss.. 10 Art. 7 of the TRIPS Agreement: “the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination 
of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a 
manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations”. 
11 Ibid., emphasis added.  
12 Emphasis added.  
13 Incentives have to be shaped with particular attention in the pharma sector where the production 
of a new drug is very difficult and costly, whereas reproduction of an already invented drug is easy 
and relatively cheap. The free riding of competitors has to be faced as  a serious risk, conceived by 
the economic literature as a real market failure that has to be correct by means of legal forms of 
protection of the original investments. Cf. so LYBECKER, The Economics of Access to Medicines: meeting 
the challenges of Pharmaceutical Patents, Innovation, and access for Global Health, supra, 28. Cf. 
GAMBARDELLA-ORSENIGO-PAMMOLLI, Global Competitiveness in Pharmaceuticals- A European 
Perspective, published on November 2000, online available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/docs/comprep_nov2000_en.pdf, 77-78, warning against the risks 
of strengthening the forms of intellectual property rights protections. 
14 See GOREN, Pharmaceutical innovation and intellectual property rights: a global public good?, supra, 162 and 
164. 
15 “It is important to note that even when research and development efforts are successful and a safe 
and effective drug is developed, it may not necessarily profitable, with lifetime sales that exceed 
average R&D costs”, so LYBECKER, The Economics of Access to Medicines: meeting the challenges of 
Pharmaceutical Patents, Innovation, and access for Global Health, supra, 32. See also FACKELMAN, Clinical 
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In fact, the market exclusivity granted by the different forms of intellectual 
property- as we will see, not only by patents- and the control over price that 
it grants to companies17, create time- and cost- barriers delaying- if not 
preventing at all- generic companies to access the market.  
This deters the awaking of “competition by imitation” mechanisms18 , 
capable of sinking prices and of fostering medicine’s varieties19. 
Exploitations of patents20 and of regulatory procedures aimed at excluding 
generic competition21 , lay therefore the grounds to barriers restricting 
patients’ and consumers’ access to needed medical treatments22.  
From this perspective, literature23 has been focusing on the relationship 
between international trade agreement provisions referring to drug’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
data, data exclusivity and private investment protection in Europe, in DREXL-LEE, Pharmaceutical innovation, 
competition and patent law- A trilateral perspective, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2013, 147 and 
EISENBERG, Patents, product exclusivity and information dissemination: how law directs biopharmaceutical 
research and development, supra, 478.  
16 ROFFE-SPENNEMANN-VON BRAUN, From Paris to Doha: the WTO Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, in ROFFE-TANSEY-VIVAS EUGUI, Negotiating Health- Intellectual 
Property and Access to medicine, supra, 9 ss.. 
17 Control over price means also the ability to segment different markets and charge different prices. 
See LYBECKER, The Economics of Access to Medicines: meeting the challenges of Pharmaceutical Patents, 
Innovation, and access for Global Health, supra, 26 ss.. Worth noting is also the so called Ramsey pricing 
strategy, consisting in charging different consumers different prices on the basis of their price 
sensitivity, as explained by DANZON, Making sense of drug prices, 23, REGULATION, 56, 61 (2000), 
online available at 
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2000/4/danzon.pdf. See also 
ROSENBERG, Market concentration of the Transnational Pharmaceutical Industry and the Generic Industries: 
trends on Mergers, Acquisitions and other Transactions, supra, 65 ss.. 
18 FACKELMAN, Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment protection in Europe, supra, 156. 
19 BERGER, Advancing public health by other means: using competition policy, supra, 13.  
20 Cf. European Generic Medicine Association, Patent-related barriers to Market Entry for Generic Medicines 
in the European Union- a review of weakness in the current European patent system and their impact on market access 
of generic medicines, published on May 2008, online available at 
http://www.egagenerics.com/images/Website/IP_Barriers_web_Patent-related_Barriers.pdf. 
21 Cf. DG Competition of the European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry- a preliminary report, 
published on 28th november 2008, online available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/preliminary_report.pdf, 13, states 
that “ in many instances originator companies use two or more instruments from the “tool box” in 
parallel and/or successively in order to prolong the lyfe-cycle of their medicines”. A perfect example 
of the strategic abuse of regulatory procedures for anticompetitive purposes, is given by the 
Astrazeneca v. Commission case, decided on the 6 december 2012 by the European Court of Justice 
C-457/10 P, with particular reference to the second abuse, concerning the filing for a marketing 
authorisation for a drug in tablet formulation, combined with the request of de-registering the market 
authorisation already had for the same drug’s version in capsules. Cf. NEGRINOTTI, Abuse of 
regulatory procedures in the intellectual property context, in GOVAERE-ULLRICH, Intellectual property, Market 
Power and the Public interest, Brussels, Peter Lang, 2008, 143 ss.. 
22 As the DG Competition of the Eu Commission has pointed out, “these tactics significantly 
increase legal uncertainty to the detriment of generic entry and can cost public health budgets and 
ultimately consumers significant amount of money”. DG Competition of the European Commission, 
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry- a preliminary report, supra, 5. 
23 Cf. European Generic Medicines Association, How to increase Patient Access to Generic Medicines in 
European Healthcare systems- A report by the EGA Health Economics Committee, published on June 2009, 
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intellectual property protection, and state’s obligations to accomplish the 
fundamental right to health.  
Policy concerns related to price heights24 have thus led on the one hand to 
compulsory licensing systems and allowance of production or export of 
generic versions of specific pharmaceutical products in developing 
countries25, and on the other hand to the enhancement of antitrust tools 
acting as remedies for “ip imbalances”26. 
Accordingly, national courts have been defining the access to life-saving 
drugs at a reasonable cost as a structural component of the right to health27. 
However, a more accurate consideration of the very nature of the right to 
health, suggests that the effects of intellectual property protection on the 
degree of access to medicines do not only involve price heights.   
 
Indeed, given the fact that 90% of patents granted for the drugs mentioned 
in the list of Essential Drugs have expired28, legal literature has underlined 
how patents and international patent protection obligations are not the 
main obstacle to adequate supply of necessary pharmaceuticals29. 
In addition- and in some cases, alternatively- to patents30, there are other 
layers of pharmaceuticals’ protection that affect, as usual, both drug’s 
availability and affordability.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
online available at http://www.medicamentsgeneriques.info/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/ega_increase-patient-access_update_072009.pdf.  
24 For a general overview of the issue cf. DANZON, Making sense of drug prices, supra, 56 ss.. 
25 Cf. CORREA, Intellectual property rights, the WTO and developing countries: the TRIPS agreement and policy 
options, London, Zed Books, 2000, 88 ss..  
26 FLANAGAN-GHEZZI-MONTAGNANI, The search for EU boundarie: IPR exercise and enforcement as 
misuse, in FLANAGAN-MONTAGNANI, Intellectual property law, Economic and social justice perspectives, 
Edward Elgar, 2010, 140. See also ADAMINI-MAARSE-VERSLUIS-LIGHT, Policy making on Data 
exclusivity in the European Union: from industrial interests to legal realities, supra, 1003. 
27 LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: the human rights case for clinical trials 
transparency, in American Journal of Law & Medicine, 38 (2012), 63 ss., 65-66.  
28 FELLMETH, Secrecy, Monopoly, and access to pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: protection of 
marketing approval data under the TRIPS agreement, in Harvard International Law Journal, 45, 2, 2004, 443 ss., 
445. For a broader analysis cf. LYBECKER, The Economics of Access to Medicines: meeting the challenges of 
Pharmaceutical Patents, Innovation, and access for Global Health, supra, 34 ss.., stating that “since access is 
clearly a problem even in the absence of patents, the results suggest that something beyond patents 
prevent access”: poverty, taxation of pharmaceutical therapies, inefficient government regulatory 
procedures, and counterfeiting have also to be taken into consideration.   
29FELLMETH, Secrecy, Monopoly, and access to pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: protection of 
marketing approval data under the TRIPS agreement, supra, 444. 
30  Cf. CORREA, Protecting Test data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical Products under Free Trade 
Agreements, in ROFFE-TANSEY-VIVAS EUGUI, Negotiating Health- Intellectual Property and Access to 
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However there’s more: in fact, such other forms of protections also lead to 
the relatively unexplored31 matter of the lack of reliable information about 
pharmaceutical products32, to be considered highly relevant from a public 
health perspective.  
In this light, a deeper analysis of the scope of the right to health33 as 
defined by international human rights treatises- such as the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and cultural rights34- suggests the need to 
consider the issue of access to medicines not only from a quantitative, but 
also from a qualitative standpoint. 
In other words, not only access to medicine in the strict sense, but also access 
to information regarding medicines, has to be addressed, if full compliance to 
the right to health wants to be achieved35.  
As some literature has pointed out 36 , adequate access to reliable 
information can be seen as a key point in the debate concerning the 
improvement of access to medicines 37 , given the risks, both for 
industrialised and developing countries, of improper prescription and 
overconsumption of drugs38. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
medicines, supra, 81 ss., stating that exclusive rights over test data “operate, in some cases, like a 
substitute for patent protection thereby removing from public domain products that should be freely 
available”, 95.  
31 SALINAS, Open access to research protocols and results: intellectual property and the right to health, in Global 
Forum Update on research for Health- Equitable access: research challenges for health in developing countries, supra, 
47 ss.. 32 “the global system of protection of intellectual property rights has ended up being a barrier not 
only for access to drugs, but also a barrier for accessing information on the efficacy and safety of 
drugs”. Ibid.. 
33 See infra Conclusions 1.1.  34 Cf. art. 12 of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316,1966. 
35 Cf. SALINAS, Open access to research protocols and results: intellectual property and the right to health, supra, 47 
ss.. 
36 LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: the human rights case for clinical trials 
transparency, supra, 66. 
37 Cfr. FAEH, Giving Information on Medicinal Products to the General Public- In Search of a Definition to 
Safeguard the Patient, in European Journal of Health Law, 21, 2014, 176 ss., 191 ss., stating how “patient 
information is a means for allowing patients to obtain more information about a prescribed product. 
Information enables patients to make informed decisions about using a product”. 38 LEMMENS, Pharmaceutical knowledge governance: a human rights perspective, in Journal of Law, Medicine and 
Ethics, 41, 1, 2013, 163 ss., 164. This risk has been widely underlined by the CJEU in the ruling Case 
C-316/09, MSD Sharp & Dohme v. Merckle, 2011. For a comment of this important judgment see 
SEITZ, No prohibition of Dissemination of information on Prescription-only Medicinal Products on a Manufacturer’s 
Website, in European Journal of Risk Regulation, 2011, 447-449.  
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Shaping the topic  
 
 
It is on these premises that the political and legal debate around the granting 
of access to clinical trials data arises. 
As this study argues, the information embedded in clinical trial protocols 
turns out to be a precious source for the evaluation of drug’s safety and 
efficacy, the awareness of which is thus to be considered essential for 
protecting patients’ and consumers’ health.  
From a pharmaceutical knowledge governance 39  perspective, adequate 
protection of public health and scientific research interests40 can only be 
achieved through the fulfilment of individuals’ and public’s right to be 
informed about pharmaceutical product’s benefits and risks. 
Hence the establishment of appropriate information systems providing 
access to test data is required. 
However, in addition to their informational value, clinical trials data also have 
a second important regulatory value, which is directly related to competition 
concerns41. 
In fact it is on the basis of the outcomes of the clinical trials conducted by 
the sponsor, that the regulatory agency evaluates the release of a marketing 
authorisation. 
From this further point of view, test data result to be of crucial significance 
for competitors aiming to enter the market with a generic product, similar 
to the one already approved42.  
The high commercial value of clinical trials data has caused pharmaceutical 
companies to seek secrecy protection regarding this information, as a means 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39 Ibid., 163 ss..  
40  MCGARITY-WAGNER, Bending Science: How special interests corrupt Public Research, Harvard 
University Press, 2012, 59 ss..  41 Cf. LIETZAN, A new framework for assessing clinical data transparency initiatives, 18 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. 
Rev. 33, 2014, 5-6. 
42 For this perspective, PUGATCH, Intellectual Property, data exclusivity, innovation and market access, 
ICTSD-UNCTAD Dialogue on Ensuring Policy Options for affordable Access to Essential Medicines Bellagio, 12-
16 October 2004, online available at 
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/Pugatch_Bellagio3.pdf. 
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of shielding the competitive advantage deriving from long and costly 
investments43.  
 
As far as the legal framework is concerned, general provisions underlining 
the relevance of the public interests and rights at stake have to be 
confronted with specific measures to be found on the international level by 
intellectual property law in the forms of clinical trials data protection, and 
implemented in various countries through the so called data exclusivity 
regimes44, providing guarantees of exclusivity to clinical testing data used to 
obtain marketing approval45. 
Recent transparency initiatives brought up both at international and 
(supra)national levels, are characterised by substantial legal weakness when 
confronted with the strong exceptions to the general rules of accessibility 
and with the related data protection regimes. 
 
Two are the main legal viewpoints from which the issue of test data’s 
secrecy must be looked at: the first is related to the question of whether 
under international trade agreements, states, and through them 
pharmaceutical companies, face a duty or a prohibition to disclose trial’s 
information; the second, directly stemming from the first one, regards the 
forms and degree of protection that states in virtue of Free Trade Agreements 
and supranational provisions effectively grant to test data.  
This last perspective opens up the door to the discussion about the possible 
legal qualification of such protection, and whether the so called data 
exclusivity regimes can be seen as a peculiar form of intellectual property 
(so called sui generis protection), as the provision under the TRIPS agreement 
would suggest46; as a mere form of commercial investment protection, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Ibid., 9-10.  
44 Cf. infra chapter 2. 
45 FELLMETH, Secrecy, Monopoly, and access to pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: protection of 
marketing approval data under the TRIPS agreement, supra, 445. See also FACKELMAN, Clinical data, data 
exclusivity and private investment protection in Europe, supra, 141 ss.. 
46 BRAUN-PUGATCH, The changing face of pharmaceutical industry and intellectual property rights, in The 
Journal of World Intellectual Property, 8, 5, 2006, 599 ss.. 
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more close to trade secrets47; or finally as a portion of drug authorisation 
law48.  
As this paper will assess, also privacy restraints are raised to support the 
path of secrecy.  
The debate over the forms of control of this particular kind of data turns 
out to be of great practical importance from both a drug policy and 
competition standpoint, and from a fundamental rights protection 
perspective. 
If data exclusivity protection is justified on the basis of the need to secure 
research-based company’s investments and more in general the industry’s 
innovation and productivity rate49, the secrecy regime as it is currently 
shaped and interpreted, turns out to have unbearable social externalities, 
due to the technical and clinical value of the information hidden50.  
As regards to the first aspect, the granting of an exclusivity period over 
which the competent authorities cannot rely on the data submitted for 
application in order to grant other marketing authorisations, can have the 
undesirable effect of excessively delaying competitor’s market entrance51:  
this non-reliance obligation is associated, in fact, with a non-disclosure duty, 
causing generic companies either to duplicate clinical trials, raising serious 
financial and ethical problems52, or to wait until the exclusivity period 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 PUGATCH, Intellectual Property, data exclusivity, innovation and market access, supra, 6: “theoretically, the 
underlying logic of data exclusivity suggests that it is an expression of trade secrets (…)”.  
48 FACKELMAN, Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment protection in Europe, supra, 172 ss.. 
49 PUGATCH, Intellectual Property, data exclusivity, innovation and market access, supra, 3. 
50 LIETZAN, A new framework for assessing clinical data transparency initiatives, supra, passim. 
51 ATTARAN-CARTAGENA, A study of Pharmaceutical Data Exclusivity Laws in Latin America: is Access 
to affordable Medicines threatened?, 2009, 17 Health Law Journal, 269 ss., online available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1620606.  
52 Cf. ANDANDA, Managing intellectual property rights over clinical trial data to promote access and benefit 
sharing in public health, supra, 153-154, mentioning concerns related to the compliance to paragraph 32 
of the Declaration of Helsinki, according to which “the benefits, risks, burdens and effectiveness of a 
new intervention must be tested against those of the best current proven intervention, except in the 
following circumstances: the use of placebo, or no treatment, is acceptable in studies where no 
current proven intervention exists; or where for compelling and scientifically sound methodological 
reasons the use of placebo is necessary to determine the efficacy or safety of an intervention and the 
patient who receive placebo or no treatment will not be subject to any risk of serious or irreversible 
harm. Extreme care must be taken to avoid abuse of this option”. World Medical Association 
Declaration of Helsinki- Ethical principles for Medical Research involving Human beings, current 
version 2013, online available at http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=1760318. 
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expires in order to have access to the information needed to “imitate” the 
original product, with additional time delays53.  
If, as some intellectual property scholars have pointed out54, intellectual 
property rights are not an end in themselves, for their being instruments for 
“preserving and enhancing the system of free enterprise and 
competition”55, several doubts come up as to the pro-competitiveness of 
the data exclusivity provisions as such56.  
Getting to the second point, secrecy causes the amount and trustworthiness 
of the scientific information publicly available to be utterly compromised, in 
a manner that ends up threatening the accomplishment of consumers’ right 
to information as well as patients’ right to health 57. 
If the non-reliance obligation on clinical trials data is economically justified 
because originators are shielded from the free-riding of competitors, the 
non-disclosure requirement 58  has to be better understood and legally 
justified in front of the overriding public interests of stimulating regular 
competition, and assuring individuals’ health and safety.   
Thus, the peculiarities of these data exclusivity regimes raise concerns that 
are slightly different from the ones related to the patent protection 
traditionally enjoyed by pharmaceutical products59: as some literature has 
underlined, the dispute over clinical trials data protection “seems to mark a 
shift from the conventional debates over patent protection and drug 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Ibid., 273. 
54 GHIDINI, Intellectual Property and Competition Law. The innovation nexus, supra, 2 ss.. 
55 Ibid., 12. 
56 ATTARAN-CARTAGENA, A study of Pharmaceutical Data Exclusivity Laws in Latin America: is Access 
to affordable Medicines threatened?, supra, 274. Sharing this perspective, FACKELMANN, Clinical data, 
data exclusivity and private investment protection in Europe, supra, 179 and ANDANDA, Managing intellectual 
property rights over clinical trial data to promote access and benefit sharing in public health, in Journal for intellectual 
property and competition law, 44, 2, 2013, 141 ss..  
57 This point is particularly stressed by LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: 
the human rights case for clinical trials transparency, supra, passim. See also LEMMENS, Pharmaceutical 
knowledge governance: a human rights perspective, supra, passim and LEMMENS- BOUCHARD, Mandatory 
clinical trial registration: rebuilding public trust in medical research, in Global Forum Update on research for Health- 
Equitable access: research challenges for health in developing countries, volume 4, London, Pro-Book Publishing, 
2007, 43.  
58 See Global Intellectual Property Center- U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Heading in a Different 
Direction?- The European Medicines Agency’s Policy on the Public Release of Clinical Trials Data, published on 
the 29th May 2014, online available at http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/EMA-Study-COMPLETE.pdf, 10-11.  
59 On this point CORREA, Protecting Test data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical Products under Free Trade 
Agreements, supra, 81-82. 
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prices”, involving “political and economic interests”, in addition to “safety 
issues that guarantee to make it one of the more interesting as well as heated 
subjects in the IPR field”60. 
Public and private interests collide here in the face of information disclosure 
or concealment. 
 
This study aims to define a legal framework of the clinical trials data, by 
investigating the endurance of international and the European provisions of 
data secrecy in front of growing demands for disclosure.  
Legal disclosure prohibitions will be read in light of competition and public 
health concerns. 
 
In section one the technical dimension of clinical trials data will be assessed 
from a pre-market as well as from a post-market point of view, with regards 
to the two-sided regulatory and clinical nature of test data.  
Firstly, their crucial importance in the R&D process and in the gaining of 
market approval will be justified.  
Secondly their relevance as regards the drug’s safety and efficacy will be 
examined, especially in respect of the problem of the inaccuracy of the data 
published after agency’s approval: biased reporting practices and the 
enormous amount of information hidden by pharmaceutical companies 
emphasise the need of transparency.  
In this light, current registration practices will be explored, with particular 
attention given to the relatively recent EMA controversy.  
 
Shifting to a purely legal perspective, section two will provide an overview 
of the provisions constituting the legal basis for secrecy on the international 
and European level, with respect to trade secret protection; to 
pharmaceutical data protection under art. 39.3 of the TRIPS agreement and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 PUGATCH, The intellectual property debate- Perspectives from Law, Economics and Political Economy, supra, 
126. 
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finally to the data exclusivity regime posed by art. 10 of the Directive 
2001/83/EC.  
Following these lines of reasoning, also privacy concerns emerge as a legal 
barrier to disclosure, given the vast amount of personal data embedded in 
the results of test data.  
 
Abandoning the fields of intellectual property and privacy law, we will 
finally look at other areas of law, such as consumer and human rights law, in 
order to find, if not direct legal grounds for positive disclosure, at least 
some valid interpretational tools.  
These tools are needed firstly for a better understanding of international 
obligations under the TRIPS agreement; secondly for envisaging the 
contrast of the data exclusivity regime as it is presently shaped, in respect of 
ordinary free market and competition goals; finally, for bridging the demand 
to access to clinical trials data and market-transparency necessities.  
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Chapter 1 	  
Clinical trials  data and current reporting practices 
 
1. Nature of clinical trials data 
 
1.1 Regulatory value of clinical trials data  
 
Clinical trials data, also known as drug marketing approval data, document 
the safety and efficacy features of the drugs aiming to enter the market.  
They are thus the crucial tool for gaining the marketing authorisation 
needed to distribute the new pharmaceutical product as a consumer good.  
Within the EU, and specifically for high technology medicinal products61, 
this authorisation is provided by the European Medicines Agency 
established as a Community institution by regulation (EC) 726/2004 of 31 
March 2004, defining Community procedures for the authorisation and 
supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use62. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61 Cf. FACKELMAN, Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment protection in Europe, supra, 149 ss.. 
As regards to drugs that do not fall in the category of high technology medicinal products, the 
alternative between a EU wide marketing authorisation in virtue of the decentralised procedure, also 
known as mutual recognition procedure, laid down by Directive 2001/83, and a national marketing 
authorisation procedure, is given. However it must be noted how it is no longer possible to file 
parallel applications in different Member States regarding the same pharmaceutical product. The 
purpose of this is the achievement of uniform marketing authorisation requirements throughout the 
European Union. See also LORENZ, Das gemeinschaftliche Arzneimittelzulassungsrecht, Baden-Baden, 
Nomos, 2006, 187 ss.. 
62 Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 
Laying Down Community Procedures for the Authorisation and Supervision of Medicinal Products 
for Human and Veterinary Use and Establishing a European Medicines Agency, 2004 OFFICIAL J. 
EUR. UNION L 136/1, L 136/22-23 (2004), online available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-1/reg_2004 726 cons/reg 2004 726_consen.pdf. 
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In accordance to this regulation the centralised procedure is compulsory, 
stimulating the building of a common market for pharmaceuticals63, in 
compliance to art. 114 TFEU, and at the same time assuring a uniform 
degree of scientific evaluation of medicines in the European area64.  
This should result in patients and healthcare providers having a 
homogeneous level of confidence in the safety and efficacy of drugs 
marketed in all EU member states65.  
Authorisation is granted by the regulatory authority in accordance with the 
requirements defined by the Medicinal Product Directive 2001/83/EC, 
establishing in chapter 3 the “procedures relevant to the marketing 
authorisation”66.  
The same Directives also specifies the degree and the type of scientific and 
administrative information that the license application must include67.  
Moreover, observance must be given to the manufacturing and facility 
safety standards68 , expressed by the good manufacture practices, providing 
“quality assurance which ensures that product are consistently produced 
and controlled to the quality standards appropriate to their intended use”69. 
With specific regards to clinical trials, the standards needed to be 
accomplished have been recently reformed by the new Clinical Trials 
Regulation n. 536 entered into force on June 201470.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 This issue is examined by LORENZ, Das gemeinschaftliche Arzneimittelzulassungsrecht, Baden-Baden, 
Nomos, 2006, 33 ss.. Cf. also FACKELMAN, Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment production 
in Europe, supra, 152. 
64 SPALCKE, Arzeneinmittelungsverfahren in der Europäischen Union und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika: 
Entwicklung und Harmonisierung, Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 2004, 112. 
65 FACKELMANN, Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment production in Europe, supra, 152. 
66 Parliament and Council Directive 2001/83/EC of 6 November 2001 on the Community Code 
relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use, online available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-
1/dir_2001_83_consol_2012/dir_2001_83_cons_2012_en.pdf. 
67 Ibid., annex 1.  
68 FELLMETH, Secrecy, Monopoly and Access to Pharmaceuticals, supra, 445. 
69 Cf. European Medicines Agency, Good manufacturing practice and good distribution practice compliance, 
online available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/regulation/document_listing/document_listi
ng_000154.jsp. 
70 In virtue of the importance of clinical accuracy of trial-procedures and of the information deriving 
from it, in 2012 the Commission has published a proposal for a specific regulation on clinical trials 
on medicinal products, Cf. European Commission, Medicinal Products for Human Use- Cinical Trials, 
online available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/clinicaltrials/2012_07/proposal/2012_07_proposal_en.pdf, and 
European Commission, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the council on 
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The need of a regulation has been perceived for a long time, due to the 
poor effectiveness 71  of the “improvements in the safety and ethical 
soundness of clinical trials”72 declared by the former Clinical Trials directive 
2001/20/EC73. 
The regulation provides identical rules for conducting clinical trials 
throughout the European Union. This uniformity assures, in return, an even 
ground for the regulatory agency in assessing applications74. 
Before the regulation becomes effective- no earlier than 26th May 201675- all 
clinical trials conducted in the European Union have to be carried out in 
accordance to the mentioned Clinical Trials Directive, to the Good Clinical 
Practice Directive 2005/28/EC, and the Directive 2003/94/EC providing 
guidelines of good manufacturing practice in respect of medicinal products 
for human use and investigational medicinal products for human use76.  
However, as regards the good manufacture practices, the Commission calls 
upon the adoption of  “a new delegated regulation (…) to set the GMP 
rules for Investigational Medicinal Products”, that “will apply to all clinical 
trials authorised on the basis of the Clinical Trials Regulation”77. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
clinical trials on medicinal products for human use and repealing Directive 2001/20/EC, online 
available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/clinicaltrials/2012_07/proposal/2012_07_proposal_en.pdf. The 
compromise text of the Clinical Trials Regulation ha resulted in Regulation EU 536/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the council of 16 April 2014 on clinical trials on medicinal products for 
human use and repealing Directive 2001/20/EC, online available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R0536. 
71 “The clinical trials directive is arguably the most heavily criticised piece of legislation in the area of 
pharmaceuticals”. European Commission, Medicinal Products for Human Use- Cinical Trials, supra, 2. 
72 Ibid.. 
73 Directive 2001/20/EC of the European Parliament and Commission, of 4 april 2001 on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to 
the implementation of good clinical practice in the conduct of clinical trials on medicinal products for 
human use, online available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:121:0034:0044:en:PDF. 
74  Cf. European Commission, Clinical Trials, General Information, online available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/human-use/clinical-trials/information/index_en.htm#ct2. 
75 Ibid.. 
76 Ibid.. 
77 Ibid.. 
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1.2 Informational value of test data  
 
In order to meet these requirements, and thus before qualifying for regular 
application, pharmaceutical companies have to undergo laborious and time-
consuming test procedures78, at the end of which a document79 is laid 
down collecting all, or better said, nearly all, pre-clinical and clinical studies, 
together with relevant experts reviews80.  
Additional clinical data shall be given in case of extension of a marketing 
approval to other medical indications, or to other dosage forms of the same 
active substance81: in these cases test procedures must be repeated. 
The final report serves as proof of the safety and efficacy of the new 
pharmaceutical product.   
However, compliance with the formal standards, needed to get 
authorisation, is not itself provide a full proof of pharmaceuticals’ effective 
safety.  
Indeed, after the granting of market authorisation, publicly available 
information about the safety of the so approved medicines82 is only a small 
top of the iceberg83, due to widespread selective-reporting practices84, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Cf. FACKELMANN, Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment production in Europe, supra, 144 
ss., who explains how these test procedures usually are divided into three compulsory phases, that 
can be followed by a fourth one following the marketing authorisation. As far as the first three steps 
are concerned, the first one implies the testing of a new discovered active substance on humans for 
the first time; in the second one aims to test the effects in respect of the specific indications for 
which the tested drug would be prescribed, in order to provide “proof of efficacy, compatibility 
testing and risk assessment in case of longer treatment durations”; finally, the third phase aims to 
define the drug’s (side-)effects using a great number of volunteers. Cf. also PUGATCH, Intellectual 
property and pharmaceutical data exclusivity in the context of innovation and market access, supra, 1. 
79 Cf. art 5 of Clinical Trials Regulation n.536/2014, supra: “in order to obtain authorisation, the 
sponsor shall submit an application dossier (…)”. Cf. artt 25 ss. of the same Regulation. 
80 Cf. BANZI-BERTELE’-GARATTINI, Drug data access: The new EMA policy, in Giornale italiano di 
Farmacoeconomia e Farmacoutilizzazione, 2014, 6, 5 ss., 8.   
81 Ibid.. 
82 On the wider issue of the very little safety knowledge about drugs approved mainly for the 
marketing in developed countries cf. Report of the WHO Commission on Intellectual Property, 
Innovation and Public Health, Public health, innovation and intellectual property rights, Geneva, WHO Press, 
2006, 154 ss.. 
83  Cf. CHAN-HRÓBJARTSSON-HAAHR-GØTZSCHE-ALTMAN, Empirical evidence for selective 
reporting of outcomes in randomised trials: comparison of protocols to published articles, JAMA, 2004, 291, 2457 ss.. 84 Cf. DHIR, Corporate selective reporting of clinical drug trial results as a violation of the right to health, in 
RIOUX et al., Critical Perspectives on Human Rights and Disability Law, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2011, 341 ss.. 
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the phenomenon of publication biases85, through which the benefits of a 
certain product are amplified, and conversely the side effects minimised86.  
Thus, the information provided by scientific research through published 
articles turns out to be qualitative and quantitatively different from the data 
entrenched in the dossier handed to the regulatory authority87.  
Due to this kind of informational distortions, also the line between what 
can be considered scientific information, and latent advertisement appears 
to be blurred88.  
However, the problem of selective reporting may be also found at a pre-
market stage, affecting the final report as well89, given that the clinical 
testing is carried out by trial sponsors (mainly pharmaceutical companies) 
who have an interest in the marketing success of the product at stake. 
This risk has not only been signalled by NGO’s such as the Consumer 
Project on Technology90 , and by some scholars91 , but has also been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85 GØTZSCHE-JORGENSEN, Getting access to unpublished clinical trials at the European Medicines Agency, 
BMJ, 2011, 342. 
86 The issue is also discussed by REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in international 
intellectual property law: The case for a public goods approach, 13 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW REVIEW 1 (2009). 
87 LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: the human rights case for clinical trials 
transparency, supra, 96. HILL, Access to Information and Medicines Regulation in New Zeland, 45 Victoria U. 
Wellington L. Rev. 549 2014, 554 ss.. 
88 On this point cf. JEFFERSON et al., EMA’s data sharing policy-Toward peeping tom based medicine?, 
published on 22nd May 2014, online available at http://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2014/05/22/tom-
jefferson-et-al-emas-data-sharing-policy-towards-peeping-tom-based-medicine/. Cf. also LYNDON, 
Secrecy and access in an innovation intensive economy: reordering information privileges in an environmental health, and 
safety law, 2007, 78 University of Colorado Law Review, 465 ss., 520, stating that “the only type of 
information that firms generally want to distribute is advertisement or its equivalent, positive 
descriptions of their activities”.   
89 The “incentive to cheat” is very high also, and maybe above all, at a pre-market stage. Cf. 
GØTZSCHE, Why we need easy access to all data from all clinical trials and how to accomplish it, published 
online the 23rd November 2011, available at http://www.trialsjournal.com/content/pdf/1745-6215-
12-249.pdf. FAEH, Giving Information on Medicinal Products to the General Public- In Search of a Definition to 
Safeguard the Patient, supra, 180, underlines the difficulty of establishing whether a message is of 
promotional nature or, as expressed in the Directive 2001/83/EC, “designed to promote”: the 
Author cites the CJEU ruling MSD Sharp & Dohme v. Merckle, supra, where the Court has accepted a 
broad definition of advertisement, including “any form” of promotion “in light of the serious 
consequences for health which maya rise from improper use or overconsumption” of medicinal 
products. Par. 30-31- 32.  90 Cf. SANJUAN, Us and Eu Protection of pharmaceutical Test data, Consumer Project on Technology, 
(CPTech) discussion paper no. 1., Washington, D.C., published on 12th April 2006, online available 
at CPTech. www.cptech.org/publications/CPTechDPNo1TestData.pdf. 
91 Cf. DHIR, Corporate selective reporting of clinical drug trial results as a violation of the right to health, supra, 
349, underlining the “fact that corporations fail to disclose the totality of sudies conducted with 
respect to particular drugs- and the resulting risk implications, before a drug goes to market”.  
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practically shown by two notorious cases92, in which the concrete and 
devastating consequences of biased and unreliable reporting also in the 
application dossier, were at once clear. 
The first case involved the pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline 
(GSK) and the use of its antidepressant Paxil for the treatment of paediatric 
depressions.  
Among the reasons of the prosecution carried out in 2004 by the Attorney 
General of New York, publications to promote off label prescriptions, 
selective reporting of positive trial data and hiding of negative data at a pre-
market stage were to be found93.  
Another controversy regarded the pain relief medication Vioxx94, which 
had caused a vast amount of myocardial infractions and cardiac deaths95. 
Also in this situation the lack of the reporting of complete test data, as well 
as the use of ghost-writing in scientific publications96, turned out to be of 
calamitous relevance.  
The withdrawal of the Vioxx medicine from the market97 proves that if at 
the time of the filing for market authorisation, the FDA had had a more 
accurate report about clinical trials results, the drug would have been very 
unlikely to reach the market, avoiding significant money and life losses98. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Cf. LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: the human rights case for clinical 
trials transparency, supra, 69.  
93 See New York v. GlaxoSmithKline, N 04-CV-5304 MGC, 2004 WL 1932763 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 
2004), commented by  JUREIDINI-MCHENRY-MANSFIELD, Clinical Trials and Drug promotion: 
Selective reporting of study, 329, 20, INT’L L RISK & SAFETY MED. 73, 2008.  94 Cf. LAW, Big pharma- exposing the global healthcare agenda, New York, Carroll & Graf Pub, 2006, 126;  
LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: the human rights case for clinical trials 
transparency, supra, 69.	   
95 It is has been proofed that the drug has caused more than 100.000 deaths due to infarctus or 
stroke. Ibid., 95. 
96  The problem of ghost-writing in medical research, involving articles to be written by 
unkaknowledged authors, and through industry’s financial support. Cf. ROSS et al., Guest Authorship 
and Ghostwriting in publications related to Rofecoxib, A case study from industry documents from Rofecoxib 
Litigation, JAMA, 2008, 299, 1800 ss.. 
97 Cf. FDA Public Health advisory: Safety of Vioxx, published on the 30th september 2004, online 
available at 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders
/ucm106274.htm, announcing the “withdrawal of Vioxx from the US market due to safety 
concerns”. 98  This is expressed very well in the words of Dr. David Graham of the FDA in relation to hte 
Vioxx catastrophe: “(we) are faced with what may be the single greatest drug safety catastrophe in the 
history of this country or the history of the world. We are talking about a catastrophe that . . . should 
have been largely or completely avoided”, as reported by CAHOY, Medical Product Information Incentives 
and the Transparency Paradox, 2007, 82, Indiana Law Journal, 50, 623. Cf. also HORTON, Vioxx, the 
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The two above mentioned cases have gained a particular notoriety for their 
serious public health implications, caused by the hiding of vital information 
about otherwise unknown side effects, leading in the first case to serious 
risks for children, in the second to hundreds of thousands of premature 
deaths99. 
Also within the European Union, voluntary failures to report safety data100 
have caused an impressive number of pharmaceuticals to be withdrawn 
from the market, with the retreatment of the marketing authorisation 
explained by safety reasons101.  
Scientific research has shown how the decision over a market withdrawal is 
mainly based on post-market information, such as case control studies 
carried out in order to identify new safety evidences and unexpected drug 
interactions102.  
This is related to the fact that some adverse drugs reactions emerge only 
after consumption by a larger population and with interactions with other 
drugs. 
However, these adverse reporting studies constitute only the embryo of a 
pharmacovigilance system, that necessarily needs to be improved, if not 
newly implemented at all, as far as the methodologies and the object of the 
drug monitoring practices themselves are concerned. 
In fact, with regards to the first issue, at present, pharmacovigilance studies 
are nearly entirely based on spontaneous research initiatives103, raising the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
implosion of Merck and Aftershocks at the FDA, published online on 5th November 2004, available at 
http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(04)17523-5.pdf.  
99 LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: the human rights case for clinical trials 
transparency, supra, 69. Many other cases have however been reported by literature. On the point see 
also GØTZSCHE-JORGENSEN, Getting access to unpublished clinical trials at the European Medicines 
Agency, supra, 18, recalling the cases concerning the anti-arthritis drug, rofecoxib, in respect of which 
the drug company Merck had missed to report cases of myocardial infractions and deaths, leading to 
the death of thousand patients, and the Pfizer’s drug celecoxib, the publications on which resulted 
dramatically misleading compared to the trial protocols. 
100 For a list of controversial pharmaceutical product, see GØTZSCHE-JORGENSEN, Getting access 
to unpublished clinical trials at the European Medicines Agency, supra, passim. 
101 On the issue MCNAUGHTON-HUET-SHAKIR, An investigation into drugs products withdrawn from 
the EU market between 2001 and 2011 for safety reasons and the evidence used to support the decision making, in 
BMJ Open, 2014, online available at http://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/4/1/e004221.full.pdf+html. 
Between 2001 and 2011 ninteen drugs were withdrawn for pharmacovigilance reasons.  
102 Ibid., 2. 
103 Ibid., 4. Cf. also LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: the human rights case 
for clinical trials transparency, supra, 67.  
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question of the completeness and efficiency of such an “independent” 
scrutiny.  
Secondly, and most importantly, the speed and the consistency of those 
monitoring studies are substantially dimmed if no access to the genetic 
features of a drug- that is to say the scientific information embedded in 
trials data- is to be found104. 
In fact, as scientists have demonstrated, the chemical and biological 
peculiarities found in early clinical testing phases could be used to reliably 
predict adverse drug’s reaction105, being, as some studies show, a leading 
cause of death in hospitalised patients106. 
 
The above given scenario, raises two main legal issues. 
On the one side there is the problem of assuring accuracy and completeness 
of test data handed to the regulatory agency107, essential condition of every 
pre-market assessment. 
Direct responses to this matter are provided by the new Clinical Trials Data 
regulation, enhancing safety standards by imposing uniform European 
criteria on the conducting of clinical trials and by requiring a certain level of 
detail of the test data resulting from the trials. 
Also the approval of the invoked Good marketing Practice regulation, 
aimed at substituting the less stringent already existing directive, will be 
offering further relevant insights on this perspective.  
This topic is therefore worthy of a future analysis, at a time when also this 
other new regulation will have come into force. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 On this point GØTZSCHE-JORGENSEN, Getting access to unpublished clinical trials at the European 
Medicines Agency, supra, 5. 
105 LIU et al., Large scale predicition of adverse drug reactions using chemicha, biological and phenotypic properties of 
drugs, in Journal of The American Medical Informatics Association, 2012, 28. Cf. also DUKES, Drug regulation 
and the tradition of secrecy, in International Journal of Risk & Safety in Medicine, 9, 1996, 147. See also 
GØTZSCHE-JORGENSEN, Getting access to unpublished clinical trials at the European Medicines Agency, 
supra, 5, stating that “monitoring adverse effects reported by doctors to drug regulatory agencies 
would not have revealed that Vioxx causes heart attacks”, and underlining how “less than 10% of 
such (adverse) events are ever reported (…)”. 
106 LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: the human rights case for clinical trials 
transparency, supra, 94. 
107 Cf. LIETZAN, A new framework for assessing clinical data transparency initiatives, supra, 19, underlining 
the need for a “requirement to report to the national regulatory authority the result of every trial 
relevant to safety and effectiveness of the drug (…)”. 
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Strictly related to the former issue, but still sufficiently independent from it 
for an autonomous account, is the issue of the access to clinical trials as a 
fundamental tool for an effective pharmacovigilance system108 , able to 
prevent public health tragedies as the above listed ones.  
However, the route toward this end goal is not that easy. 
In fact, as some literature has noticed109, the implementation of compulsory 
and publicly accessible reporting systems suggested by public health 
interests, could themselves embed the risk of decreasing information 
handed out to the regulatory agency for approval, due to the certainty that it 
will later enter the public domain. This phenomenon has been called the 
“information paradox”110.  
This risk could however be adequately shielded by the new Clinical trials 
Regulation through the definition of specific quality and quantity 
requirements that have to be observed by marketing approval data in order 
to become legally suitable for authority’s evaluation.  
Moreover, once the practical importance of access to clinical trials data is 
stated, the transparency demands raise complex legal issues, regarding the 
difficulty in defining the legal foundation for the duty to provide access to 
information about therapeutic products111.  
More structured information exchanges 112  about drugs’ safety would 
increase the protection of the fundamental right to health113 as defined by 
international human right treatises and in the European Convention on 
Human Rights, and provide compliance to the right to information seen as 
an essential condition for a more conscious consumer decision-making114. 
However, pharmaceutical companies have been shifting the discussion 
towards other fields of the law- namely the fields of intellectual property 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Cf. European Commission-Public Health, The Eu Pharmacovigilance system, online available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/human-use/pharmacovigilance/index_en.htm. 
109 CAHOY, Medical Product Information Incentives and the Transparency Paradox, supra, 643. 
110 Ibid.. 
111 LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: the human rights case for clinical trials 
transparency, supra, 67. 112 Cf. ABBOTT, Big data and pharmacovigilance, using health exchanges to revolutionise drug safety, 2013, 99 
Iowa L. Rev., 225. 
113 LEMMENS, Pharmaceutical Knowledge Governance: A Human Rights perspective, supra, passim.  
114 See infra Conclusions 1.1.  
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and of personal data protection- providing strong legal justifications to the 
policy of denying disclosure of trial registration. 
In fact, the creation of publicly accessible clinical trials registry has been 
professed as contrary to normal business practices, given the great 
commercial value of the data set up through test procedures. 
Before entering the highly controversial field of the forms of protection 
directly granted by international and European legislation to test data, it is 
first necessary to define the strategic significance of this kind of data from 
an economic point of view, and the degree of development of current 
reporting practices. 
 
1.3 Economic value of clinical trials data 
 
The selective reporting practices above mentioned are to be explained in 
light of economical rationales.  
Test data is in fact a precious good for pharmaceutical companies, which 
spend vast sums of money on these trials.  
Therefore, subjection to a sort of moral hazard, lying in the incentive to 
“paint the end results in the rosiest possible light”115, is very likely to be 
found. 
Test procedures are costly first of all from a time perspective, as they carry 
on for more than ten years116, reaching in some cases the maximum length 
of twenty years117.  
Among the explanations for the increase in clinical studies’ duration, there 
are also the more extensive normative requirements for the proof of drug 
safety and efficacy118.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in international intellectual property law: The case for a 
public goods approach, supra, 4.  
116 PUGATCH, Intellectual property and pharmaceutical data exclusivity in the context of innovation and market 
access, supra, 9, citing the study carried out by Di Masi, Hansen and Grabowski in 2003.  
117 FACKELMANN, Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment production in Europe, supra, 148. 
118 Cf. supra par. 1  
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However, other factors119 seem to play an important role, and in particular 
the more complex structure of medicinal products, the higher number of 
volunteers needed and the increasing number of so called orphan drugs for 
rare chronic diseases120, which require longer study durations.   
Length difficulties and scientific uncertainties account for these high 
costs121, referring to the fact that only a very small part of the active 
substances that undergo clinical trials manages to reach the market stage122.  
This means that the costs of such failures must be recouped with those very 
few medicinal products that make it: in order to get the effective cost of the 
clinical trials of a certain drug, the costs of the vain tests must be also 
counted, easily reaching the one billion dollars123.  
From an economic standpoint, trials failures mean fruitless R&D 
expenditures, and the risk of losing market share to competitors124.  
Despite the lack of certain estimation of the effective costs of 
pharmaceutical R&D, it is evident that developing a new drug requires vast 
financial resources, causing test data to be a highly valuable commercial 
asset for research-based companies.  
It is thus undeniable that the possession of trials data becomes a strategic 
tool in the competition game, being key to the exclusion or delay to generic 
companies’ access to the market.  
Indeed, as argued above, originators have to face long and costly test 
procedures carried out in order to produce the right amount of information 
required by normative approval-standards.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 FACKELMANN, Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment production in Europe, supra, 149. 
120  Cf. BAGLEY, Patent  term restoration and non-patent exclusivity in the US, in DREXL-LEE, 
Pharmaceutical Innovation Competition and Patent Law- A trilateral Perspective, supra, 128 ss..  
121 “It is important to note that the innnovator assumes the entire risk for the generation of the data”. 
Cf. International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations, Encouragement of new 
clinical drug development: the role of data exclusivity, online available at 
http://www.ifpma.org/fileadmin/content/Publication/IFPMA_2011_Data_Exclusivity__En_Web.
pdf, 5. 
122 FACKELMANN, Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment production in Europe, supra, 147, 
reporting that between 5000 and 10000 substances that are tested, only one obtains marketing 
authorisation. 
123 REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in international intellectual property law: The case for a 
public goods approach, supra, 4.  
124 FACKELMAN, Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment production in Europe, supra, 148. 
	   32	  
The costs associated with trials constitute a substantial obstacle for generic 
companies that are financially too weak to reproduce this kind of tests125.  
In addition to the financial problems of test duplication, literature126 
has been stressing ethical concerns associated with repeating already 
existing trials127. 
Given the commercial value of the information collected through 
testing, research-based companies have been successfully lobbying for 
secrecy protection of this data 128 , presented as the only way to 
prevent competitors’ free riding.  
Indeed, generic companies, once entered into possession of trials 
data, could easily file for marketing approval on the basis of the mere 
bioequivalence test129, given the absence of any legal requirement to 
reproduce such data for obtaining market approval130.  
Economic inefficiencies, related to the decrease of incentives for 
innovators to conduct the necessary trials131, and directly stemming 
from what some scholars have defined as “parasitism”132, must not be 
underestimated. 
The strategic importance of the data at stake, and the consequential 
rising pressure for specific legal protection for it, is also referable to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125 SAN JUAN, U.S and E.U Protection of Pharmaceutical Test Data, CPTech Discussion Paper N. 1, 
published on 12th April 2006, online available at 
http://www.cptech.org/publications/CPTechDPNo1TestData.pdf. 
126 Cf. CARVALHO, The TRIPS regime of Patent Rights, Wolters Kluwer, 2010, 605. 
127Stressing this point also also European Generic Medicines Association, Industrial Policy: making 
Europe a hub for manufacturing of generic and biosimilar medicines, published on 11th January 2013, online 
available at 
http://www.apmgr.org/docs/EGA_INDUSTRIAL_POLICY_PAPER_11_Jan_2013_FINAL_01.p
df,8. 
128 REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in international intellectual property law: The case for a 
public goods approach, supra, 4. 
129 FELLMETH, Secrecy, Monopoly, and access to pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: protection of 
marketing approval data under the TRIPS agreement, supra, 457. 
130  COTTIER-MEITINGER-MEITINGER, The protection of Test Data submitted to Governmental 
Authorities: The impact of the TRIPs Agreement on EC law, in WERNER-STEIN, Marketing Authorisation 
for Pharmaceutical Products and the Protection of Submitted Data, Baden Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
2000, 53. 
131 International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations, Encouragement of new 
clinical drug development: the role of data exclusivity, supra, 5. 
132 CARVALHO, The TRIPS regime of Patent Rights, supra, 603. stating that “protection of test data is a 
social mechanism that shields originators against parasitism, which is not only socially reproachable 
but also leads to economic inefficiency”.  
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the growing weakness of the patent system as a means to 
strengthening market control.  
Other layers of protection are therefore sought, regarding something 
different from the newly invented product, but concerning 
information about the product itself, or better said, about the properties 
of the medicinal product133.   
This trend is to be justified by two lines of argument, one being the 
innovative productivity challenges the pharmaceutical industry has to 
face at present; the other directly related to the patent system’s 
distortions, and more specifically to the numerous patent disputes 
between originators and generic based companies134.  
Indeed, granting patent protection for new products in the 
pharmaceutical environment is getting harder, due to the difficulty of 
coming up with products that can be considered really innovative135 
and thus patentable136.  
Hence the proliferation of the so-called me-too drugs137 , obtained 
through small changes of the molecular composition of already existing 
drugs, which companies seek to patent. 
In second instance, in recent years many generic companies have 
undergone an economic enforcement138 thanks to the development of 
successful strategic patent retaliation 139 , and the connected 
phenomenon of authorised generics140.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Ibid., 605. 
134 PUGATCH, Intellectual property and pharmaceutical data exclusivity in the context of innovation and market 
access, supra, 9 ss..  
135Ibid., 10, noticing that “during the late 1990s and early 2000s we experienced a decline in the 
number of new drugs approved for market use- from 53 new molecular entities during 1996 to a level 
of about 20 new molecular entities in 2000”.  
136 Also the statistics of the European Patent Office show a substantial decrease even in the number 
of pharmaceutical patent applications. Cf. European Patent Office, European Pharmaceutical Patent 
applications, online available at http://www.epo.org/about-us/annual-reports-statistics/annual-
report/2014/statistics/patent-applications.html?tab=3. 
137 Cf. BRAUN-PUGATCH, The changing face of pharmaceutical industry and intellectual property rights, supra, 
606.  
138 For an economic perspective, cf. LYBECKER, The Economics of Access to Medicines: meeting the 
challenges of Pharmaceutical Patents, Innovation, and access for Global Health, supra, 29 ss.. 
139 The advantages of adopting a patent sipute strategy is better understandable in light of the 
American provisions granting a 180 days market exclusivity period for generic companies challenging 
the validity of the original patent of a drug, in the course of submitting an abbreviated new drug 
application.  Cf. Section 505 of the Federal Drug and Cosmetic Act grants. See PUGATCH,  
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Finally, the issue of the so-called patent-cliff141 has to be acknowledged, 
related to the expiry of most of the best selling drugs142.  
It is undeniable how this peculiar economic environment143 leads to an 
acknowledged growing ineffectiveness of the patents in securing a 
predictable and stable revenue stream for research based companies144.  
Indeed, pharmaceutical companies have argued how, compared to the long 
periods of trial and market approval, the twenty-years duration of patent 
protection result to be insufficient145.  
This leads in return to a shift of the focus of legal protection from final 
inventions towards other strategic assets relevant to the R&D race.  
As shown above, test procedures are the greatest investment-consuming 
part in the course of a drug development 146 . The trials information 
collected is the direct result of this investment.  
Given the informational nature of clinical trials, the tool that pharmaceutical 
companies have sought- especially in international trade agreements 
negotiations- in order to protect this investment as such, has been data’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Intellectual property and pharmaceutical data exclusivity in the context of innovation and market access, supra, 11. It 
is interesting to notice that Europe doesn’t have such a provision.  
140 The authorised generic strategy consists in the granting of a license given by the originator to the 
generic company in order to produce a generic substitute to the original drug. Cf. PUGATCH, 
Intellectual property and pharmaceutical data exclusivity in the context of innovation and market access, supra, 11.   141 As Joseph Jimenez, CEO of Novartis has pointed out, “patent cliffs are one of the biggest issues 
facing our industry. To put this in perspective, IMS Health, a health care information provider, 
predicts that by 2016 patent expirations will have caused a loss of $106 billion in sales from branded 
drugs over the previous five years, with the heaviest burden in 2012 and 2013”. JIMENEZ, The CEO 
of Novartis on growing after a patent cliff, published on December 2012 on Harward Business Review, 
online available at https://hbr.org/2012/12/the-ceo-of-novartis-on-growing-after-a-patent-cliff. 
142 LYBECKER, The Economics of Access to Medicines: meeting the challenges of Pharmaceutical Patents, 
Innovation, and access for Global Health, supra, 31. 
143 However, literature has been underlining also the opposite trend of the escalation of fruitful 
patent strategies, the ever growing exploitation of supplementary protection certificates, and the 
increase in innovative output being achieved by the biotechnology industry. See BRAUN-
PUGATCH, The changing face of pharmaceutical industry and intellectual property rights, in The Journal of World 
Intellectual Property, supra, 606. 
144 Ibid., passim. 
145 COTTIER, The protection of Test Data submitted to Governmental Authorities: The impact of the TRIPs 
Agreement on EC law, supra, 55. 
146 According to the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufactorers and Associations 
(IFPMA), the costs involved in producing test data amounts to seventy per cent of the total cost of 
deveolping of a new drug. See International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and 
Associations, Encouragement of new clinical drug development: the role of data exclusivity, supra, 6.  
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secrecy, perceived as imperative because of the commercial sensitiveness of 
the data itself147. 
Secrecy has therefore been presented as the best way for capturing 
competitive advantages stemming from the intangible asset at stake148.  
 
2. Current registration and reporting practices 
 
Despite the unquestionable commercial value of test data, functioning as an 
economic basis for the demand of protection against parasitism and free-
riding, it is the same economic standpoint that fuels the opposite need of 
clinical trials information transparency systems.  
Indeed, as some scholars have pointed out, the tragic public health 
outcomes of selective reporting practices related to the hiding of already 
known side effects, result in detrimental financial consequences for 
pharmaceutical corporations themselves, due to the enormous loss of value 
that companies causing such scandals undergo149. 
Moreover, informational failures can lead to enormous waste of health care 
funds150. 
 Approaching the legal wrinkles of the issue, the “overriding public (health) 
interest”151 has been called upon, ever increasingly over the last years, both 
on the international and supranational level, in order to push states in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  147 “Mandatory public disclosure of intellectual property, confidential commercial information, and 
proprietaty scientific methods found in clinical trials could stifle discovery, and open the possibility of 
competitors or unscrupulous actors using the information for their own products in other markets or 
countries. Without appropriate protection for intellectual property to incentivize the enormous 
investment risk involved, biopharmaceutical companies will be discouraged from investing in the next 
generation of new medicines, leading to patients and physicians being deprived of innovative 
therapies to tackle the serious and life threatening diseases of the 21st century.” That is the position 
of president and chief executive officer, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
(PhRMA), CASTELLANI, Are clinical trials data sufficiently shared today? Yes, published on 9 July 2013, 
online available at http://www.bmj.com/content/347/bmj.f1881. 
148 Cf. CARVALHO, The TRIPS regime of Patent Rights, supra, 603. 
149 As far as the Vioxx case is concerned, after Merck had to admit the hiding of relevant information, 
the company had to face a decrease of its value amounting about 30 billion dollars. DHIR, Corporate 
selective reporting of clinical drug trial results as a violation of the right to health, supra, 352.  
150 Cf. Health Action International, Protecting citizen’s health: Transparency of clinical trial data on medicines in 
the Eu- Policy Paper, published on October 2012, online available at http://haieurope.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/HAI_Protecting-citizenshealth-transparency-of-clinical-trial-data-on-
medicines-in-the-EU.pdf. 
151 Art. 39.3 TRIPS agreement, cf. infra chapter 2. 
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opposite direction of disclosure, through controlled sharing of the scientific 
test data152. 
If on one hand hiding the trials results is seen as a unique way to shield high 
research and development costs from competitors, on the other hand, the 
public and consumers demand information 153 , in an increasingly 
commercialised research environment where obscuring practices seems to 
be corroding the integrity of the foundations of evidence based health 
care154. 
Especially after the two above-mentioned catastrophes, various relevant 
initiatives have been brought forward, in order to enhance access to 
information about the safety and effectiveness of drugs155, and thus to 
advance the accountability of general scientific knowledge of approved 
pharmaceutical products156. 
From a strictly legal perspective, however, these actions appear to be 
vulnerable in the face of specific provisions of international trade 
agreements157, continuously invoked by the International Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations as a direct impediment to 
the promotion of access to clinical trials158.  
 
2.1 International and supranational evolutions  
 
The first step towards an official consideration of the problem of 
accountability in medical research is to be found in the recitals of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 ANDANDA, Managing intellectual property rights over clinical trial data to promote access and benefit sharing 
in public health, in Journal for intellectual property and competition law, supra, 152 ss.. 
153 Cf. COTTIER, The protection of Test Data submitted to Governmental Authorities: The impact of the TRIPs 
Agreement on EC law, supra, 53-54. 
154 On the issue cf. GOODYEAR-KRLEZA-LEMMENS, The Declaration of Helsinki and the Ottawa 
Statement on Trial Registration, publishe on 27th September 2007, online available at 
http://www.bmj.com/rapid-response/2011/11/01/declaration-helsinki-and-ottawa-statement-trial-
registration. 
155 For example the costs of stockpiling a drug are to be considered, as LEMMENS, Pharmaceutical 
knowledge governance: a human rights perspective, supra, 165, recalls, commenting the Tamiflu case. 
156 Cf. LIETZAN, A new framework for assessing clinical data transparency initiatives, supra, 33. 
157 Cf. infra, chapter 2. 
158 International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations, Encouragement of new 
clinical drug development: the role of data exclusivity, supra, 6. 
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Statement on Health Research, written down on the occasion of the Global 
Forum and Ministerial Summit on Health research in Mexico, calling up the 
World Health Organization to establish “a platform linking a network of 
international clinical trials registers to ensure a single point of access and the 
unambiguous identification of trials”159. 
In direct response, in 2005, the World Health Organization implemented 
the International Clinical Trial Registration Platform (ICTP), as a result of 
the direct acknowledgment of the connection between the sharing of 
scientific test results and the fulfilment of the right to health. 
The importance of the established system has to be recognized with regards 
to the formal layout, for having defined a standardisation for the 
registration of the trials themselves through the creation of a unique 
numbering mechanism, and as regards to the substantial profile, for fixing a 
minimal data set160 required for registration.  
The WHO platform however, is not a registry itself, but it defines a uniform 
system, providing a unique identifier for clinical trials submitted to primary 
registries to be implemented on a national level 161 , such as the 
ClinicalTrials.gov162 in the US and the European Clinical Trials Database163 
in the European area.  
In 2008, during the Bamako Global Ministerial Forum for Health, 
governments were therefore encouraged to “develop, set, and enforce 
standards, regulations, and best practices for fair, accountable, and 
transparent research processes, including those related to . . . the registration 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  159 The Ministerial Summit on Health Research, Mexico City, Mexico, Nov. 16 -20, 2004, The 
Mexico Statement on Health Research, Knowledge for Better Health: Strengthening Health Systems 
3, available at http://www.who.int/rpc/summit/agenda/en/ 
mexico_statement_on_health_research.pdf; see also WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY, Ministerial 
Summit on Health Research, WORLD HEALTH ORG., available at 
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA58/WHA58_34-en.pdf. Cf. LEMMENS-TELFER, 
Access to information and the right to health: The Human Rights Case for Clinical Trials Transparency, supra, 70, 
and REVEIZ et al., Do trialists endorse clinical trial registration? Survey on a Pubmed sample, published on 
23th October 2007, online available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2147029/#B2. 
160 This minimal data standard has been critised as inconsistent by some researchers, stressing the fact 
that the registration of various other important trials data was not included as a requirement for 
registration, LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: The Human Rights Case for 
Clinical Trials Transparency, supra, 70. 
161 Ibid., 72. 
162 Online available at https://clinicaltrials.gov/. 
163 Online available at https://eudract.ema.europa.eu/. 
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and results reporting of clinical trials and open and equitable access to 
research data”164, thus putting another important brick in the wall of public 
transparency goals.   
In line with the recent international trends, the Pan American Health 
Organization (PAHO) adopted in the same year of 2008 a new PAHO policy 
on research for health, stressing the need for clinical trials registration. As far as 
the American region is concerned, the PAHO policy had an important role 
in enhancing the information exchanges between more populated countries 
having already established national registry platforms belonging to the 
WHO Registry Network, and other smaller countries165.  
Responses to the WHO initiatives were brought forward also by the Ottawa 
Group166, an international group of individuals and organizations from the 
international medical research community, publishing two documents, the 
Ottawa Statement on the Principles of Clinical Trial Registration167 and the 
Ottawa Statement on the principles of its implementation168, particularly 
underlining the ethical169  and scientific rationales for international trial 
registration 170 , and demanding a higher degree of detail of the trial 
protocols to be registered171- i.e. the inclusion of information of the full 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  164 World Health Organization, WHO’s Role and Responsibilities in Health Research: Bamako Global 
Ministerial Forum on Research for Health, published on 6th January 2009, online available at 
http://new.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2009/Bamako-Annex.pdf. 
165 For example, the Brasilian trial registry has been used as a PAHO supported platform for the 
whole South America. Cf. LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: The Human 
Rights Case for Clinical Trials Transparency, supra, 70-71.  
166 REVEIZ et al., Do trialists endorse clinical trial registration? Survey on a Pubmed sample, supra.  
167 The Ottawa Statement Part One, Principles for international regstration of protocol information and results from 
human trials of health related interventions, online available at http://ottawagroup.ohri.ca/statement.html. 
168 The Ottawa Statement Part two, Principles of operationalisation for international trial registration, online 
available at http://ottawagroup.ohri.ca/statement2.html. 169 Cf. The Ottawa Statement Part one, supra, “above all, international trial registration is necessary to 
fulfill ethical obligations to research participants. When members of the public agree to participate in 
trials, it is on the understanding that they are contributing to the global body of health-related 
knowledge. It is thus unethical to conduct human research without ensuring that valid descriptions of 
the study and its findings are publicly available”.  
170 “Public access to trial protocol information and results will help to minimise known risks and 
potential harm arising from unnecessary exposure to previously tested interventions; accellerate 
research by making knowledge available about prior experiences with interventions; identify and deter 
unnecessary duplication of research and publication; identify and deter selective reporting of research 
(reporting biases); provide a means of comparing the original protocol upon which ethics approval 
was based with the study as it eas carried out; enhance collaboration among researchers by informing 
them of ongoing trials”. Ibid.. 
171 For a critical view of the issue see KREZLA-JERIC et al., Principles for international registration of 
protocol information and results from human trials of health related interventions: the Ottawa Statement (part. 1), 
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protocol, consent forms, details of ethics committee approval and other trial 
design information172-, as well as the institution of mandatory and legally 
enforceable mechanisms of trial reporting173. 
Furthermore, registers such as ClinicalTrials.gov and Controlled Clinical 
trials-ISRCTN established at the beginning of year 2000, saw a particular 
increase in the registered trials, after the International Committee of 
Medical Journal Editors introduced in 2005 the requirement for registration 
as a condition for publishing in the most leading medical journals174.  
However, the most important recognition of the principles of prospective 
public disclosure of research information and results through trial 
registration is to be found in the 2008 World Medical Association’s 
Declaration of Helsinki on Ethical Principles for Research Involving 
Human Subjects175, stating for the first time that “every clinical trial must be 
registered in a publicly accessible database”176- thus overcoming the debate 
over the scope of trial registration177- and that “researchers have a duty to 
make publicly available the results of their research on human subjects and 
are accountable for the completeness and accuracy of their reports”. 
Furthermore, the Declaration advocates that “negative as well as positive 
results must be published or otherwise made publicly available”, that 
“sources of funding, institutional affiliation and conflict of interest must be 
declared in the publication”178, concluding with the general final statement 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
published on 23rd April 2005, online available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC556346/.  
172 See LEMMENS-BOUCHARD, Mandatory clinical trial registration: rebuilding public trust in medical 
research, supra, 43.  
173 KREZLA-JERIC et al., Principles for international registration of protocol information and results from human 
trials of health related interventions: the Ottawa Statement (part. 1), supra. Cf. also LEMMENS-BOUCHARD, 
Mandatory clinical trial registration: rebuilding public trust in medical research, supra, 40. 
174 DE ANGELIS et al., Clinical trial registration: a statement from the International Committee of Medical 
Journal Editors,  N Engl J Med.2004, 351 ss.. Cf. REVEIZ et al., Do trialists endorse clinical trial 
registration? Survey on a Pubmed sample, supra, and LEMMENS-BOUCHARD, Mandatory clinical trial 
registration: rebuilding public trust in medical research, supra, 40.  
175 World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki- Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving 
Human Subjects, supra. Cf. LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: The Human 
Rights Case for Clinical Trials Transparency, supra, 71.  
176 World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki- Ethical Principles for Medical Research 
Involving Human Subjects, supra. 
177 Cf. KREZLA-JERIC et al., Principles for international registration of protocol information and results from 
human trials of health related interventions: the Ottawa Statement (part. 1), supra. 
178 World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki- Ethical Principles for Medical Research 
Involving Human Subjects, supra. 
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that “in all cases, new information should be recorded and, were 
appropriate, made publicly available”179. 
From a technical standpoint, the progressive nature of the declaration of 
Helsinki lies in the requirement of the completeness of the trials registration 
and in the fact that the registration of the trial results is mentioned.  
This is to be considered the direct transposition of the call of many 
influential organizations, such as the US Institute of Medicine, and again the 
International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, asking for the direct 
access for the final outcomes180.  
The WHO itself has recognized the problem, and established a Study 
Group on the Reporting of Findings of Clinical Trials, which is looking at 
the development of criteria and standards of results disclosure. The Study 
Group has released at the end of 2014 a Draft of a WHO Statement on 
Public Disclosure of Clinical Trials Results181, stating that “clinical trials 
results are to be reported within 30 days of the study completion date”, by 
submitting them for “publication in a peer reviewed journal” through “open 
access mechanisms”, and “in addition” by making these results publicly 
available on the result section of the primary clinical trial registry”182. 
However, as literature has been stressing 183 , the requirement of the 
completeness of registration, recently settled as regards to the existing 
European Database184 , won’t achieve any effectiveness until reporting 
practices become mandatory as such in pursuance of specific provisions185. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Ibid.. 
180 Cf. DE ANGELIS et al., Clinical trial registration: a statement from the International Committee of Medical 
Journal Editors, 351.  
181 World Health Organisation, Statement on Public Disclosure of Clinical Trials Results- Draft, online 
available at 
http://www.who.int/ictrp/results/Draft_WHO_Statement_results_reporting_clinical_trials.pdf?ua=
1. 
182 Ibid.. 
183 LEMMENS-BOUCHARD, Mandatory clinical trial registration: rebuilding public trust in medical research, 
supra, 43, and also LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: The Human Rights 
Case for Clinical Trials Transparency, supra, 73. 
184 European Medicines Agency, Posting of clinical trial summary results in European Clinical Trials Database 
(EudraCT) to become mandatory for sponsors as of 21 July 2014, online available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/news_and_events/news/2014/06/news_det
ail_002127.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac058004d5c1. As far as the US is concerned, in 2007 the FDA 
Amendments Act introduced for the first time the requirement to register also the summary results of 
the already registered trials. Cf. Current and Ongoing Transparency Activities in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
Brief of the Multi-Regional Clinical Trials Center at Harvard University to the Standing Senate Committee on Social 
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On the other hand, as will be further examined, current national regimes 
have until recent times lacked of trial data transparency provisions, thereby 
affecting the health standard collectively and individually enjoyed186.  
Indeed, research and trial registration practices have mainly remained 
outside the scope of legal rules, mostly being object of the soft regulation of 
non-binding research ethics guidelines and clinical practice standards187.  
Registration practices have been mostly the product of scientific and ethical 
responsibility, instead of resulting from mandatory provisions and 
enforcement mechanisms188.  
The few legislative undertakings aimed at shifting towards this latter form of 
regulation, have generally resulted in nothing more than window-dressing, 
due to the ineffective nature of the norms deriving from them. 
In 1997, for instance, the Food and Drug Administration Modernisation 
Act required all trials for serious and life-threatening diseases to be 
registered in the ClinicalTrial.gov platform189. 
However, the lack of definition of the scope of the notion of “serious 
disease”, and the reliance on the FDA to negotiate registration requirements 
with the pharmaceutical stakeholders, nullified the apparent good intentions 
of the American legislator190.   
As the FDA’s Status Report on implementation acknowledged, the absence 
of enforcement tools and the consequent dependence on pharmaceutical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Affairs, Science and Technology, published on 1st October 2014, online available at 
http://mrct.globalhealth.harvard.edu/files/mrct/files/2014_10_1_harvard_mrct_brief_of_mrct_on_
bill_c-17.pdf. 
It has to be noticed however, how the mandatory result submission requirement is to be refferred 
only to the trials that are voluntarily registered by the sponsor. One thing is the mandatory 
requirements of trials registration practices that are still based on the free will of the sponsor, other 
being the mandatory nature of reporting practices as such. Cf. infra in the same parapgraph.  
185 LEMMENS-BOUCHARD, Comments on the Legal, Regulatory and Ethical Aspects of the WHO Clinical 
Trial Registry Platform- submitted as part of the Formal Consultation on Disclosure Timing Policy, online available 
at http://www.who.int/ictrp/011_Lemmens_Bouchard_5April06.pdf., 1-2.  
186 Ibid.. 
187 LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: The Human Rights Case for Clinical 
Trials Transparency, supra, 73. 
188 Cf. World Trade Organization, World Intellectual Property Organization and World Health 
Organization, Promoting access to medical technologies and innovation, Intersections between public health, intellectual 
property and trade, London, Book now Ltd., 2012, 113-114. 189 On the issue cf. Current and Ongoing Transparency Activities in the Pharmaceutical Industry, supra, 2. 
190 LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: The Human Rights Case for Clinical 
Trials Transparency, supra, 73. 
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industry’s participation, caused only thirty-five per cent of industry 
sponsored trials to be effectively registered191.   
Despite this first unsuccessful legislative attempt regarding the issue of 
clinical trials transparency, in 2007 the US came to a second, more effective, 
solution to the problem, by imposing the duty to register in the 
ClinicalTrials.gov, all trials, and most importantly the final results, of 
medical devices and pharmaceutical products filed for drug regulatory 
approval192.  
However, the turning point is not to be found in the statement of such a 
duty, but rather in the definition of clear severe financial penalties for non-
compliance, together with the posting of official notices of non-compliance 
in the same database193. 
 
2.2 The European case- from the prior reporting systems to 
regulation EC n. 536/2014 
 
The European Union’s heading towards a paradigm of compulsory and 
complete trial registration system has been slower and more complicated.  
As far as the European normative framework is concerned, the legal basis 
for transparency is to be found in art. 15 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFUE), stating that “any citizen of the Union, and 
any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a 
Member State, shall have a right of access to documents of the Union's 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies194(…)”.  
This right to information is further developed by Regulation EC n. 
1049/2001 on public access to European Parliament, Council and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Food and Drug Administration, Guidance for Industry- Report on the status of Postmarketing Study 
Committments- Implementation of Section 130 of The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, 
published in February 2006, online available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/uc
m080569.pdf; cf. also Current and Ongoing Transparency Activities in the Pharmaceutical Industry, supra, 3.  
192Cf. Food and Drug Amendment Act 2007 §303-Reporting Requirements.  
193 LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: The Human Rights Case for Clinical 
Trials Transparency, supra, 74-75. 
194 Emphasis added. 
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Commission documents, whose purpose, in accordance to recital 4, is to 
“give the fullest possible effect to the right of public access to 
documents”195, and more specifically also by art. 80 of Regulation EC n. 
726/2004196 ensuring “the availability to the public of regulatory, scientific 
or technical information concerning the authorisation or supervision of 
medicinal products which is not of a confidential nature197”. 
The two already existing reporting platforms do not provide at present a 
satisfactory fulfilment of the cited provisions. 
In fact, as some scholars have also been underlining198, the Eu Clinical 
Trials Database (Eudra-Ct) established in accordance of art. 11 of the 
Clinical Trials Directive 2001/20/EC199, is intended to be a confidential 
database, accessible only by competent national authorities 200 , and 
controlled by the European Medicines Agency. 
According to art. 57 of Regulation EC n. 726/2004201  and art. 41 of 
Paediatric Regulation EC n. 1901/2006202, the European Medicines Agency 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 According to recital 8 of Regulation 1049/2001, “all agencies established by the institutions should 
apply the principles laid down in this regulation”.  
196 Regulation EC of the European Parliament and of the European Council of 31 March 2004 laying 
down Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human 
and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency, online available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:136:0001:0033:en:PDF. 
197 Ibid., art. 80. Emphasis added.	   
198 LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: The Human Rights Case for Clinical 
Trials Transparency, supra, 74-75. 
199 Directive 2001/20/EC of the European Parliament and Commission, of 4 april 2001 on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to 
the implementation of good clinical practice in the conduct of clinical trials on medicinal products for 
human use, supra.  
200 Cf. European Medicines Agency, Eu Clinical Trials Register- Questions and answers relating to practical 
and technical aspects of the EU Clinical Trials Register, published on the 7th March 2014, online available at 
https://www.clinicaltrialsregister.eu/doc/EU_CTR_FAQ.pdf.  201 Art. 57 of Regulation EC n. 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 
March 2004 laying down Community Procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal 
products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency, “The Agency 
shall provide the Member States and the institutions of the Community with the best possible 
scientific advice on any question relating to the evaluation of the quality, safety and efficacy of 
medicinal products for human or veterinary use which is referred to it in accordance with the 
provisions of Community legislation relating to medicinal products. To this end, the Agency, acting 
particularly through its committees, shall undertake the following tasks (…) (l) creating a database on 
medicinal products, to be accessible to the general public, and ensuring that it is updated, and 
managed independently of pharmaceutical companies; the database shall facilitate the search for 
information already authorised for package leaflets; it shall include a section on medicinal products 
authorised for the treatment of children; the information provided to the public shall be worded in an 
appropriate and comprehensible manner. (…)The database provided for in paragraph 1(l) shall 
include the summaries of product characteristics, the patient or user package leaflet and the 
information shown on the labelling. The database shall be developed in stages, priority being given to 
medicinal products authorised under this Regulation and those authorised under Chapter 4 of Title 
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has to provide the public with appropriate203  information stored in the 
EudraCt database.  
With considerable delay, in 2011 the European Commission established the 
European Clinical Trials register204  providing information205  about any 
clinical trial of medicinal products with at least one site within the European 
Union, in compliance to the recommendation of the European 
Commission206, and about any paediatric clinical trial with investigator sites 
within or outside the European Union207.  
This registry is thus innately incomplete, and therefore of little scientific 
value208, given that full test data reporting is assured only as regards the 
paediatric trials209: outside the paediatric field, only trials conducted in the 
area of the European Union are to be recorded, notwithstanding the fact 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
III of Directive 2001/83/EC and of Directive 2001/82/EC respectively. The database shall 
subsequently be extended to include any medicinal product placed on the market within the 
Community”.  202 Art. 41 of Regulation EC n. 1901/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 
December 2006 on medicinal products for paediatric use, “(…)by way of derogation from the 
provisions of Article 11 of Directive 2001/20/EC, the Agency shall make public part of the 
information on paediatric clinical trials entered in the European database. 27.12.2006 EN Official 
Journal of the European Union L 378/13 2. Details of the results of all the trials referred to in 
paragraph 1 and of any other trials submitted to competent authorities in compliance with Articles 45 
and 46 shall be made public by the Agency, whether or not the trial was terminated prematurely 
(…)”.  203According to art. 57 Regulation EC n. 726/2004, supra, it is EMA’s task to ensure “the 
dissemination of information on adverse reactions to medicinal products authorised in the 
Community, by means of a database permanently accessible to all Member States; health-care 
professionals, marketing authorisation holders and the public shall have appropriate levels of access to these 
databases, with personal data protection being guaranteed”. 
204 Cf. Pharmaceuticals: Today the EU register of Clinical Trials is launched, published on the 22nd March 
2011, online available at http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/clinicaltrials/ip-11-339_en.pdf. 
205 See European Commission, Lists of fields contained in the EudraCt Clinical Trials database to made public, 
in accordance with art. 57(2) of Regulation EC n. 726/2004, and its implementing guideline 2008/C168/02, 
published on the 4th February 2009, online available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-10/2009_02_04_guideline_en.pdf. Cf. also European 
Medicines Agency, Eu Clinical Trials Register- Questions and answers relating to practical and technical aspects of 
the EU Clinical Trials Register, supra, 2.  206 European Commission, Communication from the Commission regarding the guideline on the data fields 
contained in the clinical trials database provided for in Article 11 of Directive 2001/20/EC to be included in the 
database on medicinal products provided for in Article 57 of Regulation (EC) No 726/2004, in Official Journal of 
the European Union, 2008, C 168/3, online available at http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-
10/2008_07/c_16820080703en00030004_en.pdf. 
207  More specifically, the register includes clinical trials contained in the so called Paediatric 
Investigation Plan, that is the research and development program that aims to generate the data 
required to authorise a medicinal product for use in children. See Pharmaceuticals: Today the EU register 
of Clinical Trials is launched, supra, 1.  
208 Stressing this point GØTZSCHE-JORGENSEN, Getting access to unpublished clinical trials at the 
European Medicines Agency, supra, passim and LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to 
health: The Human Rights Case for Clinical Trials Transparency, supra, 74-75. 
209 Cf. GØTZSCHE-JORGENSEN, Getting access to unpublished clinical trials at the European Medicines 
Agency, supra, 8. 
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that most of the trials relevant for the granting of marketing authorization 
are conducted outside the European Union210. 
In the realm of European clinical data reporting platforms, it is worth to 
mention also the Eudravigilance system, which is however not a real clinical 
trials database, but rather a collection of the European Medicines Agency’s 
reports on drug’s safety and effectiveness, used by the Committee for 
Medicinal Products for human use, and the Pharmacovigilance Risks 
Assessment Committee as evidence to invoke regulatory actions211. 
Only in 2014, with the approval of the new regulation n. 536/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on clinical trials on medicinal 
products for human use212, establishing a publicly accessible European 
database of “all trials conducted in the Union”213, a step forward has been 
made in ensuring a “sufficient level of transparency in clinical trials”214.  
In fact, in accordance to the general confinement of the regulation to trials 
situated within the Union215, the regulation defines a specific duty of the 
trial sponsor to “submit to the EU database a summary of the results of the 
clinical trials” “within one year from the end of a clinical trial in all Member 
States concerned”216, irrespectively of the outcome of the trial itself.  
A broader perspective is nonetheless adopted as regards the case “a clinical 
trial was intended to be used for a marketing authorisation for the investigational 
medicinal product”217 , in respect of which a specific provision binds the 
applicant to “submit to the EU database the clinical study report within 30 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 See European Medicines Agency, Clinical Trials submitted in marketing-authorisation applications to the 
European Medicines Agency- Overview of patient recruitment and the geographical location of investigator sites- 
containing data from 2005 to 2011, published on 11th December 2013, online available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2009/12/WC500016819.pdf, 
underlining the trend of increasing number of patients being recruited outside of Europe for pivotal 
clinical studies.  
211  See European Medicines Agency, EudraVigilance, online available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/regulation/document_listing/document_listi
ng_000239.jsp.  
212 Regulation EU 536/2014 of the European Parliament and of the council of 16 April 2014 on 
clinical trials on medicinal products for human use and repealing Directive 2001/20/EC, cit.. 
213 Art. 2 Regulation n. 536/2014, supra. 
214 Ibid..Cf. recital 67. 
215 This is to be derived from the joint provisions of art. 1 of the Regulation, restricting the Scope of 
it to “all clinical trials conducted in the Union”, and art. 81 (1), stating that “the EU database shall 
contain the data and information submitted in accordance with this regulation”. Ibid.. 
216 Ibid.. Art. 37.  
217 Ibid.. Emphasis added.  
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days after the day the marketing authorisation has been granted, the 
procedure for granting the marketing authorisation has been completed, or 
the applicant for marketing authorisation has withdrawn the application”218.   
This clinical study report shall contain a summary of all the trials conducted 
in order to get marketing approval for a specific pharmaceutical product, 
thus also the ones carried out outside the European Union, in respect to 
whom the European Commission has stated the need to assure compliance 
“with regulatory requirements at least equivalent to those in the EU, 
including rules on transparency”219. 
The clinical study report is thus to be considered of crucial importance 
given its fundamental regulatory value- in fact it entails the information 
assessed by the competent agency in order to release the marketing 
authorisation-, and high scientific and informational value, due to the fact 
that it furnishes a complete overview of the trials relevant for a specific 
pharmaceutical product.  
It can be thus argued that the revolutionary impact of the new European 
transparency provisions lies exactly in the mandatory requirement of clinical 
study report’s publicity.  
However, the effective degree of the informational transparency 
enhancement provided by the new mandatory reporting system stated in the 
regulation has to be defined in light of the exemptions under art. 81(4), 
stating that “the Eu database shall be publicly accessible, unless, for all or 
part of the data and information contained therein, confidentiality is 
justified on any of the following grounds: a) protecting personal data in 
accordance with Regulation EC n.45/2001; b) protecting commercially confidential 
information, in particular through taking into account the status of the marketing 
authorisation for the medicinal product, unless there is an overriding public interest in 
disclosure (…)”220.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Ibid.. 
219 European Commission, New rules for clinical trials conducted in the EU, published on the 2nd April 
2014, online available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-254_en.htm.  
220 Emphasis added. 
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The regulation seems thus having perfectly embedded the conflict between 
the two opposite interests involved- the public and the private one. 
However it is specifically in respect of clinical study reports, that the 
regulation provides a fundamental interpretational benchmark for the 
assessment of the balance to be addressed. 
Indeed, recital 68 of the regulation states that “for the purposes of this 
regulation in general the data included in a clinical study report should not be 
considered commercially confidential once a marketing authorisation has been 
granted, the procedure for granting the marketing authorisation has been 
completed, the application for marketing authorisation has been 
withdrawn”221, with that excluding the appliance of the above mentioned 
exemption at all.  
More generally, as far as the clinical trials are concerned, the same recital 
provides that “the main characteristics of a clinical trial”, that is to say most 
of the information entailed in it, “(…) should not be considered 
confidential”, thus leaving in that case a bigger room for what turns out to 
be a very delicate matter of interpretation.  
In fact pharmaceutical companies have been calling upon privacy 
restrictions and the protection of commercially confidential information 
under the current international and European data exclusivity regime222, as 
legally founded obstacles for disclosure.   
 
Three as thus the legal issues at stake.  
First, as far as the protection of commercial information is concerned, one 
must define what part of clinical trials information has to be considered 
commercially confidential, and thus protected under specific international 
and supranational norms. 
Second, once the layers of protection are identified, it must be stated 
whether they entail a specific ban to disclose these kind of information. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 Emphasis added.  
222 See infra chapter 2.  
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Third, as regards to the privacy implications, it is necessary to define the 
scope of the data protection regime in respect of the release of clinical trials 
data containing personal information of trials volunteers, by verifying if any 
of the exemptions provided by the current privacy framework could apply. 
The last two issues will be addressed in the next chapter. 
 
As regards to the first matter, the new European Medicines Agency policy 
on publication of clinical data223, released on the 2nd of October 2014, 
provides another important tool for the interpretation of the exception 
contained in art. 81 (4) of the Clinical Trials Regulation224. 
In fact, although the Agency acknowledges the competing interest of 
protecting patient’s personal data and commercially confidential 
information (CCI), it expressly states that “in general, however, clinical data 
cannot be considered CCI”, being there only “limited circumstances where 
(this kind of) information could constitute CCI”225.  
Hence the Agency’s approach to the question seems to follow the path of a 
narrow interpretation of the notion of commercially confidential 
information in respect of the information entailed in clinical trials data, 
already affirmed in recital 68 of the new regulation.  
This becomes even more important if one considers that art. 81 of the same 
regulation appoints the European Medicines Agency as the direct controller 
of the database to be established226.  
However, as it will be shown, this public friendly route may be destined to 
confinement on the field of theoretical declarations. 
In fact, although these statements contribute to further circumscribe the 
question at stake, they do not however give direct answers to the problem 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223European Medicines Agency, European Medicines Agency policy on publication of clinical data for medicinal 
products for human use, released on the 2nd October 2014, online available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2014/10/WC500174796.pdf. 
224 Regulation EU 536/2014 of the European Parliament and of the council of 16 April 2014 on 
clinical trials on medicinal products for human use and repealing Directive 2001/20/EC, cit.. 
225 Ibid., 4.  
226 Cf. art. 81: “(…) The Agency shall be considered to be the controller of the EU database, and 
shall be responsible for avoiding unnecessary duplication between the EU database and the EudraCT 
and Eudravigilance databases”.  
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of what exactly constitutes commercial confidential information in a clinical 
study report.  
The issue has been generally discussed by the Agency in a few draft 
papers 227 , and in the latest Policy Document, where a definition of 
commercially confidential information is given, as regards “any information 
contained in the clinical study reports submitted to the Agency by the 
applicant that is not in the public domain or publicly available and where 
disclosure may undermine the legitimate economic interest of the 
applicant”228. 
Annex 3 of the same policy document more specifically identifies 
some categories of information that may be considered of 
commercially confidential interest, including details about the product 
itself and about the “product development rationale”229.  
However, under these categories, also “benefits and risks 
conclusions” and “efficacy and safety variables”, regarded as 
commercially sensitive in light of a possible “unfair commercial 
use”230 by competitors, and also “novel statistical or other analytical 
methods and exploratory endpoint results about potential new uses of 
a medicine that are not the subject of the marketing authorisation 
application231” can qualify as commercial confidential information232.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Cf. for exaple, European Medicines Agency- Heads of Medicines Agencies (HMA), HMA/EMA 
Guidance document on the identification of commercially confidential information and personal data within the structure 
of the marketing authorisation application-Release of information after the granting of marketing authorisation, 
released in 2010, online available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2011/06/WC500106995.pdf 
and Heads of Medicines Agencies and  European Medicines Agency, The identification of commercially 
confidential information and personal data within the structure of the marketing authorisation (MA) application- 
Release of information after the granting of a marketing authorisation, Guidance Document 2012, online 
available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2012/03/WC500124536.pdf. 
228 European Medicines Agency, European Medicines Agency policy on publication of clinical data for medicinal 
products for human use, supra, 3. 
229 Ibid., 17. 
230 Cf. art. 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, which will be discussed in the next chapter.  
231 Cf. European Medicines Agency, Redaction Principles- Draft, published on the 5th May 2014, online 
available at 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/resources/otherdocument.faces/it/54535/html.bookmark.   
232 See LEMMENS, EMA’s proposed Data release Policy: promoting transparency or expanding Pharma control 
over data?, published on 30th May 2014, online available at 
http://blogs.plos.org/speakingofmedicine/2014/05/30/emas-new-data-release-policy-promoting-
transparency-expanding-pharma-control-data/. 
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Particular attention must be given to this last reference to “results 
about potential new uses of a medicine”, implying also clinical trials 
data related to off-label use of a drug.  
Off-label uses233 are the second major cause -together with the above 
discussed biased reporting practices- of threats to patients’ health, 
directly arising from the deficiency of knowledge about 
pharmaceutical products234. 
That means in return, that important information about safety and 
effectiveness of pharmaceuticals product may still be withheld, as a 
consequence of the interpretational enlargement of the exemption to the 
general transparency rule stated in art. 81.4 of the Clinical Trials 
Regulation235. 
Hence, the general transparency rule risks to be overridden by its own 
exemptions.  
Ultimately, the scope of the information available is the result of the 
European Medicines Agency’s discretion in evaluating the balance between 
the protection of the commercial confidentiality of sponsor’s data and the 
“need to inform the public in the interests of public health and 
transparency”236, the outcome of this balance depending solely on the 
definition of what portion of clinical data has to be qualified under the 
mentioned categories of exemptions237. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  233 On the issue of drug’s off label use see ARNAUDO, The strange case of Dr. Lucentis and Mr. Avastin. 
The Italian Competition Authority fines Roche and Novartis for collusion, in European Competition Law Review, 
35, 7, 2014, 347 ss..  
234 It is relevant noticing that also the European Legislator has correctly evaluated the role of clinical 
trials regarding uses of drug’s that are not in accordance with the marketing authorisation,  by 
qualifying these trials as “low-intervention clinical trials” that should, according to recital n. 11, “be 
subject to the same application procedure as any other clinical trial”, thus implying also the 
transparency duties that sponsor have to fulfil. Art. 81 about the European database does however 
not expressly mention the reporting requirement regarding these low-intervention clinical trials, thus 
leaving room for interpretation.  
235 Regulation EU 536/2014 of the European Parliament and of the council of 16 April 2014 on 
clinical trials on medicinal products for human use and repealing Directive 2001/20/EC, cit.. 
236 European Commission, Communication from the Commission regarding the guideline on the data fields 
contained in the clinical trials database provided for in Article 11 of Directive 2001/20/EC to be included in the 
database on medicinal products provided for in Article 57 of Regulation (EC) No 726/2004, supra, under §3 
Scope.  
237 This has been underlined by the same Agency, declaring how “the EMA is responsible for ruling 
on any redactions of documents to be published”, and for these purposes a careful assessment is to 
be made as regards “the specific request”, and “in accordance with existing laws and internal 
implementing rules”. European Medicines Agency, EMA responds to European Ombudsman, published 
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2.2.1. The European Medicines Agency’s new policy on access to 
clinical data- only theoretical declarations?   
 
The European Medicines Agency’s policy of access to clinical study reports 
is a separate initiative in respect of the establishment of the European 
database announced by the examined regulation238.  
By defining the objectives of its policy, the European Medicines Agency 
underlines the need for “public scrutiny” and  “application of new 
knowledge in future research” in order to establish a “level playing field that 
allows all medicine developers to learn from past successes and failures”, 
and to “enable the wider scientific community to make use of detailed 
clinical data to develop new knowledge in the interest of public health”239.  
However, the practical implications of these statements rather seem to head 
in the opposite direction of obscurantism if one examines the severe terms 
of use governing the access to and use of clinical trials reports submitted to 
the Agency by marketing applicants and rendered publicly accessible in 
accordance to the new policy. 
The same terms of use in fact appear to insist on the concept of 
commercially confidential information as a ground for substantially 
restricting access to test data, by the possible “redaction”, i.e. manipulation, 
prior to publication of the clinical study report 240, “when needed to protect 
those specific elements which qualify as CCI that should not be 
released”241.  
The scope of this redaction again depends on the definition of what is to be 
considered of commercial confidentiality interest, thus leaving room for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
on the 11th November 2014, online available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/news_and_events/news/2014/11/news_det
ail_002210.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac058004d5c1.  
238 Cf. Current and Ongoing Transparency Activities in the Pharmaceutical Industry, supra, 4. 
239 European Medicines Agency, European Medicines Agency policy on publication of clinical data for medicinal 
products for human use, supra, 4 240 Ibid., 6, stating further that “Where redaction of CCI is proposed by the applicant/MAH, a 
consultation with the applicant/MAH will be undertaken, following scrutiny by the Agency of the 
proposed redaction, including the justification provided by the applicant/MAH, as to whether the 
definition of CCI applies”. 
241 Ibid.. 
	   52	  
discretion of the Agency itself in deciding what kind of information has to 
be hidden242. 
In addition to this possible enlargement of the scope of the exemptions, 
various technical restrictions on data access itself play an important role in 
blurring the effectiveness of transparency.   
Indeed, by signing the Terms of Use, users have to “acknowledge (…) that 
the information is protected by copyright and proprietary rights, and can be 
considered commercially valuable”243.  
From a legal technical point of view, these statements are too vague to be 
taken seriously, being totally unclear to which copyright (the User 
interface?), or which other “property right” (database protection?) they refer 
to.  
The clinical report will be also available only “on screen”, due to the legal 
prohibition, accepted with the signing of the terms of use, and the technical 
impossibility “to download, save, edit, photograph, print, distribute, the 
Clinical trial reports”244.  
Moreover, the user also agrees to not “access the Clinical Reports using a 
method other than the interface provided by the EMA, or remove, bypass, 
circumvent, neutralise or modify any technological protection measures 
which apply to the Clinical Reports”245. 
If copyright protection has to be called upon, it is arguable whether these 
“fair use crippling contractual terms”246 comply with the exceptions to the 
reproduction right and to the right to communication to the public, 
provided by the EU Copyright Directive247, and more specifically by art. 
5(3), as regards the “use for the purpose of (…) scientific research”, “use for 
the purposes of public security or to ensure the proper performance or reporting of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 LEMMENS, EMA’s proposed Data release Policy: promoting transparency or expanding Pharma control over 
data?, supra, 2. 
243 European Medicines Agency, European Medicines Agency policy on publication of clinical data for medicinal 
products for human use, supra, 10.  
244 Ibid.. 
245 Ibid.. 246 Quoting REICHMAN, A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of 
Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, in Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 22, 2007, 981.  247 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society.  
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administrative, parliamentary or judicial proceedings” 248 , and “use by 
communication or making available, for the purpose of research or private 
study”249.  
More generally speaking, these terms of use provisions dramatically clash 
with the declared liberalist intents of enhancing the degree of researcher’s 
scientific awareness, and the level of information enjoyed by European 
patients, thus revealing the innate contradictory nature of European 
Medicines Agency’s transparency policy.   
Little wonder, if one considers that the same document is the “end 
product” of a long-lasting policy controversy directly involving the 
European Medicines Agency, and in second instance, also the European 
Court of Justice. 
 
2.2.2. The EMA controversy - The Ombudsman’ decision 
 
The controversy involving the European Medicines Agency and the Danish 
research group Cochrane Collaboration, provides indeed a fundamental 
background for a better understanding of the new policy on access to 
clinical trials data, to become effective on the 1st January 2015.  
The latest policy document is in fact the result of a drastic change of 
position of the European Medicines Agency, which initially denied access to 
test protocols.  
In 2007 the research group Cochrane Collaboration sought access to clinical 
trials protocols of an anti-obesity pill, whose effect on weight loss was 
suspected by the researchers to be very small, compared to the risks of 
cardiac and pulmonary complications, and also psychiatric disturbances that 
were likely to be caused by the medicine itself250. 
The analysis of the trials’ outcomes would have been necessary to evaluate 
the scope of these risks.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 Emphasis added. 
249 Ibid., art. 5(3) lett a), e), n). 
250 GØTZSCHE-JORGENSEN, Getting access to unpublished clinical trials at the European Medicines Agency, 
supra, 342 ss.. 
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The research group was thus asking the European Medicines Agency for an 
independent assessment of these test data, for specific research purposes, 
resulting necessary due to the incompleteness of the publicly accessible 
information, and in order to “provide healthcare providers and patients 
with reliable information about the benefits and harms of anti-obesity 
drugs”251.  
According to the researchers the documents which they were asking access 
to, did not contain any commercially confidential information, provided 
that these same documents “were based on general and well known 
principles which could be applied to any drug trial”252 , and that the 
Guidelines on the conducting of the trials253 did not “suggest that any 
information contained in the clinical study report could be considered as a 
trade secret”254.  
Because of the likeliness of the “widespread use in the future of this 
drug”255, the researchers affirmed that “societal interests”256 were at stake, 
for the fulfilment of which European provisions assure “the widest possible 
access to documents the Agency receives or has in its possession”, as it is 
stated in art. 1 of the Rules for the implementation of Regulation EC N. 
1049/2001 on access to EMEA documents 257 , reproducing the right 
generally acknowledged in art. 15 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union. 
The study group was thus seeking the openness that according to recital 2 
of the Regulation EC n. 1409/2001, is essential in order to enable “citizens 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 Ibid., 350.  
252 Ibid., 353. 
253 Cf. European Medicines Agency, Structure and Content of Clinical Study Reports- Note for Guidance on 
Structure and Content of Clinical Study Reports, online available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2009/09/WC5000
02832.pdf.  
254  European Ombudsman, Decision of the European Ombudsman closing his inquiry into complaint 
2560/2007/BEH against the European Medecines Agency, Strasbourg, 24th November 2010, online 
available at http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/decision.faces/en/5459/html.bookmark, 
paragraph 55; Cf. also GØTZSCHE-JORGENSEN, Getting access to unpublished clinical trials at the 
European Medicines Agency, supra, 359. 
255 Ibid., 343. 
256 Ibid., 343.  
257 Cf. Rules for the implementation of Regulation EC N. 1049/2001,  on access to EMEA 
documents, EMEA/MB/203359/2006 Rev.1 Adopted. Management board meeting 19 December 
2006, online available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2010/02/WC500070829.pdf. 
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to participate more closely in the decision-making process”258, and to assure 
“that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and 
more accountable to the citizens in a democratic system”259. 
However, the researchers argued that even if commercial interests would 
have been thought to be at stake, the Rules for the implementation of the 
Regulation would have still assured the release of the remaining parts of the 
clinical study reports not covered by exceptions260. 
Furthermore, the existence of an “overriding public interest” in the 
accessibility of the reports, acknowledged by art. 3 of the Rules for 
implementation as an exception to the exceptions given to the general 
transparency rule261, had to be taken into consideration.  
Also non-binding provisions were mentioned to enforce the researchers’ 
position, such as the ones contained in the Declaration of Helsinki, defining 
in art. 30 the duty for authors “to make (…) the results of their research” 
publicly available262. 
Thus, according to the research group’s reasoning, a general and strict 
refusal to access would not have been justifiable in any way under the cited 
normative provisions263, and also in the face of the recent statements of the 
European Commission, intending to “signal the importance of (…) access 
to and dissemination of scientific information”264.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Recital 2 of Regulation EC n. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 30 
May 2001, regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission Documents, 
online available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/PDF/r1049_en.pdf.  
259 Ibid.. See also CARVALHO, The Trips regime of Patent Rights, supra, 605, stating that “excessive 
concealment prevents the public at large from checking the quality of product registrations granted 
by governmental agencies”. Cf. LYNDON, Secrecy and access in an innovation intensive economy: reordering 
information privileges in an environmental health, and safety law, supra, 510: “to the extent that data is withheld 
from social processes of risk assessment, it undermines personal autonomy, participation, and 
efficiency across the society”.  
260 Cf. art. 3 (6) of the Rules of implementation of Regulation EC N.1049/2001, supra, stating that: “if 
some parts of the requested document are covered by any exceptions, the remaining parts of the 
document shall be released”.  261 Ibid., art. 3(2): “The Agency shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine 
the protection of a) commercial interests of a natural or legal person, including intellectual property 
(…) unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure”. Emphasis added.  
262 See World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki- Ethical principles for Medical Research 
involving Human beings, supra. 
263 GØTZSCHE-JORGENSEN, Getting access to unpublished clinical trials at the European Medicines Agency, 
supra, 354.  Cf. on the point, GARATTINI, Confidentiality, published on the Lancet, on the 27th 
September 2003, online available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/14522545. 
264 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and 
the European Economic and Social Committee, on scientific information in the digital age: access, dissemination and 
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The European Medicines Agency, on defence, took the exact opposite 
stand, and went on defining the legal framework for concealment.  
The complexity of the issue at stake is interestingly shown by the fact that 
the regulatory agency based its reasoning on the same provisions that 
provided the complainants the grounds for requesting disclosure.  
In fact, the European Medicines Agency appealed to the same Rules on 
implementation in order to leverage on the exemption provided by art. 4(2) 
of the Rules of implementation, shielding “information that could be of 
benefit for a competitor, the disclosure of which could cause a 
disproportionate prejudice to and seriously harm the commercial interest of 
the party”265.  
This was according to the Agency the case of the data contained in clinical 
study reports, that are “extremely detailed and extensive”266, and contain 
“full detail of the clinical development programme for a medicinal 
product” 267 , representing the “most substantial part of applicants 
investment”268.  
The disclosure would have thus permitted competitors to use the 
information contained in the documents made available as a basis for 
starting developing similar medicinal products and “to obtain valuable 
information about the marketing authorisation holders long term clinical 
development strategies”269.  
The interest of protecting a third party that would be adversely affected “in 
case of improper disclosure of the content of the concerned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
preservation, published on 14th February 2007, online available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/document_library/pdf_06/communication-
022007_en.pdf. 
265  European Ombudsman, Decision of the European Ombudsman closing his inquiry into complaint 
2560/2007/BEH against the European Medicines Agency, paragraph 43. 
266 Ibid., paragraph 17. 
267 Ibid.. 
268 GØTZSCHE-JORGENSEN, Getting access to unpublished clinical trials at the European Medicines Agency, 
supra, 351.  
269  European Ombudsman, Decision of the European Ombudsman closing his inquiry into complaint 
2560/2007/BEH against the European Medicines Agency, paragraph 55. 
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documents”270, had thus to be adequately valued also in front of the public 
interest of publishing these data.  
According to the regulatory Agency, although the presence of an overriding 
interest in a better assessment of the effects of the anti-obesity drug could 
be acknowledged, this did not lead to an automatic disclosure obligation271. 
In fact, this same interest was already being addressed by the Agency 
through the publication of summary of products features and the control of 
the written information for patients entailed in the package leaflet in all 
European languages, in compliance with art. 57 (1)272 and art. 80273 of 
Regulation EC n. 726/2004, from whom the Agency’s task to inform 
healthcare and patients on information relating to medicinal products 
approved or rejected by the Community274, is derived.  
These summaries already provided an evaluation of the benefits and risks of 
a pharmaceutical product, and were constantly updated in virtue of the 
Agency’s monitoring activity of the (side-)effects of a specific 
pharmaceutical product275. 
That is why “with this regard (…) the Agency” could not “identify any 
overriding public interest that could justify the disclosure of the concerned 
documents”276.    
Furthermore, the Agency argued that grounds for non-disclosure were also 
to be found at the international level in art. 39.3 of the TRIPS 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 GØTZSCHE-JORGENSEN, Getting access to unpublished clinical trials at the European Medicines Agency, 
supra, 348. 
271 Ibid., 348-349. 
272 Art. 57 (1) EC n. 726/2004, supra: “The Agency shall provide the Member States and the 
institutions of the Community with the best possible scientific advice on any question relating to the 
evaluation of the quality, safety and efficacy of medicinal products for human or veterinary use which 
is referred to it in accordance with the provisions of Community legislation relating to medicinal 
products”. 273 Art. 80 Regulation EC n. 726/2004, supra:“To ensure an appropriate level of transparency, the 
Management Board, on the basis of a proposal by the Executive Director and in agreement with the 
Commission, shall adopt rules to ensure the availability to the public of regulatory, scientific or 
technical information concerning the authorisation or supervision of medicinal products which is not 
of a confidential nature. The internal rules and procedures of the Agency, its committees and its 
working groups shall be made available to the public at the Agency and on the Internet”.  
274 GØTZSCHE-JORGENSEN, Getting access to unpublished clinical trials at the European Medicines Agency, 
supra, 348. 
275 Ibid.. 
276 Ibid., 349.  
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Agreement277 , imposing on the World Trade Organization members a 
specific obligation of protection of undisclosed information which must be 
protected against “unfair commercial use”278, except “where necessary to 
protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are 
protected against unfair commercial use”	  279.    
This provision refers to the specific case of the submission to the test data 
“as a condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical”280. 
 This is why it is to be interpreted as lex specialis- thus prevailing- in respect 
of the general rules for accessibility of the documents entailed in Regulation 
EC n. 1049/2001 and the Rules of implementation related to it, invoked by 
the research group for disclosure281.  
Further normative referrals for the refusal to give access to raw data were, 
according to the Agency, to be found also in the data protection provisions 
laid down by Regulation EC n. 45/2001 282  expressly evoked by the 
Agency283.  
Indeed, clinical trials data result to be structurally made up not only by 
commercial confidential information, but also by the personal data of the 
volunteers who have been submitted to them. 
The only way for disclosure to be allowed would have been the redaction of 
the raw test information in order to erase the sensible parts entailed in it284.  
This would have however caused the Agency a “disproportionate effort in 
terms of time and resources”285, distracting the Agency itself from its core 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277  European Ombudsman, Decision of the European Ombudsman closing his inquiry into complaint 
2560/2007/BEH against the European Medicines Agency, paragraph 18. 
278 Art. 39.3 TRIPS Agreement.  
279 Ibid.. Cf. infra chapter 2.  
280 Art. 39.9 TRIPS Agreement.  
281  European Ombudsman, Decision of the European Ombudsman closing his inquiry into complaint 
2560/2007/BEH against the European Medicines Agency, paragraph 18. 282 Regulation EC n. 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community 
institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data, online available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:008:0001:0022:en:PDF.  
283   European Ombudsman, Decision of the European Ombudsman closing his inquiry into complaint 
2560/2007/BEH against the European Medicines Agency, paragraph 86. 
284 Ibid., 87.  
285 Ibid., 17.  
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business activities, as foreseen by art. 57 of the Regulation EC n. 
726/2004286. 
The difficulty and the length of the process of examining the documents, 
would thus have resulted in an excessive burden for the administration, 
justifying, as the European Court of Justice has stated, “a derogation from 
that obligation to examine the documents”287. 
Moreover, according to the Agency, the redaction of the protocols would 
have itself deprived the documents of “all the relevant information”288.  
 
In assessing the two opposite positions, the European Ombudsman decided 
in favour of the research group, identifying a right for the complainants to 
access the documents of the clinical trials data.  
The decision released on the 10th May 2010, was taken on the grounds of 
the same normative framework, which both the complainants and the 
defendants referred to in order to support their claims. 
First of all the Ombudsman contested the interpretation of art. 39.3 TRIPS 
Agreement as a lex specialis in respect of the general rules entailed in 
Regulation EC n. 1049/2001 and in the Rules of implementation of the 
same regulation.  
This interpretation is to be considered wrong, because the two set of rules 
pursue completely different aims: the international provision contains a 
general rule for non-disclosure, whereas the European norms state a general 
obligation to grant access289.  
Moreover, strictly interpreting the article, it was acknowledged how the 
obligation for non-disclosure given by TRIPS provision is only limited to 
the event of “commercial use” of the data submitted in the realm of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  286 Art. 57 Regulation EC n. 726/2004, supra: “The Agency shall provide the Member States and the 
institutions of the Community with the best possible scientific advice on any question relating to the 
evaluation of the quality, safety and efficacy of medicinal products for human or veterinary use which 
is referred to it in accordance with the provisions of Community legislation relating to medicinal 
products”.  
287 Case T-2/03, Verein für Konsumenteninformation vs. Commission, 2005, ECR II-1121, cited by the 
European Ombudsman, Decision of the European Ombudsman closing his inquiry into complaint 
2560/2007/BEH against the European Medicines Agency, paragraph 36.  
288 Ibid., 54.  
289 Ibid., 22-23.  
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pharmaceutical market authorisation, this being not the case of the research 
purposes declared by the complainants, which have been motivating access 
only by purely scientific concerns.  
Art. 39.3 TRIPS did not therefore prevent private access for research 
purposes290. 
Furthermore, the Ombudsman stated how the provisions of Regulation EC 
n. 1049/2001 assure a general obligation for disclosure, and hence a general 
right of the public to access official documents, independently from the future 
use of the accessed information291.  
As far as the exceptions to this general rules are concerned, the 
Ombudsman underlined how they must be applied in the narrowest 
possible way, following the interpretation given by the case law of the 
Community Courts: the application of the exemption would therefore not 
been justified by “the mere fact that a document concerns an interest 
protected by an exemption”292. 
The exemption offered by the regulation is only to be relied on as regards to 
the specific condition that the threat of the commercial interests’ frustration 
is actual and specific293.  
Thus, this risk must be “reasonably foreseeable and not purely 
hypothetical”294.  
Given this normative scenario, according to the Ombudsman, the 
European Medicines Agency had failed to adequately proof various points, 
relevant for a legitimate refusal for disclosure. 
First of all, the regulatory agency had not provided any accurate evidence of 
the fact that the clinical study reports in respect of which request of access 
was presented, effectively contained commercially confidential information.  
As regards to this, the Ombudsman recognised the heaviness of such a 
burden of proof, given that the current European legislation provides no 
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291 Ibid., 24.  
292 Ibid., 28.  
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specific definition of what is to be considered of commercial confidential 
value295. 
At the same time, distance had to be taken from excessively broad 
interpretations of the notion given by the jurisprudence, as the one 
according to which “all information relating to a company and its business 
relations”296 is to be considered of commercially confidential value: this 
broad interpretation would in fact “not give effect to the general principle 
of providing the public with the widest possible access to documents held 
by institutions”297.  
In the Ombudsman’s opinion, the documents for which access was 
requested did not entail commercially confidential information298. 
As far as the presence of personal data in the trials protocols was 
concerned, the Ombudsman noticed that the requested documents did not 
identify the patients by their name, but “by their identification and test 
centre numbers”299, not qualifying as personal data due to the difficulty to 
associate them to a specific individual300.  
However, even if the presence of commercially confidential information or 
personal data, had been shown, or presumed, no proof had been anyway 
given of the fact that the disclosure of the reports would have actually and 
specifically compromised the protection of commercial interests, in order to 
apply the exception301. 
In second instance, even if this last proof had been given, the law still would 
have required disclosure, “if steps” were “taken to ensure that the data are 
protected against unfair commercial use”302, that meaning, if an adequate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 Ibid., 71.  
296 Ibid., 76.  
297 Ibid., 72 
298 Ibid., passim.  
299 Ibid., 86.  300 “Patients could therefore be identifiable, provided that, in case of disclosure or otherwise, 
information on the attribution of particular numbers to particular patients is also available. However, 
neither the requested documents nor other information in the public domain appeared to allow a link 
to be made between a given identification number and a particular patient, thus making it possible for 
himlher to be identified”. Ibid.. 
301 Ibid., 82 
302 Art. 39.3 TRIPS Agreement. 
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erasure of the sensitive information was made in order to render the data 
accessible.  
By comparing the regulatory agency’s acting with the collaborative approach 
taken by the European Investment bank in a similar case involving access to 
confidential information303 , the Ombudsman noted that the European 
Agency did not offer sufficient reasons for its refusal: no adequate proof of 
the “excessive administrative burden” that the redaction of the protocols 
would have caused, had indeed been given304.  
The Ombudsman also underlined how the exception of the administrative 
burden affirmed by the European Court of Justice in the controversy Verein 
für Konsumenteninformation vs. Commission was to be confined to the 
“exceptional” cases of an individual examination that appears “to be 
particularly heavy, therefore exceeding the reasons of what may be 
reasonably required (…)”305.  
This failure of proof was to be considered in the Ombudsman’s opinion as 
a sign of maladministration in respect of the obligation entailed in art. 18 of 
the European code for good administrative behaviour306, stating that every 
decision taken by an institution “shall clearly state the legal basis of the 
decision”307.  
Finally the Ombudsman stated that also if the action of erasure had turned 
out to be excessively burdensome, still disclosure would have been possible, 
according to both the international and European provisions, if the 
presence of an “overriding interest” had been acknowledged308.  
Unfortunately however, the Ombudsman did not provide any reasoning 
about the existence of a possible overriding public interest, given that his 
understanding of this specific case was in the sense of the absence of any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303  European Ombudsman, Decision of the European Ombudsman closing his inquiry into complaint 
2560/2007/BEH against the European Medicines Agency, paragraph 39.  
304 Ibid., 37 
305 Case T-2/03, Verein für Konsumenteninformation vs. Commission, supra.  
306  European Ombudsman, Decision of the European Ombudsman closing his inquiry into complaint 
2560/2007/BEH against the European Medicines Agency, paragraph 20.  
307 European Ombudsman, European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, online available at 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/resources/code.faces#/page/1. 
308  European Ombudsman, Decision of the European Ombudsman closing his inquiry into complaint 
2560/2007/BEH against the European Medicines Agency, paragraph 20 and 50.  
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data to be considered of commercial confidentiality, without any need thus 
to get deeper in the second and the third arguments309. 
This understanding of the case by the Ombudsman resulted to be wholly in 
line with the European Medicines Agency’s main purpose, that is the 
assessment of the risks and benefits of a drug310. 
This essential task had to be adequately evaluated in order to effectively 
protect the “health of European citizens”: in this perspective it was 
therefore “of utmost importance for EMA to give the widest possible 
access to documents and also to pursue a proactive information policy for 
the benefit of citizens”311.  
 
The Ombudsman’s decision provides a very precious assessment of the 
normative grounds and juridical arguments that can be used in favour or 
against disclosure.  
The fact that the same provisions can be read in both directions, offers clear 
evidence of the weakness of the legislative structure on this delicate issue.  
As some scholars have pointed out, such weakness is easily exploited by the 
more influential part312.  
The decision gives an interesting insight on the issue, by proposing a sort of 
“three-step test” to solve the disclosure/secrecy dichotomy, that the 
defendant has to overcome in order to oppose a legitimate refusal for 
disclosure: the defendant must in this light face the burden of proof 
regarding first the presence of a commercially confidential interest resulting 
actually and specifically at risk, second the subsequent excessive administrative 
burden caused by the erasure of the sensitive data entailed in the document 
for which the access is requested, and finally the absence of an overriding 
public interest. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 Cf. GØTZSCHE-JORGENSEN, Getting access to unpublished clinical trials at the European Medicines 
Agency, supra, 362.  
310 Ibid., 363. 
311 Ibid., 364.  
312 See ANDANDA, Managing intellectual property rights over clinical trial data to promote access and benefit 
sharing in public health, supra, 162.  
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The impact of the Ombudsman’s decision is to be evaluated as regards the 
subsequent Policy Documents on access to clinical trials data313 of the 
regulatory Agency, having allegedly shifted its position towards a more 
public-friendly approach314. 
The new trend of releasing clinical trials protocols that followed the 
decision has been firmly obstructed by pharmaceutical companies: two of 
them, AbbVie and Intermune sought injunctive relief in front of the 
European Court of Justice in order to prevent the regulatory Agency from 
disclosing trials reports315.  
In November 2013 however, the Court of Justice316 annulled the interim 
injunctions against the European Medicines Agency, given the absence of 
sufficient proof provided by the complainants of the “risk of serious and 
irreparable harm” to the companies’ “fundamental right to the protection of 
their business secrets, enshrined in article 339 TFEU, art. 8 of ECHR, and 
in article 7 of the Charter and of their right to an effective remedy, 
enshrined in article 6 of the ECHR and art. 47 of the Charter”317.   
 
Despite the substantial step-forwards made by law and the jurisprudence in 
recent years, much is yet to be done in the definition of the criteria that are 
relevant in the guidance of the balance between the two opposite interests 
involved in the debate over access to clinical trials data, on the one hand the 
economic and competitive interests of originators, on the other, public 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 Cf. supra.  
314  See European Medicines Agency, Mid-year report, January-June 2014, published on the 19th 
September 2014, online available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Report/2014/10/WC500175116.pdf, 
27, where the numbers of documents released after the Ombudsman’s decision in the years 2011, 
2012 and 2013 are shown. However it has to be underlined how the number of documents released 
in 2014 has impressively decreased, this to be explained in light of the “Court cases” that ruled in 
favour of the rejection of the access.  315 The injunctive measure was at first instance given, AbbVie, Inc. and AbbVie Ltd vs. EMA T-44/13 
R (Order of the President of 25th April 2013), Reports of Cases. Not yet published (General Report - 
Section “Information on unpublished decisions”); Intermune Uk e. a. vs. EMA T-73/13, Reports of 
Cases. Not yet published (General Report - Section “Information on unpublished decisions”). 
316 C-390/13, European Medicines Agency vs. Intermune,  Order of the Vice-President of 28th November 
2013, online available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=145281&pageIndex=0&doclang
=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=860401; C-389/13 P(R), European Medicines Agency 
vs. AbbVie, Order of the Vice-President of 28th November 2013, not published. 
317 Paragraph 45.  
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interests related to the collective goods of health, information and scientific 
research.  
Both the interpretational gaps left open by the new Clinical Trials 
regulation, and the contradictory nature of the latest EMA policy advocate a 
deeper understanding of the legal grounds and layouts for the protection of 
industries’ commercially confidential information, and a stronger inquiry 
over the public interests capable of overriding the reasons for secrecy.  
 
3. The European stance on clinical trials transparency in the context 
of the latest international trade developments 
 
The latest positions of the European Medicines Agency as regards clinical 
trials data transparency, as well as the disclosure mandate provided by art. 
81(4) of Regulation EC 536/2014318, have shuttered American regulators’ 
quietness in the context of the TTIP negotiations.   
Indeed, despite the negotiating intents of the European Union aiming at 
reducing “regulatory differences” in the pharmaceuticals sector 319 , 
“including consideration of approaches relating to regulatory 
harmonization, equivalence, or mutual recognition, where appropriate”320, 
the direction ultimately taken up by the European Union with regards to its 
transparency policy and legislation seems to irretrievably lead to the 
opposite arrival point. 
It is exactly in the realm of the discussions related to the creation of 
common pharmaceutical regulatory standards, that the strategic importance 
of clinical trials regulation emerged again. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318 Regulation EU 536/2014 of the European Parliament and of the council of 16 April 2014 on 
clinical trials on medicinal products for human use and repealing Directive 2001/20/EC, cit.. 319 European Commission, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Regulatory Issues. EU 
position on pharmaceutical 
products, 14.5.2014, Brussels 2014, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_152471.pdf . 320 So EU Council, Directives for the negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between 
the European Union and the United States of America, 11103/13 DCL1, 9.10.2014, Brussels, 13. Indeed, as 
it is stated, an agreement on high transatlants standards, would have the benefit of saving on costs, 
and also lead to a faster market authorization of medicinals. On this issue, and specifically focusing 
on the consumer/patient outcomes, see DIELS-THORUN, Chancen und Risiken der Transatlantischen 
Handels- und Investitionspartnerschaft (TTIP) fu ̈r die Verbraucherwohlfahrt, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, WISO 
Diskurs, Bonn 2014, 26-32. 
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Indeed, one of the discussed standards precisely regards the exchanging of 
“confidential/trade secret information”321, including data from applications for 
authorization, between the EU and the US authorities in charge of 
pharmaceutical products, i.e. EMA and FDA.  
The reference to the confidential nature of the information at stake, results of 
particular interests, clearly revealing the negotiating parties’ approach to the 
issue: confidentiality is in fact assumed322, in that way threatening a correct 
interpretation of both EMA’s transparency policy, and the latest Clinical 
Trials Regulation323.  
 
Given that the mentioned Regulation expressly states that “clinical trials 
results (…) in general, should not be considered confidential”324 , the 
implications of this sort of ‘European schizophrenia’ need to be more 
carefully assessed.  
Indeed, on the one hand, it is clear that a systematic exchange of regulatory 
data325 between the two regulatory agencies, as the European Commission 
document states326, would have considerable benefits in terms of “avoiding 
unnecessary clinical trials/testing replication” 327 , and would facilitate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  321 Emphasis added, European Commission: The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). 
Regulatory Issues. EU position on pharmaceutical products, 2. 	   322 In this sense, see MAIER-RIGAUD, Between Transparency and Secrecy- How does the TTIP impact the 
publication policy of clinical studies in the pharmaceuticals field?, Bonn : Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Dep. for 
Economic and Social Policy, 2015, online available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/wiso/11151.pdf, 
stating that “(…) it is problematic that the Commission’s TTIP position focuses on the handling of 
confidential information, and thus apparently a need for confidentiality is assumed in spite of the controversy raging 
over transparency of clinical study reports”. Emphasis added.  
323 WEISS, Trading Health? UK Faculty of Public Health Policy Report on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership, online available at 
http://www.fph.org.uk/uploads/FPH%20Policy%20report%20on%20the%20Transatlantic%20Tra
de%20and%20Investment%20Report%20-%20FINAL.pdf.  
324 Ibid.. Cf. recital 68 Reg. EC 536/2014.  
325 The idea is that of “a permanent cooperation mechanism (e.g. Regulatory Cooperation Council), 
provisions on sharing information on planned regulation and the possibility for the other party to 
comment on it at an early stage, cooperation in collecting data and evidence underlying regulatory 
action and exchange of such information (…)”. See GERSTETTER, Regulatory cooperation under TTIP- 
a risk for democracy and national regulation?, September 2014, online available at 
https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/ttip_study_regulatory_cooperation_under_ttip_1.pdf, 5. 326 European Commission, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Regulatory Issues. EU 
position on pharmaceutical products, supra, 3. 
327 Ibid.. 
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agencies’ administrative assessments328, saving a large amount of testing 
costs, with the associated human and ethical gains329.  
However, on the other hand, if a robust information sharing system 
between the FDA and the EMA could have many positive effects not only 
as regards the overall trade and economic interactions330, but also as regards 
the “issues unrelated to trade and marketing authorization” 331 , more 
attention is to be given to the connotation of confidentiality given to the 
information at stake. Indeed, such an approach could sensitively restrict the 
use of clinical trials data332, in light of the abovementioned exemptions of 
commercial confidentiality posed by the cited Regulation to the general 
disclosure rule under art. 81.4333.  
Harmonization 334  would therefore be easily achieved through the 
interpretative extension of the vague confidentiality exemption335 posed by 
the Clinical Trials Regulation, blurring in that way the important differences 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 Indeed, it has been argued that “with a robust regulatory environment and sharing of information, 
faster achievements could be made to improve the therapeutic benefits of medicines coming to the 
market”. So European Public Health Alliance, Pharmaphorum- TTIP, Bringing benefits to patients or Big 
Pharma?, published on 22nd September 2014, online available at 
http://www.pharmaphorum.com/articles/ttip-bringing-benefits-to-patients-or-big-pharma. 
329 AmCham EU’s position on the Translatic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), Building the framework for 
strenghtening the transatlantic partnership, published on 14th March 2014, online available at 
http://www.amcham.it/detail.asp?c=1&p=0&id=9111, 8, affirming that a common regulatory 
regime for test data, “would avoid unnecessay animal testing and save costs for companies and public 
authorities, while accelerating efforts to protect consumers and the environment”.  330 As the EU Directorate General for Internal Policies has stated, “harmonisation could make life 
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regulatory mechanisms and criminal penalties, innovation could be incentivised, cross-border sharing 
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the EU Directorate General for Internal Policies, Trade Secrets, published in April 2014, online 
available at	   http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2014/493055/IPOL-
JURI_NT(2014)493055_EN.pdf, 12-13. For a broader assessment of the benefits of a International 
Regulatory Cooperation (IRC), see WIENER-ALEMANNO, The Future of International Regulatory 
Cooperation: TTIP as a learning process toward a Global Policy Laboratory, (December 16, 2015), Law & 
Contemporary Problems, Forthcoming; Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 
2016-6, online available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4742&context=lcp. 
331 Regulatory agencies could in fact be facilitated to collaborate on rare diseases, paediatrics, 
medicines barcoding for hospitals, and medicines shortages”. European Public Health Alliance, 
Pharmaphorum- TTIP, Bringing benefits to patients or Big Pharma?, supra, 5. 
332 Ibid.. 
333 Art. 81.4 of Regulation n.536/2014/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on clinical 
trials on medicinal products for human use and repealing Directive 2001/20/EC, supra.  
334 For a general overview on the issue of Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation, see ALEMANNO, 
The Regulatory Cooperation Chapter of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Institutional Structures 
and Democratic Consequences, Journal of International Economic Law, 2015, 18, 625–640. 
335 For a broader assessment of the issue, see infra chapter 2.  
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between national EU and US Regulation336, as regards drugs’ safety and 
efficacy data transparency. Indeed, the US still lacks a mandatory disclosure 
requirement for pharmaceutical test data 337 , Europe thus being- with 
regards to industrial transparency policies- at the forefront338.  
Although it is true, as suggested by some scholars339 , that regulatory 
schemes animated by different policy intents are difficult to reconcile, and 
that “TTIP and any structure for regulatory cooperation created under it 
will have to build on these rules, and is highly unlikely to modify them”340, 
different conclusions are to be reached as regards those regulatory spots 
that are governed by more (political and thus interpretational) uncertainties, 
as is the case of the disclosure rule of pharmaceutical test data. Indeed, it 
should not be underestimated how the youngest and more controversial 
regulatory developments, and most of their future implementation, will be 
influenced by international trade agreements341. These are in fact very likely 
to permeate the delicate EU internal equilibrium between opposite 
stakeholders, breaking through weak normative provisions, and taking with 
that control of the discretion left to regulatory agencies 342  by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 GERSTETTER, Regulatory cooperation under TTIP- a risk for democracy and national regulation?, supra, 5, 
underlining how regulatory differences are nothing else than the product of divergent policy 
orientations regarding pharmaceutical industry and more in general health risks. 337 Cf. supra. On the point, see GALBRAITH, Dying to know: A demand for Genuine Public Access to 
clinical trials result data, Mississippi Law Journal, 78, 4, 2009, 705 ss., 720, referring the words of Abbey 
S. Meyers, President of the National Organization for Rare Disorders, that has significantly declared 
how the “FDA is probably one of the most secretive government agencies that any consumer will 
ever have to deal with. Virtually everything about a drug is considered proprietary. Agency officials 
will not talk to anyone about the drug unless the manufacturer gives them permission to do so”. Cf. 
BECKHAUS, A new prescription to balance secrecy and disclosure in drug-approval processes, 46 U. Mich. J. L. 
Reform 135 (2012), 144.  338 CHOI, Increasing Transparency of Clinical Trials Data in the United States and in Europe, 14 Wash. U. 
Global Stud. L. Rev. 521 (2015), online available at 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss3/9, 527 ss.. 
339 GERSTETTER, Regulatory cooperation under TTIP- a risk for democracy and national regulation?, supra, 6.  
340 Ibid.. 
341 Ibid., underlining how in the “cases where executive bodies are afforded much leeway for 
independent decision-making when implementing legislation, there appears to be the risk that they 
could use that power strategically to implement decisions on harmonization”. More specifically, 
“where an agency (…) wields significant independent decision making power, it could use that power 
strategically to implement decisions taken in the framework of a Regulatory Cooperation Council 
(RCC)”. Ibid., 32.  342 Already stressing the discretion enjoyed by regulatory agencies as a consequence of the short 
circuit between general rules and exemptions, MCGARITY, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in 
Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEo. L. J. 
729, 741-43 (1979); SHAPIRO-MCGARITY, The trade Secret Status of Health and safety testing information: 
Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, in Harvard Law Review, 93, 5, 1980, 837 ss..  
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interpretational ambiguities343 to the benefit of economic interests and to 
the detriment of the fulfilment of other EU “constitutional” obligations344, 
such as the ones of patients and consumers’ protection, as well as of 
competition encouragement345.  
In this perspective, the latest European transparency tendencies have 
already been strongly condemned by the American Chamber of Commerce 
to the European Union, affirming that the new policy of test data access 
could significantly “undermine the trust in the regulatory approval system, 
introducing risks of misinterpretation and misuse of clinical data into the 
process; and weaken incentives for companies to invest in biomedical 
research by disclosing companies’ commercially confidential 
information”346 . In order to maintain a high degree of investments in 
clinical trials, the solution pursued by the American party is the one of 
protection of “patient privacy and commercial confidential information and 
trade secrets in their respective clinical trials and marketing authorization 
disclosure policies”347. According to the American Chamber of Commerce 
to the European Union, a different attitude towards the protection of the 
strategic commercial asset of pharmaceutical testing data, would clearly lead 
towards solutions that are inconsistent with both Europe’s and America’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  343 Cf. LYNDON, Secrecy and access in an innovation intensive economy: reordering information privileges in an 
environmental health, and safety law, 2007, 78 University of Colorado Law Review, 465 ss., 466-467, 
underlining how the “lack of clarity in the law has led to a default mode of decision making, case-by-
case balancing of interests. This approach tends to favour the party with the more immediate, 
concrete, and well financed interest, which is most often the commercial party”, and further noting 
how “loose exemptions for commercial information allow firms to opt out of societal learning and 
drain resources from the market, from research, and from regulation”. Cf. also LYNDON, Secrecy and 
Innovation in Tort Law and Regulation, 23 N.M.L Rev. 1 (1993), online available at 
http://lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr/volumes/23/1/01_lyndon_secrecy.pdf, 2 ss.. 
344 PETERSMAN, Transformative Transatlantic Free Trade Agreements Without Rights and Remedies of 
Citizens?, in Journal of International Economic Law, 2015, 18, 579–607, who especially insists on art. 21 of 
the Lisbon Treaty on the functioning of the EU, listing the guiding principles of the Union’s action 
on the international scene, amongst which also “(…) human rights and international principles of 
law”, therefore shaping a European Union citizenship that “goes beyond membership in the political 
communities of EU Member States and of the EU itself”. Ibid., 580.    345 For a broader assessment on the issue see MATTHEWS, Intellectual Property Rights, Human Rights 
and the Right to Health, Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper 24/2009, online 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1414900, stressing on the 
importance of art. 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and art. 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights regarding Access to Medicines in the broadest 
sense possible.  
346 AmCham EU’s position on the Translatic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), Building the framework for 
strenghtening the transatlantic partnership, supra, 11. 
347 Ibid., 15. 
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international obligations as established in the TRIPs Agreement under art. 
39348. According to this view, this is exactly what the latest European 
developments end up doing: infringing already established international 
standards of protection349.  
These same WTO standards would be substantially improved if the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership were to become “living 
law”350. Indeed the bilateral agreement at stake would evidently raise the 
threshold posed by the WTO Agreement on trade related aspects of 
intellectual property rights (TRIPs), as a consequence of a greater- and 
stricter- attention given to trade secret protection 351 , without any 
mentioning of the public interest or of a commercial use that must be unfair 
in order to meet the protection requirements 352 . In fact, during the 
negotiations carried out so far, the importance of enhancing the protection 
of trade secrets as a form of intellectual property has been firmly 
stressed353. However, at a closer look, the enforcement of trade secret 
protection has been pursued not only by the USA354  but also by the 
European Union355, calling for broader commercial confidentiality356 in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 Ibid., 35. 
349 “The Us should raise trade related concerns with these EMA policies in the context of the TTIP 
discussions”. Ibid.. 350  Cf. ALEMANNO, The Regulatory Cooperation Chapter of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership: Institutional Structures and Democratic Consequences, supra, 625 ss..  
351 HUFBAUER-CIMINO-ISAACS, How will TPP and TTIP change the WTO system?, in Journal of 
International Economic Law (2015), 18 (3), 679-696 
352 Cf. art. 39.3 TRIPs Agreement. See infra chapter 2.  
353 “As knowledge and information become increasingly valuable and increasingly targeted for theft 
by domestic competitors and, in some cases, foreign entities and even governments, mechanisms to 
protect trade secrets become essential. TTIP should include strong protections for trade secrets, 
which should be done through expressly recognising trade secrets as intellectual property, in line with 
TRIPS articles 1.2 and 39. Governments could also consider ways they could work together to 
promote adequate and effective trade secret protections in third countries. This could be achieved 
through the inclusion of robust trade secret protections in bilateral and multilateral instruments 
pursued by each government, for example”. AmCham EU’s position on the Translatic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), Building the framework for strenghtening the transatlantic partnership, supra, 36-37. Cfr. EU 
Directorate General for Internal Policies- Trade Secrets, supra, 10.  
354 Cf. YEH, Protection of Trade Secrets: overview of Current Law and Legislation, released on the 5th 
September 2014, online available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R43714.pdf.  
355 WEISS-MIDDLETON-SCHRECKER, Warning: TTIP could be hazardous to your health, J. Of Public 
Health, Sept. 2015, 37, 367-369. 
356 European Commission, Study on Trade Secrets and Confidential Business Information in the Internal 
Market, published on April 2013, online available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/trade-secrets/130711_final-
study_en.pdf, 15. 
	   71	  
latest Proposal for a European Trade Secret Directive 357 . Here, an 
extremely vague definition of the same notion of trade secret is given358, in 
that way strewing uncertainties359 on three different- though intertwined- 
legislative levels, namely EU intellectual property regulation, EU data 
transparency regulation, and finally international trade investment law.  
 
4. Normative flexibilities and the  “reflexive governance” over clinical 
trials data  
 
A critical assessment of the latest regulatory and policy developments 
achieved by European institutions in the field of pharmaceutical regulatory 
data shows the weakness- or better said the ineffectiveness- of legal 
solutions regarding the management of such a strategic commercial asset.  
Apart from the dubious valence of the European Medicines Agency’s policy 
document, that is to be referred to the bizarre terms of use of the published 
clinical study reports, greater attention is to be given to the disclosure 
obligation under art. 81 (4), and more generally to the other European 
transparency norms, such as the ones on access to EU documents360. 
Indeed the normative technique used by the European legislator in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets), against their unlawful acquisition, 
use and disclosure, 28 November 2013, online available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52013PC0813. See SOUSA-SILVA, What exactly is a trade secret under 
the proposed Directive?, in Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 2014, 9, 11 ss.; cf. also GRASSIE, 
Trade Secrets: The new EU enforcement regime, Journal of Intellectual Property Law & 
Practice (2014) 9 (8), 677-683. For a rather positive comment on the normative text, see KNAAK-
KUR-HILTY, Comments of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition of 3 June 2014 on the 
Proposal of the European Commission for a Directive on the Protection of undisclosed Know-How and Business 
Information (Trade Secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure of 28 November 2013, online 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2464971. For a deeper assessment 
see infra Chapter 2.  358 SOUSA-SILVA, What exactly is a trade secret under the proposed Directive?, supra, 12. Criticising such an 
approach, LEVINE, The People’s Trade Secrets?, 18 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 61 (2011), 10, 
underlining how a broad definition of trade secrets becomes particularly dangerous when applied in 
the context of Freedom of Information Laws’ exemptions: “particularly because the focus in such 
cases is public values such as disclosure of information through transparency, narrowingly tailoring  the 
definition of a trade secret is a good idea”. Emphasis added.  
359 Stressing the need for greater legal clarity, APLIN, A critical evaluation of the proposed Trade Secret 
Directive, July 2014, online available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2467946&download=yes, 32 ss.. 
360 E.g. Regulation EC 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001, 
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, supra. Cf. 
supra.  
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ordering of opposite interests of different stakeholders is the one of a 
hierarchical disposition of them361, in the form of a normative structure 
combining them along the lines of a general rule (sustaining the higher 
public interest) and of an exemption (defending-although in a subordinate 
position- the particular commercial interest). Also existing literature on the 
subject matter has been adopting a hierarchical approach to justify the 
reconciliation of contrasting demands, by focusing on the definition of the 
higher public interest in access to research knowledge 362  from a 
fundamental rights perspective 363 , as well as a public good rationale 
standpoint364.  
However, not far from theoretical declarations, in the leap from books to 
action, things change drastically, and the clarity of legislative and policy 
orientations starts to fade away in the moment of the concrete settlement of 
clashing interests during practical- i.e. judicial and administrative- assessment 
of the interaction between general disclosure rules and particular 
confidentiality exemptions.  
 
4.1 Judicial balancing tests and contingent interpretative solutions 
 
The European Ombudsman’s decision reflects the difficulty of the 
balancing between opposed interests 365 , even if guided by the 
abovementioned judicial “three-step test”366. As literature has noticed367, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 Cf. SVETIEV, European Regulatory Private  Law: From Conflicts to Platforms, in PURNHAGEN-
ROTT, Varieties of European Economic Law and Regulation, Liber Amicorum for Hans Micklitz, Springer, 
2014, 154 ss..  
362 See infra Conclusions 1.2.  363 LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: the human rights case for clinical trials 
transparency, supra, 65. 364 REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in international intellectual property law: The case for a 
public goods approach, supra, 4. 
365 Cf. BECKHAUS, A new prescription to balance secrecy and disclosure in drug-approval processes, supra, 143, 
with particular reference to the US Supreme Court ruling Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 290-91 
(1979), where the need for a “balancing” between private and public interests” is regarded by the 
Court as an essential means for the concrete evaluation of the commercial valence of corporates’ 
information. Cf. also UNLU, It Is Time: Why the FDA Should Start Disclosing Drug Trial Data, 16 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. Rav. 511, 525-35 (2010), 525 ss.. 
366 Cf. supra.  
367 LYNDON, Secrecy and access in an innovation intensive economy: reordering information privileges in 
environmental, health, and safety law, supra, 523.  
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the balancing between different interests is very likely to become an 
effective presumption in favour of secrecy.  
Likewise, these kinds of judicial tests368 can surely be a precious guide for a 
contingent decision-making based on an aut-aut perspective369-, but they 
appear to be far from addressing the necessity of establishing a clear legal 
framework, functioning as an effective basis for the shaping of public 
friendly legal solutions370.   
To the contrary, literature371 has been underlining how vague normative 
confidentiality exemptions have constituted an open door for the successful 
accomplishment of information segregation practices regarding regulatory 
data372, as well as other allegedly commercial sensitive information, such as 
the one related to the environmental impact of corporate activities373 . 
Loose exemptions for commercial information have therefore allowed firms 
to “opt out of societal learning and drain resources from the market, from 
research, and from regulation”374. 
In this light, especially American case law shows how, although “the plain 
text of the legal framework suggests otherwise”375, litigation interactions 
end up overturning legislative schemes. 
Indeed, if there are very few European rulings to be found as regards access 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  368 On the issue, see UNLU, It Is Time: Why the FDA Should Start Disclosing Drug Trial Data, supra, 525.  
369 LEVINE, The people’s trade secrets, supra, 85. Cf. also LYNDON, Secrecy and access in an innovation 
intensive economy: reordering information privileges in environmental, health, and safety law, supra, 467, observing 
how “balancing may also be short sighted, as decision makers may fail to perceive the systemic 
implications of each particular dispute”.  
370 Cf. GIVELBER-ROBBINS, Public Health vs. Court sponsored secrecy, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., 131 (2006); see also V.V. A.A., Symposium Secrecy in Litigation, 81 CHI. KENT L. REV. 
(2006) 301, 301–808.   371 BECKHAUS, A new prescription to balance secrecy and disclosure in drug-approval processes, supra, 142 ss.. 372 Not only in the field of pharmaceuticals, but also chemicals cf. LYNDON, Secrecy and Innovation in 
Tort Law and Regulation, 23 N.M. L. Rev. 1 (1993), 2 ss.. 
373 Regarding environmental information, see LYNDON, Secrecy and access in an innovation intensive 
economy: reordering information privileges in environmental, health, and safety law, supra, passim; SAND, The Right 
to Know: Environmental Information disclosure by Government and Industry, 2002, online available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228464480_The_Right_to_Know_Environmental_Infor
mation_Disclosure_by_Government_and_Industry; American Bar Association, Section of 
Environment, Energy, and Resources, Trade Secret and Confidential Business Information Briefing Paper, 
published in March 2014, online available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/environment_energy_resources/whi
tepapers/tsca/TSCA_paper_CBI_briefing.authcheckdam.pdf. For a deep general assessment see 
BÜNGER, Deficits in EU and US Mandatory Environmental Information Disclosure, Springer, 2011.  
374 LYNDON, Secrecy and access in an innovation intensive economy: reordering information privileges in 
environmental, health, and safety law, supra, 468.  
375 BECKHAUS, A new prescription to balance secrecy and disclosure in drug-approval processes, supra, 143.  
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to pharmaceutical safety data requests 376 , the US jurisprudence 377  is 
considerably richer and has established various rules for the definition of 
the scope of the fourth exemption 378  to the American Freedom of 
Information Act. One worth to mention, for example, is the famous ruling 
Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA379, where the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia has identified the “decisive” criterion for the 
solution of the secrecy/transparency dilemma in the “substantial harm” that 
disclosure would cause to the “competitive position of the (legal) person 
from whom the information was obtained”380.  
The case in question is important because it offers a relatively unique 
attention towards public interest concerns381, running with that contrary to 
the typical broad interpretation of the fourth FOIA exemption traditionally 
given by courts382. 
Indeed, in the American judicial panorama, the case in question appears to 
be isolated from the majority of the rulings, which have generally failed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
376 Cf. supra.  
377 For a general assessment see UNLU, It Is Time: Why the FDA Should Start Disclosing Drug Trial Data, 
supra, 528 ss.; see also BECKHAUS, A new prescription to balance secrecy and disclosure in drug-approval 
processes, supra, 141 ss..  
378 Cf. Department of Justice- Guide to the Freedom of Information Act, Exemption 4, online 
available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/exemption4_0.pdf, 
263 ss..  
379 Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1290-91 (D.C. Cir. 1983). For a broad 
comment see Department of Justice- Guide to the Freedom of Information Act, Exemption 4, supra, 
273 ss..  
380 Ibid.. 
381 UNLU, It Is Time: Why the FDA Should Start Disclosing Drug Trial Data, supra, 527, recalling a 
footnote of the cited ruling, in which the court concluded that “lumping health and safety testing data 
with all other types of information is inherently suspect”. 
382 Significantly, the Court underlined the inadequacy of the common notion of trade secrets, 
originated in the context of breaches of contract by employees and of “other fiduciary obligations”, 
but resulting “ill-suited for the public law context in which the FOIA determinations must be made”. 
Hence, the need of a proper determination of trade secret protection on the basis of the context of 
its implementation: more specifically, in the Court’s belief, the freedom of information context 
should lead the legal reasoning to the necessary consideration of the theoretical underpinnings of 
trade secret protection itself, to be carefully evaluated and weighted in order to respect the core value 
of transparency in the public infrastructure More specifically, Public Citizen adopts a utilitarian 
acceptation of trade secrets defined as “a secret, commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or 
device that is used for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of trade commodities and 
that can be said to be the end product of either innovation or substantial effort”. Pub. Citizen Health 
Research Grp. v. FDA, supra, 1289. LEVINE, The people’s trade secrets, supra, 81. For a comment, see also 
BOYCE, Disclosure of Clinical Trials Data: Why Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act Should be 
Restored, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 3, 16 ss.. Cf. also BECKHAUS, A new prescription to balance 
secrecy and disclosure in drug-approval processes, supra, 143, “(…) hence, documentation in the drug-approval 
process that manufacturers identify as a trade secret or as otherwise commercially relevant is not 
commonly disclosed to the public”. 
	   75	  
strike the right balance of interests383, and which have not quite considered 
the public interest in disclosure when deciding over attempts to access 
research data held by the regulatory agency384. Especially lower courts have 
easily found the mentioned “competitive harm” requirement satisfied385, 
given the evidence of the existence of actual competition in the drug 
business, and more precisely between the “small fraction” of drug firms 
who reach the market stage, and the manufacturers seeking approval to 
market the drug in generic form386 . As a strand of the literature has 
noticed387, approaching the problem in these terms makes it very easy for 
manufacturers to oppose disclosure, by stating that some competitor could 
gain competitive benefits from the publicity of test data388. Indeed, if the 
competition harm test developed by US Courts implies, as stated, a 
qualitative threshold to be found in a substantial harm, it does not require 
actuality of the competitive damage389, in that way considerably extending 
the legal space for judicial secrecy demands.  Ultimately, “the confidentiality 
test thus appears to be incapable of balancing interests because it focuses 
extensively on the nature and magnitude of competitive harm to private 
interests and fails to consider the extent or magnitude of the public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383 UNLU, It Is Time: Why the FDA Should Start Disclosing Drug Trial Data, supra, 526; LURIE-ZIEVE, 
Sometimes Silence can be like the Thunder: Access to Pharmaceutical data at the FDA, 69 Law 
and Contemporary Problems 85-98 (2006), online available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol69/iss3/5. 
384 BOYCE, Disclosure of Clinical Trials Data: Why Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act Should be 
Restored, supra, 16-18.  
385 On the issue LEVINE, The people’s trade secrets, supra, 111-112, recalling a ruling by the Ombudsman 
from New Zealand, who established a precise set of rules, to be applied in the decision between 
disclosure and commercial confidentiality: in balancing the public interest in information and the 
commercial interest in confidentiality, the Ombudsman weighs 1) the specific market activity to 
which the information is related, 2) number of competitors, degree of competition and other 
characteristics of the market, (…) 3) the degree to which disclosure would put a competitor to an 
advantage. “While still focused on commercial gain, this test has two primary strenghts: 1) it forces 
governments (alias regulatory agencies) to establish a clear connection between the information and 
its commercial efforts and 2) it implicitly recognizes that there may be information for which even 
commercial concerns are not significant enough to warrant denial of disclosure”.  386 Cf. UNLU, It Is Time: Why the FDA Should Start Disclosing Drug Trial Data, supra, 528, quoting the 
case Citizens Comm'n on Human Rights v. FDA, 1993 WL 1610471, where the court stated how a 
competitor in possession of raw research data and results “could also use the information to submit 
its own NDA to FDA for the same or similar drug product”. 
387 LEVINE, The people’s trade secrets, supra, 85. 
388 UNLU, It Is Time: Why the FDA Should Start Disclosing Drug Trial Data, supra, 529, citing the case 
Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Nat'l Inst. of Health, 209 F.Supp. 2d 37, 51. (D.D.C. 2002) 
389 As required, to the contrary, by the judicial test developed by the European Ombudsman, see 
supra.  
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interest”390. Moreover, due to the recalled interpretational uncertainties, and 
the courts’ difficulty to line drawing, these judicial tests only end up 
increasing litigation rates391, with the result of a long series of oscillating 
judicial ad hoc decisions, that add nothing to the deeper theoretical problem 
of the relationship between trade secrets rules and those on freedom of 
information392.  
 
4.2 The role of administrative agencies as soft regulators in the 
context of healthcare policy 
 
At this point, a step back should be made: indeed, it has been just 
demonstrated how courts have come to reverse normative prescriptions, by 
regarding health and safety information about marketed medicinal products’ 
as a companies’ commercial asset worth of protection under trade secret 
schemes.  
However, the judicial stage is only the second one of a litigation route that 
has its starting point in the direct request of the clinical trials protocol to the 
regulatory agency that has assessed the same test data for marketing 
purposes. As regards the regulatory agency’s access policy, the European 
case has already been analysed above and, with that, its criticalities revealed.  
As far as the American regulatory policies are concerned, a trend very 
similar to the judicial one should be highlighted. Indeed, as literature has 
widely underlined393, despite the enactment in 1967 of the Freedom of 
Information Act provisions and of further provisions encouraging 
disclosure, the Food and Drug Administration has tended, to “act 
cautiously, even fearfully, when dealing with proprietary claims to 
information” 394 , and has hence withheld health and safety data as 
confidential.  
Normative flexibilities and consequent legal uncertainties surrounding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
390 UNLU, It Is Time: Why the FDA Should Start Disclosing Drug Trial Data, supra, 529. 
391 LEVINE, The people’s trade secrets, supra, 113. 
392 Ibid.. 
393 LYNDON, Secrecy and Innovation in Tort Law and Regulation, supra, 23. 
394 Ibid.. 
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transparency provisions have therefore left even administrative agencies as 
rulers of their own policies, resulting particularly sensitive to the demands 
of marketing firms for broad confidentiality395. To put it in other words, 
thus, under current normative frameworks and at a pre-litigation stage, 
disclosure of R&D data has been predominantly a matter of administrative 
discretion396, further widening “nondisclosure privileges”397. According to 
this perspective, regulatory agencies’ have become managers of 
pharmaceutical firms’ research agenda, and therefore regulators of 
innovation and entry in the pharmaceutical market398. However, as has 
been noticed399, agencies have little evidence of the effective commercial 
value of the test data, being, as public institutions, necessarily external to the 
regulated industry, with no proper instruments to estimate the effects of 
releasing the information. Moreover, the only source they can enquire as 
regards the competitive value of the information at stake are the protocol 
submitters themselves400, whose evaluation can evidently not be objective.  
Furthermore, the combined analysis of the Clinical Trials Regulation’s 
transparency mandate and the European Medicines Agency policy 
document have shown how the ultimate definition of what part of clinical 
trials data have to be considered of commercial value is competence of the 
regulatory agency401. In this light, the high administrative costs needed to 
evaluate the submitted protocols in order to identify what is commercially 
valuable, should be considered another factor feeding the scope of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  395 SHAPIRO-MCGARITY, The trade Secret Status of Health and safety testing information: Reforming Agency 
Disclosure Policies, supra, 841.  396 Insisting on the point, even if in the context of the safety and efficacy data of chemical products, 
LYNDON, Secrecy and access in an innovation intensive economy: reordering information privileges in environmental, 
health, and safety law, supra, 501. Cf. Secrecy and Innovation in Tort Law and Regulation, supra, 35, stating how 
regulatory agencies “whose mandate is to foster health protection, end up in the anomalous position 
of ‘sanitising’ and protecting industry documents, editing chemical identities and health information 
out of disclosure systems, and thinking up ways of describing health effects so that no one will figure 
out what they are”.  
397 LYNDON, Secrecy and access in an innovation intensive economy: reordering information privileges in 
environmental, health, and safety law, supra, 469.  
398 EISENBERG, The Problem of new Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 717, 730 
(2005).  
399 LYNDON, Secrecy and access in an innovation intensive economy: reordering information privileges in 
environmental, health, and safety law, supra, 502; LYNDON, Secrecy and Innovation in Tort Law and Regulation, 
supra, 2.  400 Ibid., indeed the “Agencies usually cannot contact the claimant’s rivals—the most useful source 
for fact checking— without risking disclosure”.  
401 Cf. supra.  
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commercial exemptions to transparency laws, also at the administrative 
stage402. Indeed, the costs of simply claiming information as competitive or 
proprietary, are in major cases substantially lower403.  
Hence, legal uncertainties pave the way for a highly discretionary 
administrative decision-making, not always observant to the spirit of 
transparency laws.  
 
These last acknowledgements lead to deeper, more general considerations, 
regarding the role of administrative agencies in the European healthcare 
regulation process and making404 . Indeed, under such vague legislative 
schemes, administrative agencies themselves become the developers of 
“elaborate and flexible mechanisms for interaction of relevant 
stakeholders”405 to specific regulatory problems406.  
More specifically, as regards the European framework, the case of clinical 
trials data transparency regulation offers a perfect example of how the 
promotion of different policy goals is often deferred by the legislator- also, 
as it is in this case, implicitly- to administrative institutions407, working in 
that way as “reflexive platforms” for the governance 408 , and thus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
402 EISENBERG, Patent, Product exclusivity and Information Dissemination: How law directs Biopharmaceutical 
Research and Development, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 477 (2003), 481. Cf. LYNDON, Secrecy and 
Innovation in Tort Law and Regulation, supra, 35, noticing how “the administrative process is 
cumbersome and has greater procedural burdens than parallel common law litigation”.  
403 LYNDON, Secrecy and access in an innovation intensive economy: reordering information privileges in 
environmental, health, and safety law, supra, 519.  404 For a general assessment regarding PERMANAND, EU pharmaceutical regulation: The politics of policy-
making, Manchester University Press, 2006; MOSSIALOS-PERMANAND-BAETEN-HERVEY, 
Health Systems Governance in Europe: The Role of EU Law and Policy, Cambridge University Press, 2010.  
405 SVETIEV, European Regulatory Private Law: From Conflicts to Platforms, cit, 162.  
406 Cf. PERMANAND-VOS, Between Health and the Market: the Roles of the European Medicines Agency and 
European Food Safety Authority, Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper 2008/4, online available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1337111. 
407 SVETIEV, European Regulatory Private Law: From Conflicts to Platforms, cit, 170. PERMANAND-
VOS, Between Health and the Market: the Roles of the European Medicines Agency and European Food Safety 
Authority, supra, 8 ss..  
408 BROUSSEAU-GLACHANT, Regulators as Reflexive Governance Platforms, in Competition and Regulation 
in Network Industries, 2011, 12, 3 194 ss.. Cf. EVERSONE-MAJONE-METCALFE-SCHOUT, The 
Role of Specialised Agencies in Decentralising EU Governance, 2000, report presented at the European 
Commission, online available at http://ec.europa.eu/governance/areas/group6/contribution_en.pdf. 
On the point also PERMANAND-VOS, Between Health and the Market: the Roles of the European 
Medicines Agency and European Food Safety Authority, supra, 6, referring to a “so-called new ‘modes of 
governance’ (NMG) approach to the making and enforcing of rules at EU level. The NMG debate 
focuses on the shift away from the traditional ‘Community Method’ of regulation to embrace softer, more 
responsive and reflexive modes (…)”. Emphasis added. Talking about an emerging architecture 
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coordination, of different interests, rights, regulations, and, ultimately, 
policy goals409. In other terms, under a normative framework such as the 
one at stake, agencies appear to function as a legitimate and competent link 
between the collective interest and the other stakeholders involved, such as 
healthcare professionals, industry, patient and consumer organizations, and 
other non-governmental organizations410.  
Thus, it could be said that when the conciliation between contradictory 
interests appears to be particularly complex, effective regulation411 happens 
in the shadows of the law, along the lines of what literature has defined as a 
“two stage implementation process”412: indeed, on the one side regulators 
implement the “basic ruling” as shaped by the legislator, improving 
“feasibility and efficiency of the law”, supplying to “the lack of specialized 
knowledge” of the legislator” itself413. On the other side, however, this 
mechanism leaves free decisional space to agencies, capable of acting as “ex 
post minimisers” of legislators’ strong stances in favour of one policy goal 
or the other414, and sometimes ending up reversing normative dictates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“experimentalist governance in the EU”, SABEL-ZEITLIN, Experimentalist Governance, in LEVI-
FAUR(ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Governance, Oxford University Press, 2012, 322 ss.. 
409 “The role of regulators is therefore to attempt to ensure both, a sufficient coordination among 
actors to guarantee the long term dynamic of innovation and redistribution of welfare gains to the 
various stakeholders”. So BROUSSEAU-GLACHANT, Regulators as Reflexive Governance Platforms, 
supra, 195. For a critical view, SVETIEV, Private Actors and their Advisers in Administrative Agency 
Networks, in BAILLEUX-VAUCHEZ, Exploring the transnational circulation of policy paradigms: Law Firms, 
Legal Networks and the Production of Expertise in the Field of Competition Policies,  2014, online available at 
http://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/21st-
June_GGP_EUIEXPLORING-THE-TRANSNATIONAL-CIRCULATION-OF-POLICY-
PARADIGMS_21st-June_GGP_EUI.pdf, 22, recalling how “various scholars from different 
disciplinary perspectives have suggested that these processes of ‘agentification’ and networking can 
be constitutionally suspect and can lead to a reduction of national autonomy in administrative as well 
in private law”.  
410 PERMANAND-VOS, Between Health and the Market: the Roles of the European Medicines Agency and 
European Food Safety Authority, supra, 38. Cf. also PERMANAND, EU pharmaceutical regulation: The 
politics of policy-making, supra, 134 ss..  
411 Cf. GERADIN, The Development of European Regulatory Agencies: Lessons from the American Experience, 
in GERARDIN-MUNOZ-PETIT, Regulation through Agencies in the EU, A new Paradigm of European 
Governance, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2005, 215 ss.. 
412 BROUSSEAU-GLACHANT, Regulators as Reflexive Governance Platforms, supra, 201.  
413 Ibid.. Underlining this point also PERMANAND-VOS, Between Health and the Market: the Roles of the 
European Medicines Agency and European Food Safety Authority, supra, 5.  
414 BROUSSEAU-GLACHANT, Regulators as Reflexive Governance Platforms, supra, 194, even if the 
perspective adopted by the Authors is radically the opposite: indeed, the Authors argue that 
regulatory agencies act in order to remedy the “errors introduced by an excessive politicization of the 
law”, and more in general “the sensitivity” of legislators “to pure political strategic lobbying”. 
However, I believe that in the case of vague normative provisions, as the ones examined, also the 
opposite process that has been illustrated, can be made by regulators.  
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through evaluation of exemptions favouring private actors415. Hence, where 
hard law cannot properly fulfil its tasks416, the result is that of a “re-
regulation” of the European health(care) issues with internal market policy 
relevance: literature analysing this phenomenon417, has therefore regarded 
the Medicines Agency’s action as a fundamental part of what has been 
defined as the “new EU healthcare governance patchwork”418, stressing the 
“resort to more soft mechanisms for deliberation and networking with the 
various actors”419. 
Against this backdrop, it cannot be overlooked how the pharmaceutical 
regulatory agencies’ ruling over clinical trials protocols’ access has until now, 
even in light of the new policy statements, run contrary to the nature of 
public institutions of the same agencies, who should have actually been 
more sensitive to the promotion of the general interest.  
In this perspective, a final consideration seems to be necessary. Indeed, 
many authors have welcomed the above-illustrated subsidiary decision-
making architecture, in light of agencies’ technical and specialized expertise, 
that should lead to independent policy choices420. However, there’s growing 
literature questioning this alleged independence421: also in this regards, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
415 In this sense SVETIEV, Private Actors and their Advisers in Administrative Agency Networks, supra,  21 
ss..  
416 Stressing this point, MCKEE-MOSSIALOS, Health policies and European Law: Closing the Gaps, 2006, 
Public Health, online available at http://www.publichealthjrnl.com/article/S0033-3506(06)00189-
2/pdf.  
417 PERMANAND-VOS, Between Health and the Market: the Roles of the European Medicines Agency and 
European Food Safety Authority, cit, passim.  
418 This expression has been successfully used by HERVEY-VANHERCKE, Healthcare and the EU: 
The Law and Policy Patchwork, in MOSSIALOS-PERMANAND-BAETEN-HERVEY, Health Systems 
Governance in Europe: The Role of EU Law and Policy, supra, 84 ss.. 
419 PERMANAND-VOS, Between Health and the Market: the Roles of the European Medicines Agency and 
European Food Safety Authority, supra, 41.  
420 Cf. European Commission, European Governance: a White Paper, Brussels, 25 July 2001, online 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-01-10_en.htm. For the relevant literature see 
MAJONE, Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance, in European Union 
Politics, 2, 2001, 103 ss.; GROENLEER, The actual Practice of Agency Autonomy: Tracing the developmental 
trajectories of the European Medicines Agency and the European Food Safety Authority, published on 3rd August 
2011, Open Forum CES, 5, online available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1904462, underlining how autonomy has been 
the major reason for the creation of administrative agencies such as the European Medicines Agency. 
For a general assessment cf. also VOS, Indipendence, Accountability and Transparency of European Regulatory 
Agencies, in GERARDIN-MUNOZ-PETIT, Regulation through Agencies in the EU, A new Paradigm of 
European Governance, supra, 120 ss..  
421 GROENLEER, The actual Practice of Agency Autonomy: Tracing the developmental trajectories of the 
European Medicines Agency and the European Food Safety Authority, supra, 1, noticing how “we do not know 
much about how EU agencies’ de facto autonomy comes about”. The Author interestingly 
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European Medicines Agency’s attitude as regards test data’s transparency 
requests, reveals a much greater complexity related to the actual 
“dependence” of the agency’s action on the interests of the same actors the 
agency itself networks 422.  
Indeed, the role of “private actors”, and more specifically, of 
pharmaceutical industry, in the decision process should not be 
underestimated423 . As it has been outlined424 , it is exactly in front of 
individual case-decision making, such as the decision over R&D protocols 
access requests, that the vulnerability of administrative institutions to the 
capture by the industry becomes less quiescent and more perceptible425.  
 
5. First Conclusions 
 
In light of these concerns, it becomes clear how, although the same 
European Commission has declared that agencies “can adopt individual 
decisions in specific areas but cannot adopt general regulatory measures”426 and 
that they cannot be granted decision-making powers “in areas in which they 
would have to arbitrate between conflicting public interests, exercise 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
distinguishes between “autonomy by design” or “de jure autonomy” and an “actual autonomy”, 
noticing  how “the close relationship between agencies and other actors make it difficult to point to 
autonomy in practice”.  
422 Stressing this point, SVETIEV, Private Actors and their Advisers in Administrative Agency Networks, 
supra, 22-23.  
423 Ibid., 21 ss., focusing on interactions between “authorities and private actors who are the objects” 
of authorities’ policy making, examining in closer detail the ‘infrastructure’ of EU agency networks 
and the way in which this infrastructure affects agency’s decision-making in individual cases and the 
interaction with private parties and their representatives and advisers”.  
424 Ibid., 23. 
425 Cf. PERMANAND, EU pharmaceutical regulation: The politics of policy-making, supra, 129-130, focusing 
on the European Medicines Agency members’ relation to the industry. More specifically the Author 
cites the notorious ‘Poggiolini affair’ of 1990, where the head of an agency’s committee, who was at 
the same time also the head of the Italian drug Agency, was accused of taking bribes and gifts by the 
pharmaceutical industry. Moreover, literature has also underlined how strict political interests and the 
ones of the industry are often deeply intertwined, and, therefore, how political and ‘industrial’ control 
of administrative agencies’ policies run much more parallel that one could expect. Indeed it has been 
noticed hoe “the behaviour of board members is highly dependent on the interests that member 
states have in the agency’s activities. Countries with large pharmaceutical companies in particular want to keep a 
watchful eyes on the agency’s activities, which has sometimes politicisized discussions in the board.” So 
GROENLEER, The actual Practice of Agency Autonomy: Tracing the developmental trajectories of the European 
Medicines Agency and the European Food Safety Authority, supra, 10.  
426 European Commission, European Governance: a White Paper, supra, 5. Emphasis added.   
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political discretion or carry out complex economic assessments”427 , in 
practice things are quite different. Indeed, exactly in those regulatory areas 
where legislation faces the difficulties of coordination between clashing 
interests, weak normative solutions- such as the one of the general rule- 
exemption scheme entailed in art. 81(4) of the European Clinical Trials 
Regulation- leave actually room for the European Medicines Agency’s 
individual decision-making to become the source of de facto “general 
regulatory measures”.  
In this perspective, the establishment of a mandatory disclosure rule as 
regards clinical trials data, even if it reflects by the European legislator a 
greater consideration of the need of additional legal tools for the fulfilment 
of social distributive goals, hindered by excessive private control over health 
information428, will not probably have the expected outcomes in terms of 
stronger substantial transparency over the safety and efficacy properties of 
marketed pharmaceutical products. Indeed, as it has been demonstrated 
above, an analysis of both the Regulation EC 536/2014 and the last EMA’s 
policy document shows how disclosure is very likely to remain a question of 
administrative discretion, or, at second instance, of short-sighted judicial 
enforcement.  
 
In this chapter we have shown how decisions over clinical trials data 
disclosure have been governed by interpretational uncertainties in the 
definition on the one side of the public interest underlying the examined 
transparency provisions, and on the other side, of the effective economic 
value of trials data. It has been also underlined how the approach of a case-
to-case balancing and hierarchization of the involved interests leads to 
provisional legal answers, in most cases supporting industry’s requests of 
strategic information concealment.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
427 Ibid.. For a comment see GERADIN, The Development of European Regulatory Agencies: Lessons from the 
American Experience, supra, 225-226. 428 HELLER, The Gridlock Economy: How too much ownership wrecks markets, stops innovation, and costs lives, 
New York, Basic Books, 2010.  
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However, the interpretational short-circuit between general rules and 
confidentiality exemptions, and the consequent ineffectiveness of legislative 
declarations characterising transparency regulations, could be overcome by 
abandoning a strict formalistic approach, and the aut aut perspective of the 
balancing between the two interests involved.  
As it will be argued in the next chapter, composition of opposite demands is 
indeed possible, and necessarily starts from the consideration of the 
compound value of information generated in the R&D process, i.e. the 
commercial value in respect of the risk of free riding practices, and the 
social and public value.  
This perspective is the starting point for a different outline of the examined 
topic. The assumption is that the difficult interplay between general 
disclosure rules and commercial confidentiality exemptions directly stems 
from the conflict between pharmaceutical firms’ rights to protect their 
commercial confidential information, and the right of European citizens, 
patients and consumers to be informed about the safety risks of licensed 
pharmaceutical products. Following these lines of reasoning, the problem of 
clinical trials data transparency results to be contextualized in a broader field 
of enquiry: indeed, the conflict of two distinct rights must be in return read 
as a conflict of two distinct European regulatory sectors, i.e. the laws of 
intellectual property and the freedom of information429, both ultimately 
pursuing different policy goals, respectively regarding the one of steering 
investments and innovation430 , and the one of protecting individuals’ 
fundamental rights to information, health, and transparent scientific 
research. Only through an analysis of the structural interaction of the two 
bodies of law, interpretational ambiguities regarding the implementation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  429	  As far as the European framework is concerned, the set of rules recalled in this chapter are art. 15 
TFUE; Regulation EC 1049/2001 on public access to European Parliament, Council and 
Commission documents (e.g. recital 4), supra, and Rules for implementation of the same Regulation, 
supra; art. 80 Regulation EC n. 726/2004 providing Community procedures for the authorisation and 
supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European 
Medicines Agency, supra; finally art. 81(4) Regulation EU 536/2014 on clinical trials data, supra.  
430 Cf. LYNDON, Secrecy and access in an innovation intensive economy: reordering information privileges in 
environmental, health, and safety law, supra, 467, underlining the increasing importance of information in 
the contemporary economy, and the consequent development of legal tools for the protection of 
strategic informational assets.  
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general disclosure rules against confidentiality exemptions can be 
definitively addressed.  
This same analysis will ultimately lead to a reconsideration of European 
intellectual property and transparency rules within a legal model that is 
primarily based on business sustainment rationales, but which ultimately 
intends to bend R&D incentive goals to public health ones, by mandating 
information disclosure, once data’s economic value has been secured within 
quasi-proprietary rights managed by the regulatory agency itself. In other 
terms, public friendly patterns will be shaped not despite, but rather on the 
basis of a correct acknowledgment and subsequent legal control of economic 
forces pressing against the disclosure option, for the sake of safeguarding 
companies’ long and costly R&D processes. 
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Chapter 2 
Secrecy’s legal framework 
	  
1. Commercially confidential interests over clinical trials data 
 
The definition of which part of clinical trials study reports is to be 
considered commercially confidential information, therefore falling under 
the exemption to general transparency rules, ultimately relies on the 
decision of the European Medicines Agency in assessing the weigh of 
private and public interests. 
The weakness of this mechanism is illustrated by the decrease in the 
number of documents to which access has been given in 2014, due to 
“court cases”431, where pharmaceutical companies succeeded in claiming 
proprietary rights over the whole amount of data submitted to regulatory 
authorities in the context of a filing application.  
The economic “incentives to claim confidential business information”, 
together with the legislative “ease of doing so”, thus appear to be “feeding 
the expansion of exemptions”432. 
This expansion is to be referred to two main factors: on the one side is the 
interpretation of the notion of commercially confidential information, on 
the basis of which the regulatory Agency has to define which part of the 
clinical study reports is to be revealed or not; on the other side is the 
existence of other bodies of law, containing provisions specifically aimed at 
protecting pharmaceutical industry’s data 433 . As a result of their 
combination, the implementation of mandatory results reporting systems of 
testing results has to be justified in light of the regulators’ legal obligation to 
commercial data protection434.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
431 European Medicines Agency, Mid-year report, January-June 2014, supra, 7.  432 LYNDON, Secrecy and access in an innovation intensive economy: reordering information privileges in an 
environmental health, and safety law, supra, 507. 
433 See Infra. 
434 Stressing this point LEMMENS- TELFER, Access to Information and the Right to Health: the Human 
Rights Case for Clinical Trials Transparency, supra, 81 ss.. 
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The European Medicines Agency is indeed bound to protect commercial 
test data both under general trade secret provisions to be possibly enacted 
in the European Union with the definitive approval of a European Trade 
Secret Directive, and, more specifically, as a result of the obligation to data 
exclusivity posed on the same Agency by Directive 2001/83/EC435, as the 
result of the transposition of the international obligation of scientific data 
protection binding WTO Members under art. 39.3 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  
In this chapter we will hence examine the effectiveness of a general 
transparency rule such as the one provided by art. 81(4) of the Clinical 
Trials Regulation436 as opposed respectively to the forthcoming European 
discipline of trade secrets, to the TRIPS mandate to scientific test data 
protection under art. 39.3, and finally to the European data exclusivity 
provision posed by art. 10 of the Directive 2001/83/EC on medicinal 
products for human use. 
 
2. Information exclusivities in the context of the intellectual property 
system - Some general policy considerations  
 
Before examining more in detail the meaning and the economic 
implications of the regulatory ties allegedly blurring the scope of clinical 
trials information accessibility, some general considerations occur. Indeed, 
as the economy shifts from industrial to informational competition 
patterns437, also the regulatory framework has undergone a move from 
invention-based protection towards new sui generis forms of information 
exclusivity438. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435 Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on 
the Community Code relating to medicinal products for human use, supra. 
436 Regulation EU n. 536/2014, of the European Parliament ad of the Council, of 16 April 2014, on 
clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, and repealing Directive 2001/20/EC, supra. 
437 See REICHMAN, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, 53, 6 
Vanderbilt Law Review, 2000, 1743 ss.; REICHMAN-UHLIR, A contractually reconstructed research 
commons for scientific data in a highly protectionist intellectual property environment, 66 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 2003, 315 ss.. 
438 BRAUN-PUGATCH, The changing face of pharmaceutical industry and intellectual property rights, supra, 599 
ss.. 
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The structure of the pharmaceutical sector’s “safe harbour” from generic 
rivalry appears to be a complex and hybrid system, in behalf of additional 
layers of protection and in some cases alternative as regards to patents, 
strengthening the legal grounds for the concealment of test data underlying 
new medicinal products439. Indeed, apart from patents, companies seem to 
rely always more on other tools for the protection of their intangible assets 
that are to be systematically located at the edge of the intellectual property 
framework440.  
As it will be further demonstrated, the gradual expansion of 
(quasi)proprietary schemes regarding the protection of information goods in 
the era of what has been defined as “intellectual capitalism”441, has led to the 
introduction in the international- and hence supranational- intellectual 
property system of new forms of legal protection of business investments 
that have been critically evaluated by some scholars442, questioning their 
actual nature of intellectual proprietary rights- such as it has happened in 
respect of trade secrecy protection-; or underlining the sui generis nature of 
such a monopoly right in new knowledge in respect of traditional 
intellectual property tools- such as it has been done with regards to the sui 
generis database protection443, or with regards to the sui generis pharmaceutical 
data exclusivity444. As it has been stated in literature445, this trend has lead to 
the proliferation of “hybrid IP regimes” filling “other perceived gaps in the 
system”, with the effect that there are “virtually no products sold on the 
general products market that do not come freighted up with a bewildering 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
439 Ibid., 610.  
440  Cf. REICHMAN-SAMUELSON, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 Vanderbilt Law 
Review (1997), 52 ss.. 
441 DAVID, Koyaanisqatsi in Cyberspace, Stanford Institute for Economic Research, Discussion Paper 
n. 02-29, online available at http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/dev/papers/0502/0502007.pdf, 5.  
442 For a general assessment see ULLRICH, Expansionist Intellectual Property Protection and Reductionist 
Competition Rules: a TRIPS Perspective, in Journal of International Economic Law, 7, 2004, 402 ss.. 
443 Specifically enquiring the issue of database protection REICHMAN-SAMUELSON, Intellectual 
Property Rights in Data?, supra, 64 ss.. 
444 See infra.  
445 Cf. ULLRICH, Expansionist Intellectual Property Protection and Reductionist Competition Rules: a TRIPS 
Perspective, supra, 412 ss.. 
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and overlapping array of exclusive property rights that discourage follow-on 
applications of routine technical know-how”446.  
More specifically, through these peculiar intellectual property tools, and 
through their direct or indirect secrecy outcomes, companies’ valuable R&D 
information has been gradually shielded from the free-riding threats of the 
public domain447.  
It is exactly through consideration of the peculiar “public good” properties 
of intangible assets regarding scientific knowledge- being scientific 
information naturally non-rival and with high production and low re-
production costs448-, that information protectionism tendencies have to be 
better assessed from the double standpoint of short term provision of other 
public goods such as health and scientific research, and of long term 
achievements in terms of innovation and competition449.  
Under these premises, the case of pharmaceutical test data protection 
appears to be of great paradigmatic significance450.  
Indeed trade secrets and data exclusivity, though very differently structured, 
turn out to have the same outcomes in terms of blocking the availability of 
upstream industrial information inputs, with that narrowing the access to 
the scientific research commons and limiting, as some scholars have widely 
stressed, the transfer of information technologies in that what has become a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446 MASKUS-REICHMAN, The Globalisation of Private Knowledge Goods and the Provatization of Global 
Public Goods, in Journal of International Economic Law, 7, 2004, 279 ss., 297.  
447 BOYLE, The Second Enclosure Movement and the construction of the Public Domain,  66 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 2003, 33 ss., and more generally see STIGLITZ, Knowledge as a Public Good, 
in KAUL-GRUNBERG-STERN, Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, 
Oxford Scholarship Online, 2003, 75 ss.. 
448 DAVID, Koyaanisqatsi in Cyberspace, supra, 6; DAVID, The Digital Technology Boomerang: New 
Intellectual Property Rights Threaten Global “Open Science”, Stanford Institute for Economic Research, 
Discussion Paper October 2000, online available at http://www-
siepr.stanford.edu/workp/swp00016.pdf, 7, “knowledge is not an ordinary commodity; it has several 
properties that economists identify as those characterising the general class of “public goods””.  
449  “As private interests take precedence over public concerns, moreover, we argue that the 
proliferation of exclusive rights could raise fundamental roadblocks for the national and global 
provision of numerous other public goods such including scientific research, education, health care, 
biodiversity environmental protection”, and competition, MASKUS-REICHMAN, The Globalisation of 
Private Knowledge Goods and the Provatization of Global Public Goods, supra, 283 ss. and 308. See also 
DAVID, The Digital Technology Boomerang: New Intellectual Property Rights Threaten Global “Open Science”, 
supra, 12 ss.. 
450 This has noticed also by HILGARTNER, Potential Effects of a diminishing Public Domain in Biomedical 
research data, in ESANU-UHLIR, The Role of scientific and technical data and information in the public domain, 
Washington, The National Academy Press, 2003, 133 ss.. 
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transnational system of innovation and production451. This goes in return, 
from an internal market standpoint, to the detriment of generic producers’ 
market entrance possibilities, and from a broader international economic 
viewpoint, at the additional expenses of the follower countries’ ability to 
catch up with the pace of technological change452. 
 
On the other side, nonetheless, in the Pharmaceutical industry, just as in 
other markets, information secrecy is a source of sustained competitive 
advantage453.  
In fact, disclosure of trials information could have the effect of granting the 
competitor commercial benefits provided by products’ insight useful for 
“starting developing the same or a similar medicinal product on their own, 
using the information and data for their own economic advantage”454.  
As the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations 
has underlined, the circulation of commercially valuable information could 
be used in order to develop a similar patented product455. 
Moreover, disclosure could allow competitors, relying on trials data of 
products marketed in the EU, to obtain a license for a same product in a 
foreign jurisdiction456. 
The “concealment” of clinical trials data thus serves as a means of avoiding 
economically inefficient free-riding practices impeding originators to recoup 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
451 MASKUS-REICHMAN, The Globalisation of Private Knowledge Goods and the Provatization of Global 
Public Goods, supra, 309 ss.. 
452Ibid., 282, stating that “the proliferation of legal monopolies (over knowledge goods) and related 
entry barriers” would lead to “restraints on competition”, consigning “the poorest countries to a 
quasi-permanent status at the bottom of the technology and growth ladder”.   
453 Such as the environmental one, for example, LYNDON, Secrecy and access in an innovation intensive 
economy: reordering information privileges in an environmental health, and safety law, supra, passim.  
454 EMA, decision of the Ombudsman, no evidence of how insight of the drug development could be 
possible through the release of CSR.  
455 Literature has however pointed out how this risk is in reality quite small, given that patent 
applications are filed “as soon as industry sees promise in a new compound”, thus much earlier than 
the phase of the conducting of clinical trials. See LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to Information and the 
Right to Health: the Human Rights Case for Clinical Trials Transparency, supra, 24.  
456 This is however a more difficult issue of marketing authorisation procedures in developing 
countries and the impact on them by foreign trade agreements. More specifically literature has 
underlined how the problemi is to define to which extent the free trade agreements rule over the 
competitor’s rule of test data accessed in a third country. On the issues see SHAPIRO-MCGARITY, 
The trade Secret Status of Health and safety testing information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, supra, 848.  
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the cost of investment in pharmaceutical development and safety 
evaluation457.  
Hence, the innovators’ incentive rationale poses strong grounds as to the 
justification for the establishment of peculiar forms of protection regarding 
those companies’ intangible assets that have a strategic role in the final 
product development.  
 
However, as in the case of the patent system, a line has to be drawn 
between the area of protection that has positive incentive effects458, and the 
area in which the same intellectual property tools are used in a distortive 
manner, delaying genuine competition through market predominance, and 
therefore affecting consumers’ rights to information 459  and hence 
individual’s fundamental rights to access to medicines460. 
These traditional tensions in the realm of legal and economic discussions 
concerning intellectual property policy461, become particularly delicate for 
the protection of clinical trials data, i.e. protection of mere information.   
In fact, pursuant to international standards of protection, such as the ones 
established in art. 39 of the TRIPS Agreement, regulatory agencies are 
required to maintain the confidentiality of test data under certain 
conditions462.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
457 CORREA, Protection of Data Submitted for the registration of Pharmaceuticals: Implementing the standards of 
the TRIPs Agreement, Geneva, South Centre Pub., 2002, 12. 
458 GOREN, Pharmaceutical innovation and intellectual property rights: a global public good?, in PUGATCH, 
The IP property debate, Perspectives from Law, Economics and Political Economy, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2006, 159 ss.. 
459  For the examination of the theory considernig EC competition law’s final objective, not 
competition as an institution, but rather the promotion of efficiency and consumer’s welfare, see 
DREXL, The relationship between the Legal exclusivity and Economic Market Power- Links and Limits, in 
GOVAERE-ULLRICH, Intellectual Property, Market Power and the Public Interest, Brussels, Peter Lang, 
2008, 171-172.  460 Ibid., 162, stating that “on the one hand society wants to provide adequate reward/incentive to the 
innovator to continue to innovate and bring the results to patients; while on the other hand, we 
ensure society’s maximal access to such innovations”. Specifically as regards the issue of the access to 
medicines, see FELLMETH, Secrecy, Monopoly, and access to pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: 
protection of marketing approval data under the TRIPS agreement, 444 ss.. For a more general overview of the 
issue see MUZAKA, Politics of Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines, Basinstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011, 18 ss.. 
461 On this issue see, RAMELLO, Intellectual property, social justice and economic efficiency: insights from Law 
and Economics, in FLANAGAN-MONTAGNANI, Intellectual Property Law: Economic and Social Justice 
Perspectives, Cheltenham, 2010, 1 ss.. 
462 FELLMETH, Secrecy, Monopoly, and access to pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: protection of 
marketing approval data under the TRIPS agreement, supra, 446.  
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This norm is the international source of both the (supra)national trade 
secret protection, and the pharmaceutical data exclusivity.  
As far as trade secrecy protection is concerned, it will be further shown how 
trade secrets, consisting in mere information secrecy as required by art. 39.2 
TRIPS, appear to address only business sustainment tasks, in that way 
substantially clashing with economic and social needs of scientific 
information availability. 
Things are quite different when it comes to data exclusivity regimes. Indeed, 
it is useful to anticipate that the international confidentiality requirement 
established under art. 39.3 TRIPS has been transposed at a European level 
in two main obligations to test data protection, weighing on drugs 
regulatory agencies and defined by literature as the non-disclosure and the 
non-reliance obligations463.  
The protection provided by data exclusivity has thus a more layered, 
structured natured as compared to trade secret protection: indeed, 
according to the first obligation, the regulatory agency must not permit 
generic companies to access to the application dossier, whereas under the 
second, the authorities themselves must not rely on the originator’s dossier 
in order to release other marketing authorisations for similar products464. 
These two distinct obligations regarding clinical trials data perfectly reflect 
the two-folded nature of the information entailed in research protocols, 
namely the informational and the regulatory one.  
If combined, the non reliance and the non-disclosure obligations would 
provide an extremely extensive  protection of the strategic data produced in 
the R&D race by research-based companies465. 
Indeed, the non-reliance obligation faced by regulatory authorities appears 
to serve the necessary incentive rationale, for the sake of which a temporary 
market exclusivity is tolerated even at the cost of an initial low level of 
access to medicines caused by the increase of price heights. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
463 PUGATCH, Intellectual Property, data exclusivity, innovation and market access, supra, 7. 
464 Ibid.. 
465 For the economic significance of test data see supra chapter 1.  
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However, the additional non-disclosure obligation that innovators want to 
directly derive from the non-reliance requirement, turns out to have 
detrimental consequences, both from a public health perspective, creating a 
climate of “secrecy and mistrust” that affects the “consumer’s perception as 
to the accurateness and safeness of the pharmaceutical product”466; and 
also from a competition standpoint, being disclosure an immediate obstacle 
to the spread of the knowledge potentially stirring innovation’s 
evolution467: this leads in return to a delay of the competition game also 
besides the strict term of protection468, with substantial losses in terms of 
the advancement of technological progress. 
From this latter point of view, invoking intellectual property protection, in 
order to justify scientific information secrecy turns out to be highly 
contradictory, given that the main driving force of competition and 
technological progress itself is exactly the sharing of this same 
information469: as it has been stated “excessive private control of health 
information (…) creates pockets of static information within a system that 
needs to be dynamic (…). Secrecy imposes costs that become imbedded in 
the infrastructure, and opportunities to develop better technologies and 
economic patterns are lost”470. 
Moreover, economic analysis has shown how a “hyper-appropriation” of 
scientific valuable information, and the exclusionary effects related to it, 
produce serious adverse outcomes also in terms of overall market efficiency, 
being knowledge itself a fundamental economic resource471.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
466 Cf. CORREA, Protecting Test Data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical Products Under Free Trade 
Agreements, supra, 86, further stating that “the public is entitled to know whether the product contains 
certain substances. (…) This information may also bear on test data”; ID., Protection of Data Submitted 
for the registration of Pharmaceuticals: Implementing the standards of the TRIPs Agreement, supra, 24. 
EISENBERG, Patents, Product Exclusivty, and Information Dissemination: How law directs biopharmaceutical 
research and development, 72 Fordham Law Review 2003, 477 ss., 482; LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to 
Information and the Right to Health: the Human Rights Case for Clinical Trials Transparency, supra, 85.  
467 RAMELLO, Intellectual property, social justice and economic efficiency: insights from Law and Economics, supra, 
3 ss.. 
468 Global intellectual property center- US chamber of commerce, Heading in a different direction? The 
European Medicines Agency’s Policy on the Public Release of Clinical Trials Data, supra, 7. 
469 LYNDON, Secrecy and access in an innovation intensive economy: reordering information privileges in an 
environmental health, and safety law, supra, 467. 
470 Ibid., 4-5.  
471 RAMELLO, Intellectual property, social justice and economic efficiency: insights from Law and Economics, supra, 
passim. 
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Indeed, secrecy- meaning the blocking of access to users-, by eroding 
economic freedom of third parties472, inevitably freezes the cumulative 
process of production technology, with important reflexes on the field of 
social justice473. As it has been noticed, “the creation of new property rights 
for a social entity such as knowledge addresses the concept of social justice, 
since it impacts not only on the distribution of knowledge and rights over 
knowledge, but also the social relationships, communication processes and 
self-expression that access implies”474. 
 
In the first chapter it has been demonstrated that the core of the issue 
concerning clinical trials data’s disclosure is to be found in the balancing 
between public interests, directly related to fundamental rights and 
freedoms, and private ones, regarding the protection of commercially 
sensitive information.  
However, a deeper understanding of the forms of protection of these 
pharmaceuticals’ commercially sensitive data provided by the international 
and European normative framework offers precious tools in order to shift 
the core of the issue regarding clinical trials data disclosure from an 
interpretational to a structural standpoint. Indeed, as it will be shown, the issues 
at stake will be correctly addressed only by examining the connection 
between the two regulatory frameworks- concerning both disclosure and 
protection of commercially valuable information- even before addressing 
any possible interpretation capable of narrowing the impact of the 
exemptions to the general disclosure rule.  
Contrary to expectations, the latter normative framework provides no direct 
obstacles for test data disclosure. As counterintuitive as it might appear, at a 
deeper understanding, it is exactly from the layout of the sui generis 
intellectual property protection of data exclusivity, and more precisely from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
472See GHIDINI, Innovation, Competition and Consumer Welfare in Intellectual Property Law, supra, 19. 
473 Cf. RAMELLO, Incentives, Efficiency, and Social Justice: the Strange Case of Intellectual Property and 
Knowledge, POLIS Working Paper, October 2008, online available at 
http://www.serci.org/2007/Ramello.pdf., 4 ss.. 
474 RAMELLO, Intellectual property, social justice and economic efficiency: insights from Law and Economics, supra 
19. 
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the non-reliance obligation it entails, that direct positive grounds for 
information sharing can be found.  
It is indeed thanks to this quasi-proprietary right 475  managed by the 
regulatory agency, that reporting systems of pharmaceuticals’ safety data can 
function without the externality of nullifying companies’ investments in 
R&D knowledge and subsequently the market advantages awarded by it.  
 
3. Clinical Trials Data as trade secrets under the Proposed European 
Trade Secret Directive 
 
Need we say that the assessment made by the regulatory agency of what has 
to be considered commercially confidential information, risks to be further 
oriented towards the non-disclosure option, in light of the broad definition 
of commercially confidential information contained in the “Proposal for a 
directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection 
of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against 
their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure”476, according to which trade 
secret is to be considered “any information that is secret, has commercial 
value because it is secret and has been subject to reasonable steps to keep it 
secret” 477 . Such a definition seems to be the exact transposition on 
supranational level of the provision of art. 39.2 TRIPs imposing on WTO 
Members States the obligation to protect undisclosed information from a 
use that is “contrary to honest commercial practices (…)”478.  
In literature it has been underlined how this broad definition could provide 
a strong legal basis for pharmaceutical companies to refuse compliance to 
transparency policies 479 , with the ultimate intent of preserving their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
475 This concept will be better explained infra.  
476 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets), against their unlawful acquisition, 
use and disclosure, supra.  
477 Ibid., Art. 2.   
478 See BRONCKERS-MCNELIS, Is the Eu obliged to improve the protection of trade secrets? An inquiry into 
TRIPS, The European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, in European 
Intellectual Property Review, 2012, 34, 10, 673 ss.. For a comment on the TRIPs provision of art. 39 see 
infra.  
479 Cf. Corporate Europe Observatory, EU draft Trade Secrects Directive threats to free speach, health, 
environment and worker mobility- Joint Statement, published on the 23rd March 2015, online available at 
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competitive position against rivals480. Indeed, it has been stated how the 
scope of the trade secret protection is capable of comprehending “any type 
of information” 481, in respect of which commercial value is alleged482. 
Indeed, the text seems not to ask a specific proof of commercial value, 
given that the commercial value itself is derived from the information being 
secret. Hence, the proof of secrecy is the only one required for the 
qualification of a certain information asset as a trade secret483.  
Limiting the analysis to the mere definition of trade secrets, thus, would 
lead to the acknowledgment of a structural incompatibility of trade secret 
protection with mandatory disclosure provisions, contrary to what happens 
as regards patent protection, where disclosure obligations directly 
counterbalance strong exclusive rights484. Indeed, disclosure of a trade secret 
to a third party usually takes the form of a non-disclosure agreement, 
imposing on the same party who has exceptionally been given the sensitive 
information, an enforceable duty of confidence485.  
In this regards, the latest economic literature486 has interestingly observed 
that together with the growing importance of information assets in 	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480 Cf. GILOTTA, The Conflict between Disclosure in Securities Markets and the Firm’s need for confidentiality: 
Theoretical Framework and Regulatory Analysis, published on 12th March 2012, online available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1709334, 13.  
481 MYERS, Principles of Intellectual Property Law, West Academic Publishing, 2012, 363. Cf. SOUSA-
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definition given by the Proposed Directive, and concluding that “the broad meaning of ‘trade secret’ 
in the proposed directive may lead to the conclusion that, in a certain sense, ‘anything worth 
misappropriating, is worth protecting’, although specific circumstances may dictate otherwise”.  
482 This is particularly stressed by APLIN, A Critical Evaluation of the Proposed EU Trade Secret Directive, 
King’s College Research Papers Series n.2014-25, published on the 18th July, online available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2467946, 13-14, stating that “the proposed 
Directive should seek to clarify that trade secret is limited to technical or commercial information, 
either through amending the recitals or including this language in article 2(1). Cf. SOUSA-SILVA, 
What exactly is a trade Secret under the proposed Directive?, supra, 927-928. See also HULL, Trade Secret 
Licensing: The Art of Possible, in Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice, 2009, 4, 3, 203 ss.. 
483 Hence, it seems that the commercial value can be merely potential, as some literature affirms. Cf. 
CARVALHO, The TRIPS Regime of Antitrust and Undisclosed Information, The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International the Hague, 2008, 233; contra , affirming the need of proof of actual economic value, 
CORREA, TRIPS-A Commentary, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, 373.  
484 GILOTTA, The Conflict between Disclosure in Securities Markets and the Firm’s need for confidentiality: 
Theoretical Framework and Regulatory Analysis, supra, 20.  
485 See HULL, Trade Secret Licensing: The Art of Possible, supra, 209-210. It is interesting to notice how 
some scholars have tried to underline the disclosure effects of such non disclosure agreements, 
although restricted between the contracting parties. For a survey on the issue European Commission, 
Study on Trade Secrets and Confidential Business Information in the Internal Market, supra, 86-87.  
486 GOY-WANG, Does knowledge tradeability make secrecy more attractive than patents? An analysis of IPR 
strategies and licensing, Oxford Economic Papers, 68, 2016, 64 ss.. 
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competition interactions, R&D based companies increasingly rely on trade 
secrets schemes for the protection of their know-how, and less on patents 
for the protection of their final products487. From a purely economic 
viewpoint, thus, it has been demonstrated that for firms, secrecy, and the 
competitive advantage that it shields, is more valuable than the market 
exclusivity gained through patents488. This is to be also explained on the 
basis of the enormous market potential of trade secrets, that originators can 
profitably sell on the market to other competing firms, through the 
mentioned non-disclosure agreements, that assume in their ‘external’ 
dimension489 the form of very valuable trade secret license agreements: 
market mechanisms based on knowledge exclusivity490, and on the same 
knowledge tradability, are expanding in a way that ends up even 
overwhelming the need for traditional legal intellectual property rights over 
other tangible assets491. 
It is hence not without grounds that some scholars have noticed how, in the 
expanding market area of trade secrets492, the tension between disclosure 
and confidentiality reaches its highest levels493.  
However, a deeper look into the shape of trade secret protection shows 
how the proposed European trade secret discipline leaves open significant 
gaps, capable of better addressing- although not definitely and convincingly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
487 Cf. BRAUN-PUGATCH, The changing face of pharmaceutical industry and intellectual property rights, supra, 
605. It must be however stressed that the growing reliance on trade secret protection, at the expense 
of patent protection, is due not only to the strategic importance of R&D information, but is to be 
referred also to other factors, such as the higher costs of a patent application, and the lack of time 
limits, that trade secret protection, contrary to patents, do not have. See European Commission, Study 
on Trade Secrets and Confidential Business Information in the Internal Market, supra, 91.  
488 GOY-WANG, Does knowledge tradeability make secrecy more attractive than patents? An analysis of IPR 
strategies and licensing, supra, 66.  
489 As opposed to the ‘internal dimension’ of NDA when the other contracting party is an employee 
of the same firm, Cf. SOUSA- SILVA, What exactly is a trade Secret under the proposed Directive?, supra, 
927.  
490 THOMAS, Proprietary Rights in Pharmaceutical Innovation: issues at the Intersection of Patents and Marketing 
exclusivities, supra, 5.  
491 FORAY, Economics of Knowledge, Cambridge, Mit Press, 2004, 141ss., stressing how the shift from 
an invention based economy towards a knowledge based one, is to be associated with a turnaround 
within the dynamics of intellectual property policies, traditionally aimed at exploiting knowledge, and 
now used to shrink the scope of the public domain.  
492 Cf. European Commission, Study on Trade Secrets and Confidential Business Information in the Internal 
Market, supra, 87-88.  
493 GILOTTA, The Conflict between Disclosure in Securities Markets and the Firm’s need for confidentiality: 
Theoretical Framework and Regulatory Analysis, supra, 20. 
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solving- the problem of the relationship between information disclosure 
and retention, respectively under transparency and confidentiality rules.  
3.1 The scope of trade secret protection: “unlawful acquisition, use 
and disclosure” of undisclosed data 
 
The specificities of trade secret protection in the context of intellectual 
property regulations has been widely commented in literature494, and still the 
statements contained in the Draft Proposal For a European Trade Secret 
Directive do not offer decisive grounds for a solution to the problem of 
whether trade secrets should be considered or not a form of companies’ 
proprietary rights stricto sensu and the debate is still on-going495. The option 
in favour of one interpretative solution or the other has important practical 
outcomes as regards the scope and enforcement of the trade secret 
protection itself, especially against third infringing parties496.  
However, despite the systematic preference for a stronger or relatively 
weaker trade secret protection, its basic scheme is that against the “unlawful 
acquisition, use and disclosure of trade secrets”, or more precisely, of 
undisclosed information.  
Hence, it is evident how trade secret protection, and subsequently trade 
secret enforcement, is confined only to cases of conducts that are to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
494 EU Directorate General for Internal Policies- Trade Secrets , supra, 4, recalling the European Court 
of Justice ruling in Microsoft Corp. Vs. Commission, case T-167-08, where the Court mentioned trade 
secret as a different category from intellectual property rights. The referral of trade secret protection 
to the sector of intellectual property law has been put into question with the alternative of referring it 
to the area of unfair competition law. In this sense SOUSA-SILVA, What exactly is a trade Secret under 
the proposed Directive?, supra, 923. See also DIAS NUNES, The European Trade Secrets Directive (ETSD): 
Nothing new under the Sun?, published on the 25th July 2015, Lex Research Topics in Innovation 2015-
1, online available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2635897. Italy is one of 
the few Member States that has adopted a clear position as regards the consideration of the 
“informazioni segrete” as intellectual property rights. See SCARPA, Valore industriale dell’informazione 
societaria nel mercato, in Rivista di diritto industriale, 2, 2015, 71 ss..    
495 This is the thesis of APLIN, Right to Property and Trade Secrets, in GEIGER, Research Handbook on 
Human Rights and Intellectual Property, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015, 232 ss.. For an opposite view 
see BRONCKERS-MCNELIS, Is the Eu obliged to improve the protection of trade secrets? An inquiry into 
TRIPS, The European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra, 673 ss..  
For a general assessment see HULL, Trade Secret Licensing: The Art of Possible, supra, 204.  
496 Literature has indeed argued how the most effective reason for a qualification in the sense of 
property right of trade secrets, is to be referred to the enhancement of remedies available to the 
owner of information whose rights have been infringed especially by third parties. This is the theory 
proposed in early years in the well known article by KOHLER-PALMER, Information and Property, in 
PALMER-MCKENDRICK, Interests in Goods, London, Lloyd’s of London Press, 1993, 187-206.  
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considered “unlawful”. To put it in other terms, and as it is clearly to be 
derived from art. 3 of the proposed Directive497, the unlawfulness of 
conducts is to be read as a sine qua non requirement of trade secret 
protection, in the same way that patent law requires the features of novelty, 
non-obviousness and inventive step for the enactment of protection498. 
Unfortunately, if this reasoning could have led to a restriction of the scope 
of protection, the consideration of the definition of the unlawfulness given 
by the proposed Directive shows to the contrary how the extent of secrecy 
protection is incredibly broad: following art. 3 the proposed legislative text, 
not only is the use or disclosure of a commercially sensitive information to 
be considered unlawful in case of “breach of a confidentiality agreement or 
any other duty not to disclose the trade secret”499 or of “breach of a 
contractual or any other duty to limit the use of the trade secret”500 or of 
conducts that are “contrary to honest commercial practices”501, but also in 
case of any “unauthorised access to, appropriation of, or copy of any documents, objects, 
materials, substances or electronic files (…) containing the trade secret (…)” carried out 
“without the consent of the trade secret holder”502. This means that the unlawfulness 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
497 Art. 3 of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets), against their unlawful 
acquisition, use and disclosure, supra, “Member States shall ensure that trade secrets holders are 
entitled to apply for the measures, procedures and remedies provided for in this Directive in order to 
prevent or obtain redress for, the unlawful acquisition, use, or disclosure of a trade secret”. 
498 Commenting the large definition of unlawful acquisition provided by art 3.3 of the proposed 
Directive, see DIAS NUNES, The European Trade Secrest Directive (ETSD): Nothing new under the Sun?, 
PAG 14.  
499 Cf. art 3, 3 lett. b of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets), against their 
unlawful acquisition, supra . 
500 Ibid., Art. 3,3 lett. c. It is interesting to notice how case law has recognised as unlawful also the 
disclosure of trade secrets occurred at a pre-contractual stage, in light of the recent concept of 
“parasitism”, in light of which protection is given to sensitive information exchanged during the pre-
contractual period, even if the parties are not in competition with each other. Cf. G’SELL-DURAND 
BARTHES, Report on the protection against unlawful appropriation of trade secrets and confidential commercial 
information, A Report for the European Commission, submitted by Fondation pur le Droit 
Continental, online available at http://www.fondation-droitcontinental.org/en/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/EN-Synth%C3%A8se-de-rapport-secrets-format-A5-version-
definitive.pdf, 3.  
501 Art. 3,2 lett.b of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets), against their 
unlawful acquisition, supra. For a comment on the possible meanings of the notion of unfair 
commercial practices see BRONCKERS-MCNELIS, Is the Eu obliged to improve the protection of trade 
secrets? An inquiry into TRIPS, The European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, supra, 678 ss.. 
502 Art. 3,2 lett. a of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets), against their 
unlawful acquisition, supra. Emphasis added.  
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of a trade secret’s use occurs, according to the proposed Directive, every 
time the trade secret holder doesn’t give its consent.  
This statement is of particular importance for our purposes, firs of all 
because it reflects how trade secret protection moves towards absolute 
protection of an immaterial asset as such, that is very similar to a property 
right503, despite the declarations in the recital 10 of the same proposed 
Directive affirming that its “provisions (…) should not create any exclusive 
right on the know-how or information protected as trade secrets” 504 ; 
secondly, in light of the above mentioned provisions, the disclosure, carried 
out by the European Medicine Agency of a certain test data set, to which 
the originator has not given its consent to, would be regarded as unlawful, 
thus protectable under the trade secret protection.  
The fact that the transparency obligation entails an express commercial 
confidentiality exemption, also prevents to affirm that in front of a 
mandatory reporting obligation, companies cannot refuse to grant their 
consent, being to the contrary obliged to it.  
There is however more. Indeed, under the proposed set of rules, if the 
European Medicines Agency would publish clinical trials data without 
research-based companies’ consent, and hence unlawfully, trade secret 
infringement liability would also fall upon third parties, e.g. researchers or 
consumers that subsequently would handle the pharmaceutical test data as a 
consequence of their right to access an open database, knowing that the 
regulatory agency didn’t have the companies’ permission to publish the 
sensitive data505; and also upon generic companies that would “produce, 
offer or place on the market infringing goods”, i.e. goods that have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
503 Cf. APLIN, Right to Property and Trade Secrets, supra, 232 ss.. 
504 Id., Recital 10, with regards to independent discovery and reverse engineering practices that still 
remain possible.  
505 Cf. Art. 3.4 of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets), against their unlawful 
acquisition, use and disclosure, supra, considering unlawful “the acquisition, use or disclosure of a 
trade secret shall also be considered unlawful whenever a person, at the time of acquisition, use or 
disclosure, knew or should, under the circumstances, have known that the trade secret was obtained 
directly or indirectly from another person who was using or disclosing the trade secret unlawfully 
within the meaning of paragraph 3”. 
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produced and marketed on the basis of the trade secret knowledge, while 
knowing that the accessed information wasn’t allowed to be published506.  
In light of these remarks, it is clear that reading the commercial 
confidentiality exemption provided by the Clinical Trials Regulation 
536/2014, as a door open for the enactment of trade secret protection, is 
destined to nullify the transparency rule expressed by the same 
Regulation507.  
 
3.2 Art. 4.2 of the proposed Trade Secret Directive and the fa ir  use  of 
undisclosed data 
 
The possible application of the broad notion of trade secrets in the judicial 
evaluation of confidentiality exemptions’ could be nonetheless prevented 
through the recognition of specific areas of trade secrets’ fair use.  
In this light it is interesting to notice how American literature has been 
trying to define a fair use doctrine also as regards trade secrets508, this being a 
very difficult interpretative operation given the fact that the Uniform Trade 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
506 Ibid., Art. 3.5, considering unlawful “The production, offering or placing on the market of 
infringing goods, or import, export or storage of infringing goods for those purposes, shall also be 
considered an unlawful use of a trade secret when the person carrying out such activities knew, or 
should, under the circumstances, have known that the trade secret was used unlawfully within the 
meaning of paragraph 3”. See also recital 17, affirming how “a trade secret may be unlawfully used to 
design, manufacture or market goods, or components thereof, which may spread across the internal 
market, thus affecting the commercial interests of the trade secret holder and the functioning of the 
internal market. In those cases and when the trade secret in question has a significant impact on the 
quality, value or price of the resulting good or on reducing the cost, facilitating or speeding up its 
manufacturing or marketing processes, it is important to empower judicial authorities to order 
effective and appropriate measures with a view to ensure that those goods are not put on the market 
or are removed from it”. For a comment see DIAS NUNES, The European Trade Secrets Directive 
(ETSD): Nothing new under the Sun?, supra, 13-14 and APLIN, A Critical Evaluation of the Proposed EU 
Trade Secret Directive, supra, 23-24, specifying how the notion of “infringing goods has to be referred to 
the fact that the goods, or better said, the development of such goods, “have significantly benefited 
from trade secrets unlawfully acquired, used, or disclosed”. The Author underlines the breadth of 
such a notion of infringing goods, could lead to a considerable expansion of trade secret infringement 
liability. 
507 Cf. European Corporate Observatory, Trade Secret Protection, A new Right to Secrecy for Companies, and 
a dangerous EU legislative Proposal which must be rejected, published on 30th March 2016, online available at 
http://corporateeurope.org/power-lobbies/2016/03/trade-secrets-protection, mentioning the recent 
case of a man died in France after a clinical trial, and the subsequent refuse of the pharmaceutical 
company to disclose the trial protocol, by invoking trade secret protection over the information. The 
article concludes that “with the high financial penalties foreseen in the text for trade secret 
disclosure without their owners’ consent, companies will be given an additional argument to 
threaten public authorities if these would want to publish these studies”.  
508 VARADARAJAN, Trade Secret Fair Use, 83 Fordham L. Rev. (2014), 1401 ss..  
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Secret Act does not mention any case of “lawful” acquisition, use or 
disclosure of a trade secret and only defines what consists a case of 
“misappropriation by improper means”509.  
To the contrary, an analysis of the Proposed Trade Secret Directive shows 
how the European legislator has taken into account also information 
transparency concerns within the same Directive. In this perspective, a link 
between commercial confidentiality and mandatory disclosure rules seems 
to be possible, and disclosure options at the expense of information 
obscuration practices could be argued, as it has be done with privacy 
concerns, through evaluation of the reference to freedom of information 
and to the public interest expressly mentioned in the text510.  
More specifically, art. 4 of the Proposed Directive takes into account 
specific cases exempted from the prohibition faced in art. 3.  
Amongst the so established fair uses of trade secrets, there are a few 
hypotheses that seem to perfectly respond to information transparency 
demands regarding pharmaceutical test data.  
Indeed, the Proposed Directive establishes typical situations in which the 
“acquisition” and hence use and disclosure of a trade secret is to be 
considered lawful, and therefore falling outside the scope of trade secret 
protection and of the Proposed Directive’s regulation. If art. 4.1 regards 
exemptions of substantive nature, such as the “independent discovery or 
creation” or reverse engineering acts that have to be considered lawful as 
such, the following paragraph of art. 4 provides exemptions that are rather to 
be considered of procedural nature, this meaning that these exemptions 
regard cases that would have been considered unlawful in absence of a 
normative specification.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
509 See DIAS NUNES, The European Trade Secrets Directive (ETSD): Nothing new under the Sun?, supra, 16. 
510 Cf. the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection 
of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets), against their unlawful acquisition, 
supra, at recital 11, stressing that “in line with the principle of proportionality the measures, 
procedures and remedies intended to protect trade secrets should be tailored to meet the objective of 
a smooth-functioning internal market for research and innovation, in particular by deterring the 
unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure of a trade secret, without jeopardising or undermining fundamental 
rights and freedoms or the public interest, such as public safety, consumer protection, public health (…) protection 
(…)”. Emphasis added.  
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It is exactly with these exemptions that the European legislator has solved 
the balance between commercial and public transparency interests in favour 
of the latter. Indeed, the provision of art. 4.2 affirms how trade secret 
protection, and thus “the measures, procedures and remedies provided for” 
in the proposed Directive, does not apply when the sensitive information is 
used or disclosed “(a) for making legitimate use of the right to freedom of expression 
and information” such as the right to be informed about a pharmaceutical 
marketed products’ features511; “(c) for the purpose of fulfilling a non-contractual 
obligation” as the one entailed in art. 81.4 of the Clinical Trials Regulation512; 
and finally “(e) for the purpose of protecting a legitimate interest”.  
Literature commenting these normative provisions has critically stressed the 
breadth and vagueness of these exemptions, whose scope appears to be 
very poorly defined, given for example the absence of any indication of 
what has to be considered a “legitimate interest”. In this regards, some 
scholars513 have criticised also the wording of “legitimate interest”, claiming 
that the general clause of the “public interest” would have been more 
appropriate although posing, again, the same interpretative problems of 
scope definition.  
However, although these critics perfectly suit the uncertainties governing 
legislative solutions in those regulatory areas where opposite animated 
branches of law collide514, these exemptions appear to substantially address 
the case of the establishment of mandatory pharmaceutical test data 
reporting systems.  
Indeed, the relationship between the two different regulatory sector, i.e. on 
the one hand the transparency rule and on the other the one of trade secret 
protection, is to be defined by the combination between general rules and 
the exemptions posed to them, as it has been done in respect of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
511 Cf. also recital (10b) stressing that “While this Directive provides for measures and remedies 
which may consist in preventing the disclosure of information in order to protect the confidentiality 
of trade secrets, it is essential that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and information 
(…) be not restricted (…)”. Ibid.. 
512 Regulation EU n. 536/2014, supra. 
513 DIAS NUNES, The European Trade Secrets Directive (ETSD): Nothing new under the Sun?, supra, 20.  
514 Cf. LYNDON, Trade Secrets and Access in Environmental Law, in DREYFUSS-STRANDBURG, The 
Law and Theory of Trade Secrets- A contemporary Research Handbook, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2011, 442 
ss.. 
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personal data protection concerns equally posed by the Clinical Trials 
Regulation.  
Also in this case, the apparent contradiction of normative dictates can be 
interpretatively solved through the proper combination of general rules and 
exemptions posed by the two bodies of law examined.  
As it has been demonstrated indeed, the commercial confidentiality 
exemption posed by art. 81.4 of the Clinical Trials Regulation should be 
read and substantiated in respect of the general rule of trade secret 
protection established by the proposed Trade Secret Directive. The 
acknowledgement of a very broad secret protection is therefore 
automatically destined to broaden the effectiveness of the confidentiality 
exemption. However, the exemptions protecting freedom of information 
and the fulfilment of a non-contractual obligation posed by the proposed 
Trade Secret Directive itself, lead back to the starting point of the general 
rule of clinical trials data transparency, ending up strengthening its 
effectiveness.  
Hence, the circle of this complex legal structure appears to close itself in 
favour of the disclosure obligation posed by the general rule of art. 81.4 of 
the Clinical Trials Regulation.   
Differently said, trade secret protection’s confinement to the case of 
“unlawful acquisition, use, or disclosure”, substantially unfolds the problem 
of the tenancy of legal mandatory disclosure obligations regarding 
commercially sensitive information against trade secret protection, in the 
sense that trade secret protection itself results, in light of the proposed 
exemptions, ab origine inconsistent with companies’ mandatory reporting 
duties. Indeed, in light of specific information reporting obligation posed by 
the law- such as regards pharmaceutical trials data-, trade secret protection should 
not technically apply.  
In this light recitals 9(a) and 9(b) result of decisive importance for our 
purposes, by declaring that the proposed Directive “should not affect the 
application of Union or national rules that require the disclosure of information, including 
trade secrets, to the public or to public authorities, the rules that allow public authorities 
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to collect information for the performance of their duties or rules that allow or require any 
further disclosure by those public authorities of relevant information to the public (…)515 
and that “the acquisition, use or disclosure of trade secrets, whenever 
imposed or permitted by law, should be treated as lawful for the purpose of this 
Directive (…)”516.  
 
Yet, uncertainties seem to re-emerge in front of the statement contained in 
the same recital 9(b), where the European legislator immediately appears to 
retract the above recalled assertions, by affirming that the eventual 
disclosure of sensitive information “should nonetheless be without prejudice to any 
obligation of confidentiality as regards the trade secret or any limitation as to its use that 
Union or national law may impose on the recipient or acquirer of the information”517 , 
going on stating that “in particular, this Directive should not release the public 
authorities from the confidentiality obligations to which they are subject in respect of 
information passed on by holders of trade secrets”518.  
An accurate analysis of the proposed Trade Secret Directive has shown how 
the normative text recognizes some areas of lawful use of trade secrets in 
respect of a “non-contractual obligation” to disclose posed by the Clinical 
Trials Regulation.  
However, the last cited recital seems to call back the regulatory agency’s 
confidentiality obligation that the exceptions provided by art. 4.2 of the 
proposed Directive, had posed outside the scope of trade secret protection. 
Vacuum out the trade secret protection at night, and there is it again in the 
morning.  Interpretative uncertainties will have to be managed by both 
regulatory agencies and judicial courts.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
515 Recital 9(a) of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets), against their unlawful 
acquisition, supra, goes on stating that “This concerns in particular rules on the disclosure by the 
Union’s institutions and bodies or national public authorities of business-related information they 
hold pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council and Directive 
2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and the Council or to other rules on public access to 
documents or on the transparency obligations of national public authorities”. 
516 Recital 9(b) of the Proposed Trade Secret Directive, supra.  
517 Ibid.. Emphasis added.  
518 Ibid.. Emphasis added.  
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For now, the outcomes of an eventual definitive approval and subsequent 
enactment of the proposed Trade Secret Directive, as regards the trade off 
between sensitive information protection and disclosure, are still widely 
unclear.  
This is exactly what the European legislator seems to have perceived, by 
demanding to the Commission the redaction of a specific report, to be 
completed four years after the end of the transposition period of the 
proposed Directive, through which the “possible effects of the application 
of this Directive on research and innovation (…) and on the exercise of the 
right of the freedom of expression and information”519 will have to be taken 
into account.  
 
Out of the box of trade secret protection technicalities, the scope of the 
trade secret exemption may still be narrowed in the face of practical 
phenomena: indeed, the large definition of trade secrets provided by the 
Proposal for a Directive must be read in light of the necessarily temporary 
dimension of commercial interests over data. 
In fact, if only secret- that is to say undisclosed- information can enjoy trade 
secret protection, as soon as the information is disclosed, the trade secret 
protection itself breaks down520.   
As far as test data are concerned, some scholars have underlined how the 
competitive sensitiveness of the information embedded in trial protocols is 
naturally destined to decline, as a consequence of the product or process 
being known in the industry, and because over time information inevitably 
becomes visible to other market players521. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
519 Art. 17.2 of Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets), against their unlawful 
acquisition, supra.  
520 Stressing the issue CORREA, Unfair competition under the TRIPs Agreement: Protection of Data submitted 
for the registration of Pharmaceuticals, in Chicago Journal of International Law, 3, 1, 2002, 73-74.  
521 LYNDON, Secrecy and access in an innovation intensive economy: reordering information privileges in an 
environmental health, and safety law, supra, 518. Stressing this point also WEISSMAN, Data Protection: 
Options for implementation, in ROOFE-TANSEY-VIVAS-EUGUI, Negotiating Health- Intellectual Property 
and access to Medicines, supra, 151 ss., affirming that free-riding practices are always very common, and 
form part of the normal competition information-interaction.  
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Hence the qualification of trials data as commercially sensitive information, 
and thus falling under trade secret protection, although broad in scope, 
could revel itself of short time duration, with important reflexions on the 
tenancy of the trade secret protection exemption to the general disclosure 
rule. 
 
4.  Pharmaceutical Data Protection under Art. 39.3 TRIPs Agreement 
 
 
Art. 39.3 TRIPs522  requires WTO Member States to protect test data 
submitted for the marketing approval of pharmaceutical and chemical 
products for agriculture.   
The provision is found under art. 39 of the TRIPs Agreement, granting 
protection to “undisclosed information”. 
Literature regards what is referred to in art. 39 TRIPs as a form of “data 
protection”, based on widely recognised legal principles concerning trade 
secrets523 and unfair competition524.  
Art. 39 of TRIPs imposes to States an obligation to prevent that 
information submitted to regulators for marketing authorisation procedures 
for pharmaceutical products, are “disclosed, acquired, or used by others 
without their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial 
practices”525. Art. 39.3 TRIPs provision imposes two distinct obligations on 
WTO Member States, relating both to the protection against “unfair 
commercial use”, and secondly to the protection against disclosure unless 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
522 For a reconstruction of the TRIPs negotiating history, see SKILLINGTON-SOLOVY, The 
Protection of Test and Other Data required by Article 39.3 of the TRIPs Agreement, 24 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. L. 
(2003-2004), 1 ss..; BLAKENEY, A critical analysis of the TRPs Agreement, in PUGATCH, The intellectual 
Property Debate: Perspectives from Law, Economics, and Political Economy, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2006, 
17 ss., stating that during TRIPs negotiations, “the pharmaceutical industry was one of the main 
lobbyists for the global extension of intellectual property rights”; CORREA, Unfair competition under the 
TRIPs Agreement: Protection of Data submitted for the registration of Pharmaceuticals, supra, 69 ss.; GERVAIS, 
The TRIPs Agreement: Drafting History and analysis, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2008, 22 ss.. 
523 CLIFT, Data protection and Data exclusivity in Pharmaceuticals and Agrochemicals, in V.V. A.A., Intellectual 
Property Management in Health and Agriculture Innovation, Oxford, MIHR, 2007, 431 ss., 432.  
524 Ibid..  
525 REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in international intellectual property law: the case for a 
public goods approach, supra, 19.  
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such disclosure is necessary to protect the public or unless steps are taken to 
ensure that the disclosure does not result in “an unfair commercial use”526.  
Accordingly art. 39.3 addresses two issues: the use and the disclosure of the 
test data. 
 
4.1 Pharmaceutical data protection against unfair  commerc ial  use 
 
Literature has underlined how the obligations under TRIPs does not 
contain a property right entitling clinical trials’ sponsors to exclusive use of 
the data 527 : it rather aims at preventing unfair commercial use by 
competitors under certain conditions528. 
Indeed, according to the same art. 39.3 TRIPs Agreement, WTO members’ 
regulatory authorities have to bear a general duty of confidentiality, 
regarding data that are submitted for marketing approval, referring to new 
chemical entities the origination of which has required the research-based 
companies considerable efforts529. 
The condition of protection is that data must have been maintained 
undisclosed until the filing of the marketing application. This means that 
originators must have made reasonable steps in order to maintain the 
confidentiality of the clinical trials data530. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  526  Art. 39.3 TRIPs Agreement: “Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the 
marketing of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new chemical entities, 
the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which involves a considerable 
effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect such 
data against disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to 
ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use”. 
527 This is discussed by CORREA, Protection of Data Submitted for the registration of Pharmaceuticals: 
Implementing the standards of the TRIPs Agreement, supra, 5 ss.; CORREA, Unfair competition under the TRIPs 
Agreement: Protection of Data submitted for the registration of Pharmaceuticals, supra, 82, affirming that “The 
TRIPS Agreement clearly does not treat undisclosed information as property”. Cf. also ANDANDA, 
Managing intellectual property rights over clinical trial data to promote access and benefit sharing in public health, 
supra, 148 ss..  
528  This is particularly stressed by CORREA, Protection of Data Submitted for the registration of 
Pharmaceuticals: Implementing the standards of the TRIPs Agreement, supra, 8.  
529 SKILLINGTON-SOLOVY, The Protection of Test and Other Data required by Article 39.3 of the TRIPs 
Agreement, supra, 20; CORREA, Protection of Data Submitted for the registration of Pharmaceuticals: 
Implementing the standards of the TRIPs Agreement, supra, 14 ss.. 
530 See REICHMAN, The International Legal Status of Undisclosed Clinical Trials Data: From Private to Public 
Goods?, in ROFFE-TANSEY-VIVAS-EUGUI, Negotiating Health- Intellectual Property and Access to 
Medicines, supra, 134 ss..  
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In return, it means that voluntary disclosure, for example through the 
publication of the data in an academic journal, or lack of protective 
measures, removes the obligation for the agencies to protect research 
protocols’ information against disclosure, since the original confidential 
nature has been removed before the filing of marketing authorisation531.  
As far as the commercial value of the trials data is concerned, it is important 
to stress that the protection provided by the international provision is 
restricted only to unfair commercial uses practices, meaning competitors’ 
dishonest commercial behaviours.  
The protection is thus to be considered narrow in scope532, and solely 
depending on the interpretation given to the notion of unfair commercial 
use533. 
However, these indications are particularly weak in light of the lack of clear 
definition of what has to be considered honest, fair or equitable534 in a 
commercial perspective: if “commercial use” is to be defined “as an 
exchange of consideration between two or more parties on terms set by the 
market”535, the notion of fairness is to be intended in an economic sense, 
meaning that commercial use of a trade secret is only unfair where an 
adequate compensation of the market value of the secret is not provided536.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
531 REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in international intellectual property law: the case for a 
public goods approach, supra, 20.  532 REICHMAN, Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data under TRIPs Agreement and its Progeny: a broader perspective, 
supra, 2 ss.; CORREA, Protection of data submitted for the registration of Pharmaceutical products: TRIPs 
requirements and TRIPs PLUS provisions, in World Health Organization-Regional Office for South East 
Asia, Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines: papers and perspectives, India, 2010, 131 ss..  
533 CORREA, Unfair competition under the TRIPs Agreement: Protection of Data submitted for the registration of 
Pharmaceuticals, supra, 81 ss.. 
534 REICHMAN, Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data under TRIPs Agreement and its Progeny: a broader perspective, 
supra, 12.  
535 FELLMETH, Secrecy, Monopoly, and access to pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: protection of 
marketing approval data under the TRIPS agreement, supra, 464 
536 In this direction, LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to Information and the Right to Health, 86. These 
considerations have indeed led some legal scholars to hypothesise a compensation obligation for 
generic drug companies that want to rely on the data of the innovator. See in particular CORREA, 
Protection of Data Submitted for the registration of Pharmaceuticals: Implementing the standards of the TRIPs 
Agreement, supra, 8-9; ID., Unfair competition under the TRIPs Agreement: Protection of Data submitted for the 
registration of Pharmaceuticals, supra, 70-71; REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in 
international intellectual property law: the case for a public goods approach, supra, 30; SANJUAN, Us and Eu 
Protection of pharmaceutical Test data, Consumer Project on Technology, supra, 5 ss..  
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In the absence of economic correspondence the use of protected data is to 
be considered unfair537. Unfair use is thus to be restricted to specific 
circumstances of misappropriation, such as industrial espionage or breach 
of contract538. 
Following this line of reasoning, some literature has mentioned 
“competitor’s misrepresentation, fraud threats, defamation, disparagement, 
enticement of employees, betrayal of confidential information, commercial 
bribery (…)”539. 
But for these general considerations, the ultimate precise scope of the 
notion of unfair and dishonest practices depends on social perceptions in a 
particular country at a given time540, and more specifically upon the kind of 
practices that domestic and foreign trade secrets laws have traditionally 
regarded as unfair541.  
However, legal scholars have underlined how as regards the international 
normative framework, art. 10 bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection 
of industrial property of 1883 provides an important interpretational tool 
for the definition of the notion of “unfair commercial use”, by referring to 
the avoidance of “any act of competition contrary to honest practices in 
industrial or commercial matters”542.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
537 FELLMETH, Secrecy, Monopoly, and access to pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: protection of 
marketing approval data under the TRIPS agreement, supra, 461.  538 FELLMETH, Secrecy, Monopoly, and access to pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: protection of 
marketing approval data under the TRIPS agreement, supra, 463. See also REICHMAN, Undisclosed Clinical 
Trial Data under TRIPs Agreement and its Progeny: a broader perspective, supra, 12,  recalling the cases of 
disclosure caused by an employer to a competitor in order to provide him a commercially 
advantageous know-how, or the exploiting of the commercial advantage given by the knowledge of 
the test data by employers of the regulatory agency itself, in order to become a commercial rival of 
the submitting firm. 
539 CORREA, Protection of Data Submitted for the registration of Pharmaceuticals: Implementing the standards of 
the TRIPs Agreement, supra, 41. On the point see also ANDANDA, Managing intellectual property rights over 
clinical trial data to promote access and benefit sharing in public health, supra, 162, stating that “these examples 
can help authors in making decisions on the publication of clinical trials results and guide regulatory 
authorities on sharing information that may have public health relevance”. 
540 CORREA, Protecting Test Data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical Products Under Free Trade Agreements, 
in ROFFE-TANSEY-VIVAS-EUGUI, Negotiating Health- Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines, 
supra, 83.  
541 Underlining this point REICHMAN, Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data under TRIPs Agreement and its 
Progeny: a broader perspective, supra, 20.  
542 CORREA, Unfair competition under the TRIPs Agreement: Protection of Data submitted for the registration of 
Pharmaceuticals, supra, 77 ss.. Contra FELLMETH, Secrecy, Monopoly, and access to pharmaceuticals in 
International Trade Law: protection of marketing approval data under the TRIPS agreement, supra, 452, stating 
that “unfortunately the Paris Convention provides little help in interpreting the specific obligations of 
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In this light, it becomes evident how the purpose of the confidentiality 
requirement of art. 39.3 TRIPs Agreement, is that of preventing generic 
competitors from obtaining benefits or other advantages as a consequence 
of commercial practices regarded as unfair: as it has been stated, for this 
purposes it is thus “the qualification of the practice that counts, and not the 
mere existence of the advantage or benefit”543. 
Literature has drawn from these normative criteria some important 
conclusions. 
First, it has been stated that obtaining a commercial advantage is not to be 
considered unfair as such.  
Not even the granting marketing approval to a second generic entrant on 
the basis of the similarity with a previously approved product can be 
considered as a use relevant under 39.3 trips544. Indeed, it has been noticed 
that reliance on a previous market authorisation, in order to allow 
competitive production of bioequivalent products, would not constitute a 
direct use of the data, but rather a use of the safety and health outcomes 
expressed by the data themselves545.  
Such use is on the contrary to be considered fair and necessary in light of 
the need to promote competition in the market546, and in order to provide 
compliance to “data-consideration and data-disclosure provisions”547.  
Indeed it can hardly be argued that the innovator’s “reasonable investment-
backed expectations are disturbed” when the regulatory agency “acts to use 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
TRIPs Article 39.3”, moreover noticing that “the relevance of Article 10 bis of the Paris Convention 
to Article 39.3 of the TRIPs Agreement is obscure”, 453. 
543 CORREA, Trade related aspects of intellectual property rights, supra, 382.  
544 REICHMAN, Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data under TRIPs Agreement and its Progeny: a broader perspective, 
supra, 12.  
545 Ibid.. 
546 REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in international intellectual property law: the case for a 
public goods approach, supra, 21. 547 This has been the position of the American Supreme Court in the famous ruling Ruckelshaus vs. 
Monsanto Co. 467 U.S. 986, 1019-20 (1984) paragraph 6. Although referring to the protection of data 
submitted for agricultural products, literature regards this case as the pioneer case as regards 
disclosure of clinical trials data. See CORREA, Protection of Data Submitted for the registration of 
Pharmaceuticals: Implementing the standards of the TRIPs Agreement, supra, 33 ss.; REICHMAN, Undisclosed 
Clinical Trial Data under TRIPs Agreement and its Progeny: a broader perspective, supra, 12.  
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or disclose the data in a manner that was authorised by law at the time of 
the submission”548.   
This interpretation has been further supported in the important ruling of 
the Canadian Supreme Court of Appeal in the case Bayer Inc. vs. Canada549, 
affirming compliance with international provisions of Canadian Law 
allowing demonstration of a generic medicinal safety and efficacy features, 
on the basis of the originator’s application.  
Accordingly, the claim made by the USA, concerning the lack of conformity 
to international obligations embedded in art. 39.3 TRIPs was rejected.  
The Canadian court justified its decision by stating that no direct reliance on 
the innovator’s confidential information as such can be found, in the cases 
that generic competitors are able to proof “the safety and effectiveness of 
its product on the basis of bioequivalence or bio-availability studies, without 
the Minister having to examine and rely on confidential data filed by the 
innovator”550. 
Therefore, according to this interpretation, allowing drug companies to rely 
on the originators’ marketing application is not to be considered as a kind 
of unfair commercial use against which protection under art. 39.3 TRIPs is 
required551. This interpretation leads to the conclusion that the international 
framework of data protection does not therefore require the establishment 
of exclusivity rights over clinical trials data552. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
548 Ruckelshaus vs. Monsanto Co., supra, paragraph 2. 
549 REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in international intellectual property law: the case for a 
public goods approach, supra, 21-22. 
550Bayer Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (T.D.), (1999) 1 F.C. 553, paragraph 15.	  	  
551 This has also been the interpretation given by the World Trade Organization, TRIPs and Public 
Health, submission by the African group, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Venezuela, on the 20th 
June 2001, online available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/mindecdraft_w312_e.htm paragraph 40, “the 
protection is to be granted against unfair commercial use of confidential data. This means that a third 
party could be prevented from using the results of tests undertaken by another company as 
background for an independent submission for marketing approval, if the data had been acquired through 
dishonest commercial practices. However, Art. 39.3 does permit a national competent authority to rely on 
data in its possession to assess a second and further applications, relating to the same drug, since this 
would not imply unfair commercial use”. Emphasis added. Cf. REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials 
data in international intellectual property law: the case for a public goods approach, supra, 20.  
552 LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: the human rights case for clinical trials 
transparency, supra, 83 ss.; CLIFT, Data protection and Data exclusivity in Pharmaceuticals and Agrochemicals, 
supra, 433. Contra FELLMETH, Secrecy, Monopoly, and access to pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: 
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This has been underlined also by the WHO Commission on IP rights, 
Innovation and Public Health, expressly stating that art. 39.3 does not in 
fact “prevent authorities from using knowledge of such data”(…) “in order 
to assess subsequent applications by third parties for the registration of 
similar products”553. 
Also the dispute resolution body of the WTO has expressed a similar 
position, in occasion of a case brought up by the USA against Argentina, on 
the grounds of the alleged inconsistency of Argentinian law with Article 
39.3 TRIPs, given that the state did not require a period of exclusivity of 
trial data554. The American claim was finally rejected, and Argentinian law 
did not have to change its pharmaceutical data provision.  
 
4.2 Pharmaceutical data protection against unfair  commerc ial  
disclosure 
 
The narrow interpretation of the notion of unfair commercial use of test 
data has important repercussions also on the scope of the second obligation 
posed by the international provision, regarding clinical trials disclosure.  
Indeed, being the protection of test data according to art. 39.3 TRIPs 
Agreement restricted to the protection against unfair commercial use by 
third parties, the conditions laid down by the provision do not contain a 
strict obligation to keep information undisclosed: in this light, it is to be 
stated that institutions do not face any obligation to keep the information 
submitted to them secret555. 
On the contrary, disclosure is expressly allowed in those cases in which 
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protection of marketing approval data under the TRIPS agreement, supra, 463, stating that “the prohibition of 
on unfair commercial use is best interpreted as a requirement for data exclusivity (…)”.  
553 See World Health Organization, Public Health innovation and intellectual property rights- Report of the 
Commission on intellectual property rights, innovation and public health, supra, 126. See also ANDANDA, 
Managing intellectual property rights over clinical trial data to promote access and benefit sharing in public health, 
supra, 149.  
554 ATTARAN-CARTAGENA, A study of Pharmaceutical Data Exclusivity Laws in Latin America: is 
Access to affordable Medicines threatened?, supra, 277.  
555 Stressing this point, COTTIER-MEITINGER-MEITINGER, The protection of Test Data submitted to 
Governmental Authorities: The impact of the TRIPs Agreement on EC law, supra, 58.  
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commercially without the originator’s “getting that to which it is 
entitled”556. 
Moreover, it has been noticed that the unfairness of a commercial practice 
is a priori to be excluded in those cases in which the law itself expressly 
requires or allows practices557, as it is the case of mandatory disclosure of 
the test data in the European database established by art. 81 of the Clinical 
Trials Regulation558.   
The legal obligation of reporting drug’s safety features, is thus to be 
considered perfectly compatible with the constraints posed by art. 39.3 
TRIPs559.  
In fact, in the realm of this normative framework, states remain free not 
only to make non commercial uses of the data, but also uses that are to be 
considered fair, even if such uses produce a commercial impact560.  
In this light, literature has stressed that governmental use of test data to 
avoid health and safety risks561 would be “fair by definition”562, and that 
the need to promote research and science in the public interest “would 
allow some uses of the data that are both non-commercial and fair, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  556 FELLMETH, Secrecy, Monopoly, and access to pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: protection of 
marketing approval data under the TRIPS agreement, supra, 463: “the question then is what the initial 
registrant deserves- not as a matter of ethics, but as a matter of international law”. The fairness of 
compensation is again a very difficult economic matter, for a possible economic model defining it 
see, ibid., 470 ss.. 
557 REICHMAN, Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data under TRIPs Agreement and its Progeny: a broader perspective, 
supra, 6. 
558 Regulation EU 536/2014 of the European Parliament and of the council of 16 April 2014 on 
clinical trials on medicinal products for human use and repealing Directive 2001/20/EC, cit..  
559 CORREA, Protecting Test Data for Pharmaceuticals and Agrochemical Products Under Free Trade Agreements, 
supra , 84. See also, KITCH, The law and Economics of rights in valuable information, 1980, 9, The Journal of 
Legal Studies, 683, 649, stating that under Art. 39.3 TRIPs Agreement, “agencies have inherent 
power to control their records and, in the absence of statutory provisions prohibiting disclosure… an 
agency is free to choose to disclose”. 
560  COTTIER-MEITINGER-MEITINGER, The protection of Test Data submitted to Governmental 
Authorities: The impact of the TRIPs Agreement on EC law, supra, 64: “under Art. 39.3, publication is 
allowed, provided that unfair commercial use is avoided and competitors cannot directly or indirectly 
benefit from such publication”.  
561 FELLMETH, Secrecy, Monopoly, and access to pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: protection of 
marketing approval data under the TRIPS agreement, supra, 464, stating that “To the extent that the state 
can reasonably perform its function of protecting public health without compromising the initial 
registrant’s trade secrets rights, disclosure of the marketing approval data is justified”, and that 
“disclosure would be certainly justified to allow a third party, such as public interest organization, a 
university, a hospital, or another non-competitor of the drug developer, to review and verify the 
accuracy, reliability and completeness of the data”. 
562 REICHMAN, Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data under TRIPs Agreement and its Progeny: a broader perspective, 
supra, 141. 
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consistent with any research exemption embodied in the domestic patent 
laws”563. 
It is indeed the same provision that allows disclosure “where necessary to 
protect the public”564.    
Thus, uses for public health purposes, as the establishment of clinical trials 
databases clearly serve565, would in any case be allowed under the TRIPs 
standard, in virtue of the exception provided by the same article as regards 
the public interest.  
Unfortunately as literature has been pointing out, “public health concerns 
were only marginally present in the negotiation of the Trips Agreement”566, 
thus, also in this case 567 , no precise definition of the scope of the 
exemption can be found.  
Discretion in what has to be considered relevant in terms of public interest, 
is thus, again, left to WTO Member States.  
The only normative instruction to be found is the one on the necessity of the 
protection of public interest568.  
Literature has offered a variety of interpretations regarding the “necessity 
test” required by art. 39.3 TRIPs Agreement. According to the first 
position, and in order to comply with TRIPs’ provision, states aiming to 
establish a disclosure system, must provide a precise definition of the data 
the disclosure of which is relevant to the protection of the public interest569.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
563 Ibid.. 
564 Art. 39.3 TRIPs Agreement.  
565 LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: the human rights case for clinical trials 
transparency, supra, 89 stating that such a (reporting) system can be seen as an essential tool to promote 
public health and protect the public from potential harm”.  See also CORREA, Protection of Data 
Submitted for the registration of Pharmaceuticals: Implementing the standards of the TRIPs Agreement, supra, 25, 
stressing that nondisclosure “facilitates the circulation and use of substandard drugs”. More cautious 
is the position of FELLMETH, Secrecy, Monopoly, and access to pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: 
protection of marketing approval data under the TRIPS agreement, supra, 476, stating that whether clinical trials 
data disclosure “is necessary to protect the public, may be arguably in any given instance, but 
disclosure is certainly more helpful to that end than nondisclosure”.  
566 CORREA, Protection of Data Submitted for the registration of Pharmaceuticals: Implementing the standards of 
the TRIPs Agreement, supra, 22.  
567 Cf. chapter 1, par. 2.2. 
568 REICHMAN, Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data under TRIPs Agreement and its Progeny: a broader perspective, 
supra, 143. 
569LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: the human rights case for clinical trials 
transparency, supra, 87 ss.. 
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Others have suggested that in order to determine whether a measure is to 
be considered necessary to protect the public interest under art. 39.3 TRIPs 
Agreement, indications have to be taken from the General Agreements on 
Tariffs and Trade panel reports, concerning art. 27.2 TRIPs, allowing states 
to exclude inventions from patentability when necessary to protect public 
order or morality570. 
As it has been argued, the fact that the public interest exemption is 
restricted to the necessity standard evidently narrows the scope of the 
exemption itself, reflecting the negotiators’ belief that marketing approval 
data has to be considered a particularly sensitive trade secret571 , and 
therefore not intended to be regularly disclosed572.  
This argument is however easy to overcome in light of other dispositions of 
the TRIPs Agreement itself, such as art. 8, stating that WTO members “may 
adopt measures necessary to protect the public health and nutrition, and to 
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development”573. 
Furthermore, as regards public interests, one cannot neglect the statements 
contained in the DOHA Declaration on the TRIPs in 2001 574 , and 
especially in paragraph 4 of the same Declaration. It clearly provides “the 
TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking 
measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our 
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can 
and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of 
WTO members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
570 GERVAIS, The TRIPs Agreement: Drafting History and analysis, supra, 336 ss.., examining various 
appellate decisions involving a balancing between the public interest and the impact of the 
restrictions. 
571 FELLMETH, Secrecy, Monopoly, and access to pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: protection of 
marketing approval data under the TRIPS agreement, supra, 451, underlining the narrow perspective of the 
necessity standard.  
572 Ibid., 463: “the public health language of Article 39.3, as an exception to the general rule of 
confidentiality, should not be read to authorize the disclosure of marketing approval data under all 
circumstances”. The author further states that disclosure would only be possible for the sake of 
“protecting public health in an emergency”. 
573 Commenting this provision, see MATTHEWS, Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Development, 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2011, 18-19.  
574 Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health, adopted on the 14th November 
2001, online available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm.  
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access to medicines for all. In this connection, we reaffirm the right of 
WTO members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, 
which provide flexibility for this purpose”575.  
As literature has noticed, although not providing clear indications regarding 
the “relationship between states’ obligation to protect intellectual property 
and obligation to ensure the right to access to medicines and the right to 
health”, the cited statement surely stresses the need to exploit the 
interpretational flexibilities left open by the Agreement 576  in order to 
enhance the standards of access to medicines577.  
Also in light of these further declarations, it can be concluded that the 
international framework fully recognizes public health concerns, suggesting 
disclosure of marketing approval data at the condition that WTO members 
protect against unfair commercial use of the data.  
This could be achieved in various ways, such as under a rule of data 
exclusivity disallowing competing registrations during the exclusivity 
period578.   
However, scholars have traced other possible solutions for preventing 
unfair commercial use, such as compensatory liability regimes, built upon 
“take and pay” liability rules for value adding uses of innovation579 and 
therefore protecting test data against unfair commercial use without 
granting the innovator a monopoly on the marketing approval data.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
575 Cf. YUNG-CHING YEH, Pharmaceutical Data Protection Law and Policy, and their effects on the right to 
Medicines: a Comparative Analysis, supra, 6.  
576 CORREA, Implications of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health, Geneva, 
World Health Organization, 2002, online available at 
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/WHO_EDM_PAR_2002.3.pdf, 13 ss..  
577 On the issue MATTHEWS, Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Development, supra, 17 ss.. 
578 FELLMETH, Secrecy, Monopoly, and access to pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: protection of 
marketing approval data under the TRIPS agreement, supra, 476.  
579  Under a cost-sharing option model, data can be automatically used from the time of its 
submission, following the payment of a reasonable compensation by the generic company wishing to 
enter the market.  This is the proposal of REICHMAN, Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data under TRIPs 
Agreement and its Progeny: a broader perspective, supra, 15 ss..; ID., Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in 
international intellectual property law: the case for a public goods approach, supra, 32 ss.. FELLMETHM, Secrecy, 
Monopoly, and access to pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: protection of marketing approval data under the 
TRIPS agreement, supra, 473 ss.. See also WEISSMAN, Data Protection: Options for Implementation, in 
ROFFE-TANSEY-VIVAS-EUGUI, Negotiating Health- Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines, supra, 
151, distinguishing between a misappropriation approach, a cost-sharing approach and public health 
variants of the data exclusivity approach.  
	   117	  
The purpose of the duties of confidentiality could be in fact maintained if 
disclosure has been released or reliance on the originator’s test data is given 
to a competitor, provided that adequate compensation for the use of the 
test data is given as to render the reliance and the use “fair”.  
The lack of specific indications provided for the definition of the notion of 
fairness, renders the effective scope of art. 39.3 TRIPs unclear580.  
By establishing the basic obligation to consider test data as a trade secret 
proprietary to the submitter, the provision leaves to the discretion of 
member states the definition of the conditions under which disclosure and 
reliance on the submitted trials data for generic’s entrance purposes is 
considered to be fair.  
TRIPs Agreement establishes therefore a minimum international standard, 
that constitutes the basis for implementing TRIPs at a national level581, 
leaving “wide room for manoeuvre for member countries”582 to determine 
the appropriate ways for protection583.  	  
5. Data exclusivity under the European normative framework 
 
An accurate interpretation of art. 39.3 TRIPs Agreement shows how 
international obligations do not impose any obstacles to disclosure in 
publicly accessible databases584. 
However, a completely different approach has been taken by WTO member 
states and in particular by the USA 585  and the European Union, by 
transposing the international provision at a supra-national level586. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
580 See COTTIER-MEITINGER-MEITINGER, The protection of Test Data submitted to Governmental 
Authorities: The impact of the TRIPs Agreement on EC law, supra, 60.  
581 CORREA, Intellectual property rights, the WTO and developing countries: the TRIPS agreement and policy 
options, supra, 46.   
582 CORREA, Protection of Data Submitted for the registration of Pharmaceuticals: Implementing the standards of 
the TRIPs Agreement, supra, 39.  
583 PUGATCH, Intellectual Property and pharmaceutical data exclusivity in the context of information and market 
access, supra, 1, talks about “ambiguity”  of the TRIPs Agreement with regards the “operational 
translation of data exclusivity at the multilateral level creates a vacuum, and subsequently leads to the 
contemporary debate as to the scope and term of data exclusivity in each and every country”. See also 
BAGLEY, Patent  term restoration and non-patent exclusivity in the US, supra, 113. 
584 For the definition of “essentially similar medicinal products, see LISMAN-SCHOONDERBEEK, 
An Introduction to EU Pharma Law, London, Brookwood Booklets, 2005, 47 ss..  
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Indeed while art. 39.3. TRIPs is based on the concept of confidentiality, the 
supranational provisions have shifted the focus of protection on preventing 
regulatory authorities to release marketing licenses based on test data of a 
prior applicant to third parties, for a certain period of time587. 
   Developed countries have in fact interpreted the international obligations in 
the opposite direction of assuring pharmaceutical companies’ data a period 
of data exclusivity, interpreted by literature as a form of sui generis intellectual 
property right588.  
  The data exclusivity protection is therefore a higher rearrangement of 
international boundaries provided by the TRIPs Agreement, requiring non-
reliance obligations, and in second instance, following a particular 
interpretation, also stricter non-disclosure obligations. 
According to these regimes, in fact, clinical trials data submitted for 
registration of pharmaceutical products are protected by a peculiar system 
of defence, based on a temporary right to exclusive use of such data by the 
originator.  
Data exclusivity protection has to be counted among the normative tools 
for maximizing the market exclusivity period for pharmaceutical products, 
together with paediatric testing and orphan drug exclusivity589. 
It implies that generic manufacturers cannot rely on the registered data to 
file marketing authorisation for a similar product590, given a period of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
585 Section 335 of the USA Federal, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of the US (1994) defines two categories 
of data exclusivity: a five years for products with new chemical entities, and three years for a new 
indication of a known product.  
586 Cf. CLIFT, Data protection and Data exclusivity in Pharmaceuticals and Agrochemicals, supra, 432.  
587  COTTIER-MEITINGER-MEITINGER, The protection of Test Data submitted to Governmental 
Authorities: The impact of the TRIPs Agreement on EC law, supra, 68.  
588 BRAUN-PUGATCH, The changing face of pharmaceutical industry and intellectual property rights, supra, 
602. 
589 BAGLEY, Patent  term restoration and non-patent exclusivity in the US, supra, 111. See also THOMAS, 
Proprietary Rights in Pharmaceutical Innovation: issues at the Intersection of Patents and Marketing exclusivities, 
online available at http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/crs/RL33288_060320.pdf.  
590 The similarity of the generic drug is to be proven in cases where, “1) the generic drug has the same 
active ingredient in the same qualitative and quantitative composition as the reference product; 2) the 
generic drug has the same pharmaceutical form as the reference product; 3) the generic drug is 
bioequivalent to the reference product; 4) there is no scientific evidence that the generic drug differs 
from the reference product with respect to safety and efficacy”. See JUNOD, Drug Marketing 
Exclusivity in the United States & European Union Law, supra, 505. The similarity criterias have been 
pointed out in an important ruling by the ECJ in 1998, in the decision known as Generics, the court 
interpreted the notion of similarity in terms of “same qualitative and quantitative composition in 
terms of active principles and the same pharmaceutical form”. Case C-368/96, Judgment of the 
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exclusive use of the same test data, granted to originators after marketing 
approval.  
Over this period, the second entrant cannot therefore obtain a marketing 
authorisation for a similar drug through a facilitated procedure referring to 
trial data conducted by the pioneer company in order to support the new 
medicinal’s safety and efficacy591.   
Under European legislation this period has been harmonized by art. 10 of 
Directive EC 2004/27592, amending Directive 2001/83 EC with the formula 
of eight years of protection593, in addition to whom other two years of 
market exclusivity in which generic companies are only allowed to submit 
bio-equivalence tests594, and another year of protection for new indications 
of existing products595, are granted596.   
According to this framework, the second applicant can therefore file its 
request for a generic marketing authorization after eight years, but has to 
wait until the two years of marketing exclusivity have expired for the license 
to become effective597.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Court of 3 December 1998, The Queen vs. Licensing Authority (established by the Medicines Act 
1968), ex parte Generics (UK) Ltd., The Wellcome Foundation Ltd., Glaxo Operations UK Ltd., and 
others 1998- E.C.R. I-7967, online available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30dbe7249ce801c648dbaf4cfd341a24b
280.e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxuKb3n0?text=&docid=101225&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode
=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=27114. For a more accurate comment see COTTIER, 
MEITINGER-MEITINGER, The protection of Test Data submitted to Governmental Authorities: The impact 
of the TRIPs Agreement on EC law, supra, 75. Cf. also CORREA, Protecting Test data for Pharmaceutical and 
Agrochemical Products, in ROFFE-TANSEY-VIVAS-EUGUI, Negotiating Health- Intellectual Property and 
Access to Medicines, supra, 83.  
591 Cf. JUNOD, Drug Marketing Exclusivity in the United States & European Union Law, in Food and Drug 
Law Journal, 2004, 59, 479 ss., 479-480. 
592 The expressed purpose of the Directive of 2004 was that of “increasing incentives to offset the 
competitive decline of the EU pharmaceutical sector, with respect to the US sector”. See 
REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in international intellectual property law: the case for a 
public goods approach, supra, 37. Cf. also PUGATCH,  Intellectual Property and pharmaceutical data exclusivity 
in the context of information and market access, supra, 4. 
593 The protection is granted for products approved both through the centralized and the mutual 
recognition procedure. JUNOD, Drug Marketing Exclusivity in the United States & European Union Law, 
supra, 512. See supra chapter 1, par. 2.  
594 See infra.  
595 The additional one year protection, to be granted only once, can be demanded at any time, under 
the condition that the safety and efficacy of the new indications are adequatly shown through the 
support of clinical testing. JUNOD, Drug Marketing Exclusivity in the United States & European Union 
Law, supra, 513.  
596 Global intellectual property center- US chamber of commerce, Heading in a different direction? The 
European Medicines Agency’s Policy on the Public Release of Clinical Trials Data, supra, 5. 
597 JUNOD, Drug Marketing Exclusivity in the United States & European Union Law, supra, 513. 
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Literature has noticed how granting research-based companies an exclusive 
right as regards the use of these test data, increases the level of protection as 
opposed to the sole prohibition of use of the data in a manner contrary to 
what is to be considered commercially fair, as stated in the international 
TRIPs provision598.  
It has been argued599, that his exclusive right is to be justified on the basis 
of the intellectual process through which the    information was originated, 
thus entitling the originator to “freely use, sell, modify, or destroy the  
information”600.  
In this perspective, also the European Court of Justice in the case The Queen 
vs. The Licensing Authority Established by the Medicines Act 1968601 has labelled 
the pharmaceutical data’s protection as “a right to property relating to 
pharmacological, toxicological and clinical data”602. This proprietary right 
would confer to the originator monopoly rights on the use of 
pharmaceutical data 603  forming the basis of the originator’s marketing 
authorisation604.  
Hence, the data exclusivity regime creates a monopoly over the information, 
and not over the pharmaceutical product itself605.  
  However, this kind of informational monopoly rebounds in an indirect 
monopoly over the product. 
In fact, generic manufacturers are not prohibited to produce their own trials 
data regarding an already marketed active substance, in order to obtain a 
license for a similar product606. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
598 Cf. CORREA, Protecting Test Data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical Products under Free Trade 
Agreements, supra, 84.  
599 Cf. FACKELMAN, Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment production in Europe, supra, 172.  
600  COTTIER-MEITINGER-MEITINGER, The protection of Test Data submitted to Governmental 
Authorities: The impact of the TRIPs Agreement on EC law, supra, 60. 
601 European Court of Justice, C-368/96, The Queen vs. The Licensing Authority Established by the Medicines 
Act 1968, paragraphs 82 e 83. See DODDS-SMITH, Data protection under the European Pharmaceutical 
Legislation and under Federal Legislation in the USA, supra, 36 ss.. 
602 See comment of FACKELMAN, Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment production in 
Europe, supra, 172. 
603 Ibid., 173. 
604 Stressing this point LORENZ, Das gemeinschaftliche Arzeneinmittelungszulassungsrecht, supra, 206. 
605 FELLMETH, Secrecy, Monopoly, and access to pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: protection of 
marketing approval data under the TRIPS agreement, supra, 446.  
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Yet, the important financial and ethical concerns 607  regarding the 
reproduction of trials by second comers, causes the informational 
exclusivity to have the effect of a de facto product exclusivity: this is why 
scholars have called upon data exclusivity as a “qualified market barrier”, 
substantially delaying generic market entry608. 
This leads in return to price increases of medicines, not only because of the 
enforcement of the innovator’s dominant position609, but also due to the 
higher product development costs suffered by generic companies that must 
reproduce clinical trials and consequently rise the price of the generic end 
products finally marketed610. 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
606 LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: the human rights case for clinical trials 
transparency, supra, 83: “exclusivity regime is less restrictive than patent monopoly because it allows 
generic companies to produce their own materials of data”.  
607 Ibid., “generic drug manufacturers have to either wait until the exclusivity period expires, or to 
produce the required data independently”, being the effective alternative “to wait until the exclusivity 
period ends and to demonstrate the bioequivalence instead of full clinical trials”. This can in return 
cause animals and test subjects to be submitted to unnecessary duplicate testing.  
608 See PUGATCH, Intellectual Property and pharmaceutical data exclusivity in the context of information and 
market access, supra, 12. Cf. also LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to Information and the Right to Health: the 
Human Rights Case for Clinical Trials Transparency, supra, 74.  609 ATTARAN-CARTAGENA, A study of Pharmaceutical Data Exclusivity Laws in Latin America: is 
Access to affordable Medicines threatened?, supra, 269;	   LEMMENS TELFER, Access to information and the 
right to health: the human rights case for clinical trials transparency, supra, 84 data exclusivity can be one of 
several strategies applied by research-based companies, to delay generic price competition. See also 
ADAMINI-MAARSE-VERSLUIS-LIGHT, Policy making on Data exclusivity in the European Union: from 
industrial interests to legal realities, supra, 1003, underlining how “data exclusivity appears to be one of 
several strategies by the research- based industry to delay generic price competition. A recent study by 
DG Competition of the European Commission has found that “in many instances originator 
companies use two or more instruments from the ‘tool box’ in parallel and/or successively in order 
to prolong the life cycle of their medicines”. These instruments notably include secondary patenting, 
patent-related contacts and disputes, litigation, settlements, and interventions. DG Competition of 
the European Commission concluded that these tactics “significantly increase legal uncertainty to the 
detriment of generic entry and can cost public health budgets and ultimately consumers significant 
amounts of money””. 
610 LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: the human rights case for clinical trials 
transparency, supra, 85 and CHAKRABARTI, Need of Data exclusivity: Impact on Access to Medicine, in 
Journal of Intellectual Property Rights, 2014, 19, 325 ss., 333. 
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5.1. Data exclusivity and patent protection: intersections 
 
Data exclusivity protection can function as an alternative layer of legal 
defence for pharmaceutical products, in the cases where the patent system 
itself fails to provide adequate market predominance611.  
Data exclusivity is indeed to be considered as an autonomous form of 
protection in respect of patents612, given the absence of any reference to 
the patent law notions of novelty and inventive step in pharmaceutical 
development613: data exclusivity is in fact solely based on the “fixed event” 
of granting a marketing authorisation614. Indeed, the granting a marketing 
authorisation follows a very strict process, leaving “little room for any 
“creative” approaches”615: in order to grant data exclusivity protection there 
are no requirements of evidence that the original drug symbolizes a 
technical or therapeutic advancements as regards the “prior 
pharmacological art”616.  
The only precondition needed is that of pharmaceutical safety and efficacy.  
Thus, the subjection of the data exclusivity on mechanical criteria, renders 
this kind of protection qualitatively stronger than a patent protection617, not 
being exposed to generic disputes618.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
611 PUGATCH, Intellectual Property and pharmaceutical data exclusivity in the context of information and market 
access, supra, 13. See also JUNOD, Drug Marketing Exclusivity in the United States & European Union Law, 
supra, 480, quoting Greg Perry of the European Generic Medicines Association (EGA), stressing the 
relevance of non patent exclusivity: “for originator pharmaceutical companies, the expansion of data 
exclusivity provisions has become one of the main ways of extending market protection and blocking 
generic competition. Data exclusivity is seen now as the principal means of extending market 
protection for new indications, pharmaceutical forms and other variations, especially where these are 
not innovative enough to gain patent protection”.  
612  Cf. EISENBERG, Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information Dissemination: How law directs 
biopharmaceutical research and development, 72 Fordham Law Review 2003, 477 ss., 482. Literature has also 
been stressing the considerable less administrative and procedural burden of data exclusivity as 
confronted with the patent system, beimg “cheaper to obtain and to maintain”. JUNOD, Drug 
Marketing Exclusivity in the United States & European Union Law, supra, 484.  
613 FACKELMAN, Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment protection, supra, 167.  
614 Ibid.. 
615 Ibid., 176.  
616 LISMAN-SCHOONDERBEEK, An Introduction to EU Pharmaceutical Law, supra, 42. 
617 CLIFT, Data protection and Data exclusivity in Pharmaceuticals and Agrochemicals, supra, 433. COOK, 
Regulatory Data Protection in Pharmaceuticals and Other Sectors in V.V. A.A.,  Intellectual Property Management 
in Health and Agriculture Innovation, supra, 438.  
618 Cf. PUGATCH, Intellectual Property and pharmaceutical data exclusivity in the context of information and 
market access, supra, 13-14. 
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Moreover, it has been noticed that unlike in the patent system, under data 
exclusivity regimes there are no compulsory license mechanisms to be 
found619.  
Indeed, most of the WTO Members have introduced provisions to override 
patent protection in cases of public health emergencies or for remedying 
anticompetitive behaviours620. 
However, since data exclusivity regimes do not assure any form of 
exemption to protection, in the cas a compulsory license is granted, generic 
pharmaceutical companies intending to enter the market, would be still 
required to obtain marketing authorisation, with the effect of potentially 
blurring the effectiveness of the license itself621. 
Literature has also been underlining a few other possible scenarios in which 
data exclusivity regimes interact with patent protection622. 
According to the first scenario, in some circumstances data exclusivity 
works as a “gap filling alternative” 623  for patent protection over 
pharmaceutical products624. 
This can happen for example in those circumstances in which a patent for a 
pharmaceutical product is not recognized625- for example in the case of 
biopharmaceuticals626- or for which the patent term has long expired before 
the granting of a marketing license627.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
619 CLIFT, Data protection and Data exclusivity in Pharmaceuticals and Agrochemicals, supra, 433. 
620 Cf. ANDERMAN, The strategic uaw of Patent Enforcement and Acquisition Metgods and Competition Law, 
in GOVAERE-ULLRICH, Intellectual Property, Market Power and the Public Interests, supra, 171 ss.. 
621 Stressing this point WEISSMAN, Data Protection: Options for implementation, in ROOFE-TANSEY-
VIVAS-EUGUI, Negotiating Health- Intellectual Property and access to Medicines, supra, 166. 
622 COOK, Regulatory Data Protection in Pharmaceuticals and other Sectors, supra, 438-439.  
623 REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in international intellectual property law: the case for a 
public goods approach, supra, 38. See also FACKELMAN, Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment 
protection, supra, 166.  
624 CORREA, Protecting Test data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical Products, supra, 83. The American 
Congress has motivated the introduction of data exclusivity as a means of “enhancing the 
development and testing of unpatentable pharmaceuticals”, as is recalled by REICHMAN, Rethinking 
the role of clinical trials data in international intellectual property law: the case for a public goods approach, supra, 37. 
625  Countries such as Spain and Portugal did not have a patent system until the definitive 
enforcement of the TRIPs Agreement on the 1st January 2005, requiring all countries that were 
bound to it to grant protection for inventions in “all areas of technology”.  REICHMAN, Rethinking 
the role of clinical trials data in international intellectual property law: the case for a public goods approach, supra, 37. 
In these cases data exclusivity has been a substitute for patent protection over the interested 
products. CORREA, Protecting Test data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical Products, supra, 83. 
626 Indeed, patent protection for biopharmaceuticals was given only in 2006. According to the 
European Generic Association, “data exclusivity was created at a time where there were no patents 
for biotech products. This data exclusivity period therefore provided a form of market protection for 
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In some cases, patent protection for a product approved by regulatory 
authorities may be very difficult, or impossible to obtain, for instance as for 
new physical forms, new synthetic processes, or new uses of old substances, 
that would not satisfy the innovative patentability requirements628.  
Data exclusivity can also have an important role in absence of patent 
protection, as a means of protection of studies for an additional medical use 
of a previously authorised original drug. Art. 10 (1)(4) and 10(5) of the 
Directive provides in fact an additional and separate year of data protection, 
covering each and every of the drug’s indications, and also those already 
authorised for marketing629. This provision grants therefore protection to 
new therapeutic indications, but mostly becomes a means for innovators to 
maintain the market predominance in respect of previously authorised 
therapeutic indication630. 
When data exclusivity operates independently from the patent shield, 
literature has noticed how exclusive rights over test data have the effect of 
removing “from the public domain products that should be freely available”	  631.  
In other circumstances, data exclusivity has the function of “supplementary 
incentive” as regards the development of those pharmaceutical products 
that end up being protected by a shortened patent protection, due to the 
length of the regulatory approval procedure632, or because of the length of 
clinical trials processes, such as the ones needed for the testing of orphan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
these products in the absence of patents, which was particularly important to those Member States 
with developing biotech industries. Patents now exist for biotech products”. EGA, Data exclusivity, a 
major obstacle for Innovation and Competition in the EU Pharmaceutical sector, Brussels, 2000, 4.  
627 One of the most notorious cases is the one of Taxol-Bristol-Myers Squibb’s anti-cancer drug, 
discovered by the National Cancer Institute in 1962, and whose active substance was licensed for 
marketing only in 1991. Cf. PUGATCH, Intellectual Property and pharmaceutical data exclusivity in the context 
of information and market access, supra, 14.  
628 Cf. COOK, Regulatory Data Protection in Pharmaceuticals and Other Sectors, supra, 438, talking about 
“second generation patents”. See also JUNOD, Drug Marketing Exclusivity in the United States & 
European Union Law, supra, 483, talking about product line extensions, such as “slow release versions 
of pre-existing drugs”.  
629 FACKELMAN, Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment protection, supra, 173 ss.. 
630 LISMAN-SCHOONDERBEEK, An Introduction to EU Pharma Law, supra, 56. 
631 CORREA, Protecting Test data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical Products, supra, 95. 
632 EISENBERG, The role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, supra, 374. 
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drugs, or biogenetic pharmaceuticals633. In these cases the effective term of 
patent protection is shorter than the term of protection provided by data 
exclusivity634. 
Finally, if a generic manufacturer manages to produce a different but 
bioequivalent form of an already patented product, this generic drug could be 
patented, but due to the data exclusivity regime, it would not be granted a 
marketing license before the expiry of the exclusivity period. Indeed, 
according to art. 10.2 of the Directive, “the different salt, ester, ethers, 
isomers, mixture of isomers, complexes or derivatives of an active 
substance shall be considered to be the same active substance”635, and if the active 
substance thus falls in these categories, generic reference is not permitted, 
thus making the scope of the data exclusivity larger than that of patent 
protection636.  
  These scenarios directly reflect that data exclusivity is centred in the grey 
area of non-patentable, but still     economically valuable, pharmaceutical 
developments, extending the area of protection from   competition enjoyed 
by pharmaceutical products.  
5.2. Functions and dis-functions of Data exclusivity 
 
Once having defined the scope of protection of data exclusivity, also its 
functions become clearer as well.   
Some scholars have been welcoming this stronger form of protection, 
noticing that providing stronger incentives for the development of new 
drugs, will at the same time also improve the quality of clinical trials637. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
633 REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in international intellectual property law: the case for a 
public goods approach, supra, 38.  
634 PUGATCH, Intellectual Property and pharmaceutical data exclusivity in the context of information and market 
access, supra, 13. 
635 Emphasis added. 
636 FACKELMAN, Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment protection, supra, 168.  
637 EISENBERG, The role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 2007, in Michigan Telecommunications and 
Technology Law Review, 345, 370; ID., Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information Dissemination: How law 
directs biopharmaceutical research and development, supra, 489, stressing that that the non-disclosure and non-
reliance obligations binding the regulatory agency, “although puzzling from a consumer protection 
perspective”, are to be read in light of the perspective of promotion of innovation, to “promote 
investments in scientifically sound clinical trials, to generate valuable information about drugs”. 
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  However it must be noticed how other parts of pharmaceutical regulation 
already assure the qualitative enhancement of the conduction of clinical 
trials data638. Indeed, as it has been noticed, the completeness of clinical 
trials information is a requisite for the submission of any new drug 
marketing application639. 
Moreover, given that data exclusivity is particularly important in those cases 
where it exceeds patent protection, it has been stated that this form of 
protection has the effect of promoting sub-patentable research 640 , 
functioning as an indirect incentive for innovation641 particularly in those 
early stages of the R&D process in which there is still uncertainty whether 
the result of the same research will be patentable or not642.  
Indeed, in the absence of marketing exclusivity’s “safe net”, the uncertainty 
of the outcomes would have the effect of deterring research in both 
innovative and other less pioneering areas of scientific development643. 
In this light, exclusivity regime for clinical trials, has been seen as an 
incentive source for an “ever-widening” class of pharmaceuticals that would 
be denied patents644. The production of sub-patentable pharmaceuticals is 
to be considered functional to avoiding market failures in those cases where 
a certain medicine, even if non patentable, would have “saved or improved 
lives” or would have led to significant savings in other healthcare sectors 
(e.g. reduced hospitals stays)”645.  
However the incentive function as regards sub-patentable products assured 
by the data exclusivity protection, has been also criticised by other legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
638 The issue has already been discussed above, chapter 1, par. 1.1. 
639 JUNOD, Drug Marketing Exclusivity in the United States & European Union Law, supra, 485.  
640 FELLMETH, Secrecy, Monopoly, and access to pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: protection of 
marketing approval data under the TRIPS agreement, supra, 473.  
641 PUGATCH, Intellectual Property, data exclusivity, innovation and market access, supra, 6. 
642 FACKELMAN, Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment protection, supra, 179, stating that “in 
view of data exclusivity as a fall back option (…), an on-going R&D process might have better 
chances of being carried through”.  
643 JUNOD, Drug Marketing Exclusivity in the United States & European Union Law, supra, 483: “ by 
denying market exclusivity to all non innovative/unpatentable research outcomes, one runs the risk 
of discouraging drug R&D that could have led to innovative/patentable products”.  
644 REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in international intellectual property law: the case for a 
public goods approach, supra, 38. 
645 Cf. JUNOD, Drug Marketing Exclusivity in the United States & European Union Law, supra, 482.   
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scholars646 and by the generic industry647, underlining how it would on the 
contrary negatively affect the general pharmaceutical progress’ pace, by not 
providing any targeted incentive for socially productive-research648. 
On the contrary, the essential rationale of the protection is to be found in 
the shielding research-based companies from economically inefficient free-
riding practices649 that would obstruct the innovation process leading to 
patentable outcomes650. Unlike ordinary intellectual property rights, data 
exclusivity is to be referred to the protection of the investment651 necessary 
to generate an innovative product, or - better said- of the industrial know-
how652 entailed in the data portfolios handed out to regulatory agencies.  
 
However, the data exclusivity regime, intended as an additional patent style 
defence for pharmaceuticals, leads to considerable externalities as regards 
the perpetuation of market power, by establishing financial barriers to 
market entry, substantially delaying competition by imitation 
mechanisms653.  
Indeed, the proprietarisation of information 654 , extending the product 
monopoly already granted by the patent system to originators, delays 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
646 FELLMETH, Secrecy, Monopoly, and access to pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: protection of 
marketing approval data under the TRIPS agreement, supra, 473. In the same direction REICHMAN, Of 
Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, supra, 1772 ss., noticing the 
decrease of appeal of pharmaceutical patents, and of patentable pharmaceutical innovations.  
647 See JUNOD, Drug Marketing Exclusivity in the United States & European Union Law, supra, 483. 
648 Ibid.. 
649 See REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in international intellectual property law: the case 
for a public goods approach, supra, 40.  
650 However it has been underlined by literature that the free-riding practices that the data exclusivity 
provisions intend to avoid, are still very common, and form part of the normal competition 
information-interaction. See WEISSMAN, Data Protection: Options for implementation, in ROOFE-
TANSEY-VIVAS-EUGUI, Negotiating Health- Intellectual Property and access to Medicines, supra, 151 ss.. 
Cf. also LYNDON, Secrecy and access in an innovation intensive economy: reordering information privileges in an 
environmental health, and safety law, supra, 466 ss..  
651 This position is shared by FACKELMAN, Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment production 
in Europe, supra, 174-175. 
652 DODDS-SMITH, Data protection under the European Pharmaceutical Legislation and under Federal 
Legislation in the USA, supra, 30, citing the European Commission’s statements concerning 
pharmaceutical industry’s know-how, that has “an economic value equal to or greater than that of 
patents. (…)”, being non patented results “a major determinant of firms’ competitive advantage”. See 
European Commission, Treatment of know-how licensing under the competition rules, published on the 14th 
February 2013, online available at http://aei.pitt.edu/39936/. 
653 LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to Information and the Right to Health: the Human Rights Case for Clinical 
Trials Transparency, supra, 85. 654 HELLER, The Gridlock Economy: How too much ownership wrecks markets, stops innovation, and costs lives, 
New York, Basic Books, 2010, 45 ss.; REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in international 
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generic entry, with overall implications in terms of access to medicines, and 
therefore on the level of public health generally assured655, from both a 
quantity and a price perspective656.  
In fact, the effective exclusivity period generated by the data exclusivity 
regime results to be longer than the time during which the regulatory agency 
is bound by the non-reliance obligation, for one must consider also the time 
it will take regulatory authorities to approve the generic company’s new 
application657.  
Moreover, data exclusivity protection could further strengthen pioneer 
pharmaceutical companies’ dominant position, potentially leading to form 
of abuses of the dominant position itself, through the engagement of 
anticompetitive practices.  
In this perspective, the European Court of Justice has defined as abuse of 
dominant position the delaying of generic entry through the misuse of 
marketing authorisations658.  
Yet, a more significant implication of data exclusivity is to be referred to the 
overall effect it has on the market structure659: indeed this sui generis 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
intellectual property law: the case for a public goods approach, supra, 43. 
655 See CHAKRABARTI, Need of Data exclusivity: Impact on Access to Medicine, supra, 333. Cf. also 
YUNG-CHING YEH, Pharmaceutical Data Protection Law and Policy, and their effects on the right to 
Medicines: a Comparative Analysis, published on the 3rd October 2009, Theses and Dissertations, online 
available at http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=theses, 
passim. The issue will be later discussed infra chapter 3.  
656 Cf. CORREA, Unfair competition under the TRIPs Agreement: Protection of Data submitted for the registration 
of Pharmaceuticals, supra, 4. 
657 This is underlined by PUGATCH, Intellectual Property and pharmaceutical data exclusivity in the context of 
information and market access, supra, 12-13. It is on this basis that literature has underlined the sharp 
difference between data exclusivity and the other form of protection called market exclusivity, during 
which a generic applicant is allowed to make reference to the originator’s registration file, in order to 
be able to enter the market as soon as the exclusivity period has expired. See THOMAS, Proprietary 
Rights in Pharmaceutical Innovation: issues at the Intersection of Patents and Marketing exclusivities, supra, 13 ss.; 
ID., The Role of Patents and Regulatory Exclusivities in Pharmaceutical Innovation, published on 7th January 
2013, online available at 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/R42890_01072013.pdf, 4, 
noticing however how market exclusivity grants on the other side a higher standard of protection 
than data exclusivity, given that the former prevents a generic firm to enter the market, even if the 
evidence of the drug’s safety and efficacy is shown through own clinical trials.   
658  AstraZeneca AB and Astrazeneca plc v European Commission (Case T-321/05) (2005/C 
271/47). The court found two infringements of art. 102 TFEU, the first regarding misleading 
information in applications for supplementary protection (SPCs), provided by the pharmaceutical 
company before regulatory agencies from Germany, Belgium, Denmark and Norway; whereas the 
second consisted on the submission of requests for deregistration of the marketing authorisation 
from Losec, and the subsequent launch of the same product Losec in the form of tablets. Cf. 
NEGRINOTTI, Abuse of Regulatory Procedures in the Intellectual Property Context- The AstraZeneca case, 
supra, 146.  
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protection has important reflexes on the delay of scientific research, and at 
the same time on innovation development and competition interactions660.  
Also on this account, a comparison with the patent system is worthwhile. In 
fact, the patent system is shaped on the edge of a trade off between 
temporary monopoly protection and immediate disclosure of the invention. 
The transparency on which the patent system is build upon enables 
scientific research to move forward on the basis of the information newly 
disclosed, and permits therefore to similar, or improved products to enter 
the market as soon as the patent term has expired.  
On the contrary, “data exclusivity offers no trade-off between protection 
and disclosure inherent to intellectual property rights”661. 
Indeed, the non-reliance obligation of the data exclusivity regime has been 
interpreted, despite the lack of any normative grounds, as strictly related to 
a non-disclosure requirement of the same test data. Some literature662 has 
been arguing that the non-disclosure obligation of regulatory agencies is to 
be directly derived from the expressed non-reliance obligation, as well as 
from art. 287 EC Treaty663, obliging all the institutions to keep secret the 
confidential information they obtain during execution of their duties 
secret664.  
According to this position, prohibition of disclosure to third parties, is 
indeed to be derived through interpretation of the rule embedded in art. 10 
of the Directive, and is functional to the strengthening of the temporary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
659 DREXL, The relationship between the Legal exclusivity and Economic Market Power- Links and Limits, in 
GOVAERE-ULLRICH, Intellectual Property, Market Power and the Public Interest, supra, 13 ss.. 
660 On the issue see FLANAGAN-MONTAGNANI, Intellectual Property and Social Justice: a Law and 
Economics approach, supra, XI.  
661 So FACKELMAN, Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment protection, supra, 177.  
662 See COTTIER- MEITINGER-MEITINGER, The protection of Test Data submitted to Governmental 
Authorities: The impact of the TRIPs Agreement on EC law, supra, 66. 663 Art. 287 EC Treaty: “The members of the institutions of the Union, the members of committees, 
and the officials and other servants of the Union shall be required, even after their duties have ceased, 
not to disclose information of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, in particular 
information about undertakings, their business relations or their cost components”.  
664 See COTTIER-MEITINGER-MEITINGER, The protection of Test Data submitted to Governmental 
Authorities: The impact of the TRIPs Agreement on EC law, supra, 66.  
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market predominance the data exclusivity regime intends to incentivise 
innovation665.   
However, positive law of the data exclusivity regime does not provide any 
expressed confidentiality requirements666, and more specifically, no direct 
requirements of non-disclosure are found in it667: the cited interpretation is 
thus to be firmly rejected. 
On the contrary, according to a second and more convincing position, 
clinical trials disclosure is totally consistent with the data exclusivity 
regime668.  
Indeed, as it has been shown above, data exclusivity protects clinical trials 
data from competitors in the realm of marketing authorization processes.  
As far as the fulfilment of public health interests related to the spread of 
knowledge about drug’s safety and efficacy characteristics is concerned, the 
data exclusivity provisions do not pose any obstacle to the implementation 
of transparency systems.  
Indeed, given that the provision does not mention (non)disclosure at all, 
scholars have noticed how, once the protection against unfair commercial 
use is assured through the compliance with the non-reliance obligations, 
“nothing should prevent a regulator from disclosing those data to the wider 
public without having to argue that disclosure is demonstrably necessary for public 
protection”669.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
665 ADAMINI-MAARSE-VERSLUIS-LIGHT, Policy making on Data exclusivity in the European Union: 
from industrial interests to legal realities, supra, 1105; International Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers and Associations, Encouragement of new clinical drug development: the role of data exclusivity, 
supra, 5. On the issue also LEMMENS, Pharmaceutical knowledge governance: a human rights perspective, 
supra, 165.  
666 JUNOD, Drug Marketing Exclusivity in the United States & European Union Law, supra, 506. 
667 Literature has however noticed how this lack of expressed confidentiality obligations does not 
mine the international requirements under the TRIPs Agreement, for, after the elapse of the 
exclusivity period, test data are not disclosed to third parties, but at the contrary only reliance upon 
the first applicant’s data is made, therefore not compromising at all confidentiality obligations under 
TRIPs, COTTIER-MEITINGER-MEITINGER, The protection of Test Data submitted to Governmental 
Authorities: The impact of the TRIPs Agreement on EC law, supra, 68.  
668 COTTIER-MEITINGER-MEITINGER, 66. This is stressed also by LEMMENS-TELFER, 
Access to Information and the Right to Health: the Human Rights Case for Clinical Trials Transparency, supra, 86. 
669 LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to Information and the Right to Health: the Human Rights Case for Clinical 
Trials Transparency, supra, 85. Emphasis added. 
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6. Towards a systematic solution 
 
 
In light of the above made considerations, another step forward can be 
done towards the core of the problem regarding the conflict between 
private commercial interests defended by research-based companies and 
public transparency goals, functional to the promotion of health and 
scientific research. Data protection and data exclusivity regimes have been 
successfully lobbied by the pharmaceutical industry as a means of 
amplifying market shares and recouping the costs of drug development670. 
This form of “back door intellectual property”671 regarding clinical trials 
data, has been consequently invoked by research-based companies 
associations672 as evidence of the fact that information embedded in the 
application protocols is commercially valuable and therefore falling under 
the exemptions to general transparency rules673.  
The commercially sensitiveness of clinical trials data is clearly shown by 
economic analysis and directly confirmed by the establishment of a legal 
and economic protection granted by the above examined regimes674.  
However through the analysis of both the international and supranational 
normative framework, shaping the adequate protection to this particular 
commercial asset, the issue of clinical trials data disclosure is addressed and 
substantially resolved.  
Indeed, at the international level art. 39.3 TRIPs Agreement on the one 
hand defines the trade secret status of test data, on the other it provides a 
public health exemption for disclosure. 
The perspective of this provision is therefore exactly the opposite of the 
one emerging from the recent European legislation: if the former poses the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
670 See REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in international intellectual property law: the case 
for a public goods approach, supra, 4.  
671 Ibid..  
672 See the statements contained in EGA, Data exclusivity, a major obstacle for Innovation and Competition in 
the EU Pharmaceutical sector, supra, 9.  
673 Cf. supra chapter 1.  
674 See supra, chapter 1.  
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general rule for non-disclosure, remaining disclosure an exemption, the 
latter, as it has been shown above, has the contrary approach.  
Yet, the balance to be stricken remains the same, and no further, decisive, 
interpretative guidelines for the disclosure or concealment solution is to be 
found. 
On the contrary, an accurate evaluation of the data exclusivity regime675, 
criticised by literature for having raised the threshold of protection with 
reference to international obligations676, offers a deeper understanding of 
the issue.  
Indeed by purging competition through the isolation of a monopoly zone 
regarding marketing authorization, the commercial value of trials data is 
recognised and effectively secured. 
The shield provided by the non-reliance obligation imposed on regulatory 
agencies, has thus the effect of neutralising the threats to research-
companies’ commercial interests given by disclosure.  
Through the establishment of databases reporting the results of clinical 
trials as regards drug’s safety and efficacy features, general access to 
information is granted with substantial benefits for scientific research, 
innovation, and progress677.  
Consumer ONGs and healthcare providers would in that way increase their 
conscience over drug’s safety, whereas the research community and generic 
companies would gain knowledge of the arrival point of scientific 
development, in virtue of a mechanism that is similar to the transparency 
functions of patents.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
675 Stressing the need for further research on the adequate duration of data exclusivity protection 
PUGATCH, Intellectual Property and pharmaceutical data exclusivity in the context of information and market 
access, supra, 25; JUNOD, Drug Marketing Exclusivity in the United States & European Union Law, supra, 
510; FACKELMAN,  Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment protection, supra, 183.  
676 See in particular REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in international intellectual property 
law: the case for a public goods approach, supra, 13 ss.; ID., Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data under TRIPs 
Agreement and its Progeny: a broader perspective, supra, 18. 
677 JUNOD, Drug Marketing Exclusivity in the United States & European Union Law, supra, 515-516, 
stating that disclosure would finally put an end of the “sitting” of drug agencies on “hoards of 
precious information”.  
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Thus, under a data exclusivity regime, making clinical trials data publicly 
accessible has only positive effects from a public health and knowledge 
standpoint.  
As in the patent system, no erosion of commercial interests is to be found 
as long as the law precludes the marketing of similar products on the basis 
of the so disclosed clinical trials data.  
This said, it can be easily noticed how the sui generis form of intellectual 
property at stake, does not only permit- this meaning not preventing- clinical 
trials data disclosure, but is rather to be seen as a positive normative ground 
for disclosure678.   
Indeed, data shielded by exclusivity regimes are de facto protected against 
unfair commercial use679.  
The only use enabled by disclosure is thus the fair use for medical research 
and consumer consciousness enhancement.  
Reflections on the fundamental rights to health, to the share of the benefits 
of scientific progress, and to information are therefore evident680. 
It is therefore in the realm of the intellectual property framework itself that 
disclosure of test data finds its legal justification and that the interpretational 
short circuit between general rules and exemptions is interrupted. 
As illustrated above, the definition of what has to be factually considered 
commercially relevant information leads to substantial interpretative and 
therefore practical uncertainties. 
Before addressing it on an interpretative level, the issue at stake has thus to 
be defined from a systemic perspective. 
From this latter point of view, the normative framework concerning clinical 
trials data shows that protection of the commercial interests entailed in test 
data, is not to be regarded as an exemption to a general transparency rule- 
thus in a conflict perspective- but rather as a rule itself in the realm of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
678 In this direction LEMMES-TELFER, Access to Information and the Right to Health: the Human Rights 
Case for Clinical Trials Transparency, supra, 85, stating that “data and market exclusivity may be 
undesirable for other reasons, but exclusivity protection can clearly be invoked by those states that 
have entered into TRIPs+ agreements to defend the introduction of detailed trial registration and 
results reporting obligation”.  
679 Ibid.. 
680 See infra Conclusions.  
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intellectual property discipline, that systematically interacts with other 
branches of the drugs’ regulatory legislation.  
Furthermore, as some literature has been stressing, the data exclusivity 
regime does not require exclusivity over clinical trials data, but rather over 
the marketing authorisation effect related to them681.   
This subtle specification of the object of protection underlines how 
disclosure, directly referring to the data itself, is not in any way prevented 
under data exclusivity regimes. 
Thus, disclosure of pharmaceuticals’ safety information does not affect the 
marketing authorisation exclusivity effect, which is protected in the realm of 
a separate body of law aiming at sheltering companies’ industrial know-how. 
This purpose is achieved through the prohibition of the release of 
marketing authorisation for similar products, to be interpreted as a 
specification of the international obligation of protecting against the unfair 
use of clinical trials data. 
Hence, data exclusivity rule is not in contrast with the drug regulatory 
disclosure provisions of the latest reforms. On the contrary, it supports 
them, providing a structural justification for disclosure. The latter is in fact 
systematically rationalized on the condition that commercial interests are 
generally protected.  
In this perspective, it is the combined reading of consideration of different 
areas of clinical trials data’s normative framework that addresses the 
evaluation, on the one side, of the demand to preserve economic incentives, 
and on the other, of the satisfaction of public interests, in a complementary, 
rather than in an exclusionary manner.  
The interpretative creation of a non-disclosure obligation would unbearably 
alter this scheme. Indeed informational overprotection ends up mining 
pharmaceuticals’ safety awareness, with important repercussions on public 
health’s quality, and generating additional market failures caused by health 
risks682.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
681 FACKELMAN, Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment protection, supra, 173.  682 “economists and law makers have supported disclosure as a non-intrusive way to correct market 
failures that cause health and environmental risks and harms.48 Access facilitates an array of essential 
	   135	  
Furthermore, also overall dynamic market efficiency 683  results to be 
affected, impacting on ultimate innovation and competition 
development684. 
Indeed, given that the economic arguments justifying the granting of certain 
kinds of market “immunities” in consideration of the intellectual efforts 
triggering industrial innovation, must be considered as an untouchable basis 
of every intellectual property analysis, it is exactly to these same arguments 
that one must refer in order to draw a line between what is worth of 
protection and what is not, and in order to define the desirable scope of the 
protection itself685.  
In this light if the non-reliance obligation deriving from the data exclusivity 
regime, appears to be perfectly compatible with intellectual property 
system’s rationales686, the legal consistency of non-disclosure obligations is 
on the contrary very weak.  
Thus, it is only when the basic non-reliance protection expires that the 
demand to protect commercial interests gains again proper room, and must 
be satisfied through the evaluation of the exemption to the general 
disclosure rule.  
Once having defined the structural weight of the data exclusivity regime, 
and hence the legal foundations of clinical trials disclosure, the effective 
scope of mandatory reporting practices can be defined by shifting the focus 
on the interpretational issue of the balancing of opposite interests687.  
For this purpose, important suggestions are to be derived from the human 
rights, consumer law and public goods perspective.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
social and market responses that depend upon information pro- duction and sharing”. LYNDON, 
Secrecy and access in an innovation intensive economy: reordering information privileges in an environmental health, and 
safety law, supra, 483.  
683 RAMELLO, Incentives, Efficiency, and Social Justice: the Strange Case of Intellectual Property and Knowledge, 
supra, 19 ss.. 
684 FACKELMAN, Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment protection, supra, 175.  
685 MUZAKA, Politics of Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines, supra, 20-21. 
686 The peculiarities of this form of intellectual property must however be adequately evaluated. Cfr. 
BRAUN-PUGATCH, The changing face of pharmaceutical industry and intellectual property rights, in The Journal 
of World Intellectual Property, supra, 610. 687 Cf. LYNDON, Secrecy and access in an innovation intensive economy: reordering information privileges in an 
environmental health, and safety law, supra, 468, stating that “rather than balancing the two interests, the 
law should return to first principles and make it clear that EHS (Environmental, Health and Safety 
information) disclosure is the general rule. Only very limited nondisclosure privileges should be 
allowed to pro- tect new and emerging innovations”. 
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7. Privacy restraints 
 
 
Apart from the need to protect commercially confidential information, the 
second restraint that research-based companies have opposed in order to 
contrast the establishment of clinical trials reporting practices has been the 
confidentiality of volunteers’ personal data688.  
Indeed, before and during the testing procedures, an enormous amount of 
volunteers’ personal information is put together, sufficient to provide a 
detailed health profile of the individual being tested.  On the basis of these 
personal data the relevant drugs’ safety and efficacy information is 
produced689. The issue of personal health data collection becomes also 
more complex if one considers the growing importance of 
pharmacogenomics, based on the use of an individuals’ entire genetic 
profile for the purposes of the development of personalized pharmaceutical 
products690, in this way raising even deeper privacy concerns691.   
Hence, amongst the data obtained through testing, not only commercially 
valuable information is to be found, but also sensitive information regarding 
the health status of patients and their response to the new developed drug. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  688 LEMMENS, Pharmaceutical Governance: a Human Rights Perspective, supra, 181. For exampla, in its 
claim in front of the ECJ InterMune affirmed for grounds of disclosure the fact that information 
embedded in the clinical trials are protected by the fundamental right to private life under art. 8 of the 
ECHR. Cf. European Medicines Agency vs. InterMune, C-390/13 P(R), order of the Vice-President 
of the Court, 28 November 2013, supra  
689 Cf. Italian Data Protection Authority, Guidelines for data processing within the Framework of Clinical 
Drugs Trials- 24 July 2008, online available at 
http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/export/1671330, 1.  
690 For an assessment of legal implications of personalized medicine from a regulatory standpoint see 
RILEY, An Unfulfilled Promise: Changes Needed to the Drug Approval Process to make Personalized Medicine a 
Reality, 70 Food & Drug Law Journal (2015), 289 ss., 300-305, stressing how in the development of a 
‘personalized’ pharmaceutical product not only ‘ordinary’ clinical trials are needed, but also “patient 
experience data, combining claims and  cost data, clinical data included in the electronic health 
record, and data reflecting patient behaviour and preferences which may be commercially owned by 
entities outside the pharmaceutical and health provider industries”. The amount of personal data to 
be processed by pharmaceutical sponsors is thus bigger from both a quality standpoint-i.e. genetic 
information, that expresses the most intimate of individuals’ features- and a quantity standpoint- i.e. 
the variety of information needed for the product being effectively personalized.  
691 See GOLDMAN, Pharmacogenomics: Privacy in the Era of Personalized Medicine, 4 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. 
Prop. (2005-2006), 83 ss., 91-96, stressing the discriminatory threats caused by the publication of 
genetic profiles in freely accessible databases. However the Author acknowledges also the high social 
gains that a rich genetic database would achieve, given the “increased opportunity for research to 
identify and isolate polymorphisms affecting drug metabolism”.  
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This information has been referred by literature as “the most intimate, 
personal, and sensitive of any information maintained about an 
individual”692. 
The complexity of clinical trials protocols makes it difficult to clearly 
distinguish which piece of information is to be qualified as personal data or 
as commercial confidential information. It can be thus argued that this is a 
case of the ever growing overlapping of personal data and commercial 
confidential data qualification of a company’s same informational asset693. 
The demand to protect patients’ health information confidentiality has been 
stressed in the Declaration of Helsinki of 2003, underlining how “every 
precaution must be taken to protect the privacy of research subjects, and 
the confidentiality of their personal information”694.  The same declaration 
stresses the “right of research subjects to safeguard their integrity” and 
acknowledge how “every precaution should be taken to respect the privacy 
of the subject, the confidentiality of patients’ information and to minimize 
the impact of the study on the subjects’ physical and mental integrity and on 
the personality of the subject” 695 . Also the Council for International 
Organizations of Medical Science’s International Ethical Guidelines has 
recognised the need for the trials investigators to “establish secure 
safeguards of the confidentiality of subjects’ research data”, and that 
“subjects should be told the limits, legal or other, to the investigators’ ability 
to safeguard confidentiality and the possible consequences of braches of 
confidentiality”696.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
692 GOSTIN, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. (1995) 451. Also case law about 
health information has stressed the “highly private and personal” nature of health information, as the 
Canadian Supreme Court confirmed in the controversy McInerney v. MacDonald, cited by LEMMENS, 
Pharmaceutical knowledge governance: a human rights perspective, supra, 168.  
693 For a general assessment see European Data Protection Supervisor, Privacy and Competitiveness in the 
age of big data: the interplay between Data Protection, Competition law and Consumer Protection in the digital 
Economy, March 2014, online available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/20
14/14-03-26_competitition_law_big_data_EN.pdf, 26.  
694 Cf. Declaration of Helsinki- Ethical Principles for Medical research involving Human subjects, supra, par. 23.  
695 Ibid.. 
696 International Organizations of Medical Science, International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research 
involving Human Subjects, Geneva, 2002, online available at 
http://www.cioms.ch/publications/layout_guide2002.pdf, par. 18.  
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Privacy concerns have been thus internalized by the European Clinical 
Trials Regulation, underlining how the record, process, handling, and 
storage of clinical trials data must be carried out in accordance “with the 
applicable law on personal data protection”697 and that the “EU database 
shall be publicly accessible unless, for all or part of the data and information 
contained therein, confidentiality is justified” on the grounds of “protecting 
personal data in accordance with Regulation EC n. 45/2001”698.  
The scope of this second exemption to the general disclosure rule has thus 
to be better evaluated in light of the provisions of the European data 
protection framework: indeed it is evident how the need to protect subjects’ 
personal data can substantially impact on the effectiveness of legal 
transparency requirements.  
In this perspective, clinical trials disclosure is to be located on the edge of 
another trade off between public and private interests: information, 
scientific research, and therefore health demands face in this case the 
restraints suggested by the preservation of individuals’ right to dignity699. 
More generally, the fostering of health research through mandatory 
publication of data also falling under the scope of data protection rules, 
seems to reach the very core of what some scholars have defined the 
“privacy-innovation conundrum”700. 
 
In the course of pharmaceutical product development, threats to research 
subjects’ personal data are firstly to be found at a stage precedent to the 
granting of a marketing authorisation.  
Indeed, during the conduction of the testing, the health information of 
research subjects is accessed by the medical staff, and in second instance by 
the sponsor itself, often collaborating with other entities such as analysis 
laboratories or research organizations working on a contractual basis 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
697 Art. 56 of Regulation EU n. 536/2014, of the European Parliament ad of the Council, of 16 April 
2014, on clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, and repealing Directive 2001/20/EC, 
supra.  
698 Art. 81.4 of Regulation EU n. 536/2014, supra.  
699 GOSTIN, Health Information Privacy, supra, 490.  
700 Quoting ZARSKY, The privacy-innovation Conundrum, 19 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. (2015), 115 ss..  
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(CRO), in most cases located outside the EU. The continuous information 
exchanges so derived pose substantial threats to personal data’s 
confidentiality, therefore raising the need, acknowledged by some strand of 
literature, of raising a high standard of protection in order to “prevent 
specific risks from affecting data subjects”	  701. More specifically, it must be 
recalled how the Directive 96/45/EC imposes an explicit ban as regards the 
transfer of personal data from EU Member States to other non EU 
countries, where the legal regime does not assure an adequate level of 
privacy protection702: these provisions could indeed pose some problems 
for multinational pharmaceutical companies 703 , considered that the 
collection of the trials information is carried out in CRO mostly located 
outside the European Union704.  
 
Additional, and equally challenging privacy issues emerge from the 
establishment of reporting platforms regarding clinical study reports, and 
thus directly concerning the personal information embedded in them.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  701Italian Data Protection Authority, Guidelines for data processing within the Framework of Clinical Drugs 
Trials- 24 July 2008, supra, 2, underlining that “the collection, dissemination and large scale retention 
(partly in third countries), of multifarious information items related to the health and, in some cases, 
the sex life of individuals enrolled in clinical trials are fraught with several criticalities in terms of 
personal data protection; accordingly, a high standard of protection is required in order to prevent 
specific risks from affecting data subjects”. 702 Cf. art. 25 of the Directive 96/45/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, affirming that “The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third country of 
personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer may take 
place only if, without prejudice to compliance with the national provisions adopted pursuant to the 
other provisions of this Directive, the third country in question ensures an adequate level of 
protection; The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country shall be assessed in 
the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or set of data transfer 
operations; particular consideration shall be given to the nature of the data, the purpose and duration 
of the proposed processing operation or operations, the country of origin and country of final 
destination, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third country in question and 
the professional rules and security measures which are complied with in that country”.  
703 SCHULZE STEINEN-BOHN, Data Protection in Clinical Studies- Implications of the new EU General 
Data Protection Regulation, published on 19th June 2012, online available at 
http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/54c52880-824b-4c9c-a3bd-
284f8b774c77/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/8ed5a350-8281-473d-8bf2 
1d6b2f9e6c75/Alert_DataProtection_june2012.pdf, 4.  
704 Ibid..  
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Indeed, the systematic disclosure of personally sensitive information clearly 
raises a risk of massive personal data’s distortive and discriminatory misuse, 
traditionally related to health information recording systems705.  
However, a closer analysis of the European Data Protection framework 
shows how disclosure of trials subjects’ personal data collected in the 
context of clinical research experiences, is not radically prevented, and with 
that how the threats posed to the effectiveness of Clinical Trials 
Regulation’s mandatory disclosure provision by the cited privacy exemption, 
are actually of little significance.   
 
7.1 Transparency in clinical key-coded personal data: in search for 
regulatory gaps   
 
Against this backdrop, three are the data protection tools to be examined 
for our purposes: first, interesting insights are to be derived from the de-
identification techniques used to process the collected data; secondly, 
informed consent conditions to treatment are to be considered of particular 
relevance for the inclusion of scientific research purposes amongst the 
legitimate uses of personal data; finally, the same data protection provisions 
take into consideration scientific research needs through specific 
exemptions to ordinary data protection rules.  
 
As far as the first point is concerned, data collected through testing 
procedures undergo a process of de-identification706: indeed, in accordance 
to the good clinical practice guidelines established by the Clinical Trials 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
705 “The systems also have the potential to process more data in new context and to make them more 
readily available to a wider circle of recipients than before, thereby changing the whole scale of 
possible misuse of medical information about individual patients”. Art. 29 Data Protection Working 
Party, Working Document on the processing of personal data relating to Health in Electronic Health Records 
(EHR), Adopted on 15 February 2007, online available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp131_en.pdf. On the issue see 
also RYNNING, Public Trust and Privacy in Shared Electronic Health Records, in European Journal of Health 
Law, 14 (2007), 105-112. See also BANZI-BERTELE’-GARATTINI, Accessibilità dei dati sui farmaci: 
Le nuove norme EMA, in Giornale Italiano di Farmacoeconomia e Farmacoutilizzazione, 2014, 6, 11-12.  
706 Cf. World Health Organization, Handbook for Good Clinical Research Practice (GCP) for trials on 
pharmaceutical products, Geneva, 2002, online available at 
http://apps.who.int/prequal/info_general/documents/gcp/gcp1.pdf, 103-106.  
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Directive707 and the Good Clinical Practice Directive708, participants in 
clinical trials are given a unique identification number709, with the purpose 
of carrying out the testing procedures under anonymity710. The collected 
data are thus key-coded, or better said, pseudonymized711.  
It is on the basis of these de-identification mechanisms that the European 
Ombudsman has negatively resolved the problem of the protection of 
personal data embedded in clinical trials protocols, by stating that due to the 
difficulty of re-identification, no privacy obstacles were to be found for 
disclosure712.  
However this position provides a simplistic insight on the issue, given that 
these mechanisms are not irreversible713: on the contrary the same Good 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
707 Directive 2001/20/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 4 April 2001, on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of Member States relating to the 
implementation of good clinical practice in the conduct of clinical trials on medicinal products for 
human use, supra. 
708 Directive 2005/28/EC of 8 April 2005, laying down principles and detailed guidelines for good 
clinical practice as regards investigational medicinal products for human use, as well as the 
requirements for authorisation of the manufactoring or importation of such products, supra.  709 European Medicines Agency, Guideline for Good Clinical Practice, Note for Guidance on Good 
Clinical Trials Practice, July 2002, online available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2009/09/WC5000
02874.pdf, stating that “a unique identifier assigned by the investigator to each trial subject to protect 
the subject's identity and used in lieu of the subject's name when the investigator reports adverse 
events and/or other trial related data”. European Medicines Agency- Heads of Medicines Agency, 
Guidance document on the identification of commercially confidential information and personal data within the structure 
of the marketing authorisation (MA) application- Release of information after the granting of a marketing 
authorisation, supra, 2.  
710 Cf. Health Action International, Protecting citizens’ Health: Transparency of Clinical Trial Data on 
Medicines in the Eu, supra, 4-5.  
711 On the issue, LASTIC, Are Clinical Trials Data Transparency and Patient Privacy mutually exclusive?, 
Conference Paper, 2013 CDSC International Exchange, Bethesda, online available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259923557_Are_Clinical_Trials_Data_Transparency_and
_Patient_Privacy_mutually_exclusive; SETHI, The Promotion of Data Sharing in Pharmacoepidemiology, in 
European Journal of Health Law, 21 (2014), 271 ss., 282, underlining the benefits of pseudonymization, 
to be seen as “one mechanism which does enable traceability whilst alleviating some concerns around 
using identifiable data”, and as “one of several mechanisms which speak to current flexibilities 
around conducting data linkage”. The Author stresses the difference between pseudonymisation and 
anonymisation techniques, stressing the advantages of the former. Contra see CAVOUKIAN-EMAM, 
Dispelling the Myth Surrounding de-identification: Anonymization Remains a Strong Tool for Protecting Privacy, 
June 2011, online available at https://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/anonymization.pdf.  
712 This point has already been discussed in chapter 1 paragr. 2.2.2. 
713  Cf. Article 29 Working Party on anonymization techniques, online available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp216_en.pdf, 5, stressing that as a consequence of anonymization 
techniques, “the data must be stripped of sufficient elements, such that the data subject can no longer 
be identified. More precisely, thet data must be processed in such a way that it can no longer be used 
to identify a natural person by using “all the means likely reasonably to be used” by either the 
controller or a third party. An important factor is that the processing must be irreversible”. Directive 
95/46/EC, supra, does however not clarify how such a de-identification process should or could be 
performed. Contra see OHM, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the surprising failure of anonymization, 
57 UCLA LAW REV. (2010), 1701 ss., presenting interesting re-identification examples.  
	   142	  
Clinical Practices expressly require that the personal information must be 
key-coded in a way that can allow the sponsor, through the investigator, to 
retrieve the data subject714.  
In practice, trials centres own a list where the codes are matched with 
patients’ identification. This list should theoretically remain confidential, but 
in fact sponsors gain knowledge of it through their own study monitors 
visiting the trials centres in order to verify the observance of the relevant 
protocol.  
In this light, it is evident how personal data collected through testing 
processes, are subject to a considerably higher number of exposure threats, 
compared to ‘ordinary’ health data.  
Indeed, health data are generally fully protected by healthcare providers’ 
confidentiality obligation715. Under the duty of confidentiality, practitioners 
must not use or disclose information in a way that disappoints “reasonable 
expectations of privacy”716.  
 To the contrary, during the trials, the confidentiality obligation of 
physicians is weakened by the fact that for the effectiveness of their 
controls, sponsors must have access to all information protocols, including 
non-coded source documents717. For example, sponsors can access the list 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
714 SCHULZE STEINEN-BOHN, Data Protection in Clinical Studies- Implications of the new EU General 
Data Protection Regulation, supra, 3.  
715 Cf. Art. 81,1 comma lett. a) of the Proposal for a Data Protection Regulation, mentioning “the 
obligation of professional secrecy” and the “obligation of confidentiality”, weighing on health 
professional subjects. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), voted on the 15th December 2015, 
online available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf. On the issue see TAYLOR, Confidential 
Patient Information For Public Health: Distinguishing Between Health Protection and Health Improvement, in 
Medical Law Rev., 23, 3, 348 ss, stressing how the duty “to protect identifiable patient data is rooted in 
professional ethics as well as common law”. CALLENS, The Privacy Directive and the Use of Medical Data 
for Research Purposes, in European Journal of Health Law, 2, 1995, 309 ss., stating how “the physician has 
the obligation not to disclose confidential patient information which he learns in the course of his 
professional practice. Together with the individual interest, the general interest is at the root of the 
general secrecy rule. This means that it is in the interest of everyone that the physician, in the course 
of his professional practice, does not betray a patient’s confidence”.  
716 TAYLOR, Confidential Patient Information For Public Health: Distinguishing Between Health Protection and 
Health Improvement, supra, 353, citing the relevant English case law, that has widely been affirming how 
“information that can identify individual patients, must not be used or disclosed for purposes other 
than healthcare without the individual’s explicit consent, some other legal basis, or where there is a 
robust public interest or legal justification to do so”. 
717 VAN QUATHEM, Controlling Personal Data- The case of Clinical Trials, Data Protection Compliance 
Advisor, Covington and Burling, 2005, online available at 
https://www.cov.com/~/media/files/corporate/publications/2005/10/oid64167.ashx.  
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of the names in the realm of the controls of the procedures aimed at 
obtaining research subjects’ informed consent718. In this regard it has been 
noticed how the practitioner of clinical trials bears a real conflict of interest 
related to his dual role of both physician and researcher appointed by 
enterprises719. 
Secondly, through the trials procedures, the same data subject undergoes 
various phases of testing, every of which generating data that will be further 
processed for the necessary product safety assessments within analytics that 
comprehend all the data collected through the whole testing by all the 
volunteers involved720. With this regards, scholars have noticed how each 
same set of test data has different sources, related to the various testing 
phases, this leading in return to a higher identification hazard721.   
Literature has stressed how the greater possibility to identify key-coded data 
is directly functional to a better achievement of the research purposes 
intended to be achieved through the clinical studies, in relation for example 
to the need to monitor the patients’ response to a tested product also after 
the phases of the ordinary testing have been carried out722. In this regard, it 
has been significantly argued that “data can be either useful or perfectly 
anonymous but never both”723.  
 
The fact that volunteers’ data are key coded must be better assessed in light 
of the European data protection provisions. Indeed the Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC regards as personal information every information 
related to a person that is indirectly identifiable through an identification 
number724. Also Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party has underlined the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
718 Italian Data Protection Authority, Guidelines for data processing within the Framework of Clinical Drugs 
Trials- 24 July 2008, supra, 4.  
719 Cf. TERRY, Protecting Patient Data in the age of Big Data, 81 UMKC L. Rev. (2012-2013), 385 ss., 
410. 
720 MCGRAW et al., Privacy and Confidentiality in pragmatic clinical trials, in Clinical Trials Journal, 12, 5, 520 
ss., online available at http://ctj.sagepub.com/content/12/5/520.full.pdf+html.  
721  Ibid., 524. On these same issues, see also SETHI, The Promotion of Data Sharing in 
Pharmacoepidemiology, supra, 288. 
722 It is the case of the monitoring of long term adverse events. Cf. VAN QUATHEM, Controlling 
Personal Data- The case of Clinical Trials, supra, 3.  
723 OHM, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the surprising failure of anonymization, supra, 1703-1704. 
724 According to Art. 2 (a) of Directive 95/46/EC, supra, “personal data shall mean any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (data subject); identifiable person is one who 
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relevance as personal data of every piece of information deriving from the 
combination of different items, and allowing the identification of a data 
subject725. Specifically referring to key coded data, the Working Party has 
underlined how such data “constitutes information relating to identifiable 
natural persons for all parties that might be involved in the possible 
identification, and should be subject to the rules of data protection legislation”726.  
Hence, under the current European approach, literature has underlined how 
identifiable data gain the same status of identified data727.  
The very broad notion of personal data adopted by the European Union728 
is thus perfectly capable of comprehending key-coded data that are, as 
shown above, very easy to decode.  
In this perspective, the trials’ sponsor, i.e. the research-based company, is to 
be considered data controller, as it is the sponsor itself that initiates the 
trials and determines the purpose and means of the processing of the 
collected data729. The role of the data controller can be also held by the 
contract research organization responsible for the conducting of the trials in 
the cases the organization itself takes over the ordinary functions of the 
sponsor730. Moreover pharmaceutical companies are to be considered also 
data processors, for they being the very first ‘centre of administration’ of 
the trials protocols before the handing out of trials portfolios to the 
regulatory agency.  
Under these premises, if also key-coded data are to be fully considered as 
personal information, then it is evident that data protection provisions must 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to 
one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity”.  
725For example through the matching of a patient’s initial with his birth date. Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, Opinion n. 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, online available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf.  
726 Ibid.. Emphasis added. 
727 SCHWARTZ-SOLOVE, Reconciling Personal Information in the United States and European Union, 102 
California Law Rev. (2014), 877 ss., online available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2271442, 895-896. Emphasis added.  
728Id., focusing on the difference between American and European notion of personal data, being the 
former narrower due to a direct identification requirement.  
729 GILLON, “Fully” informed consent, clinical trials, and the boundaries of therapeutic discretion, in DOYAL-
TOBIAS, Informed Consent in Medical Research, London, BMJ Books, 2001, 257 ss., 262. 
730 SCHULZE STEINEN-BOHN, Data Protection in Clinical Studies- Implications of the new EU General 
Data Protection Regulation, supra, 2-3.  
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be fully applied, with all the related obligations imposed by the law731, such 
as limits on information use and restrictions on information disclosure732.  
Such a high privacy threshold protection may however lead to an 
overprotection of these data that are very unlikely to be identified for 
various reasons, because of the difficulty of de-codification of the same 
data733, or because of the difficulty to retrieve the data subject734.  
Some scholars have for example mentioned the scenario in which the data 
controller maintains encrypted keys along with strong institutional 
safeguards to prevent access to key-coded data unless specifically defined 
events occur, affirming how “the party who accesses the data but not the 
keys, handles information that is functionally nonpersonal information for that 
party” and concluding that “in certain circumstances, therefore, the 
possibility of identification may be highly remote for the party who has 
access only to key-coded data”735. According to this viewpoint, greater 
attention to “the risk level associated with potential identification” is to be 
given, with the consequence that information that is merely identifiable 
should not be treated “as fully equivalent to identified information”736.  
To the contrary, it is argued, the European data protection rules are shaped 
so as to increase the level of protection in a manner that is disproportionate 
to the effective risks connected to data use, in that way blocking “socially 
productive uses of analytics that do not raise significant risks of individual 
privacy harms”737. Echoing this reasoning, also from the lines of civil law 
scholars it has been acknowledged, through a much more theoretical 
argument, how the processing of sensitive health data for research purposes 
is substantially different from the use of these same data for purposes that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
731 VAN QUATHEM, Controlling Personal Data- The case of Clinical Trials, supra, 3.  
732 SCHWARTZ-SOLOVE, Reconciling Personal Information in the United States and European Union, supra, 
910. Cf. SETHI, The Promotion of Data Sharing in Pharmacoepidemiology, supra, 272.    
733 For example, if the matching documents from which the name of the data subject is to be derived, 
gets lost, or there is a proof of destruction.  
734 MCCHARTHY-PORTER, Confidentiality: the Protection of Personal Data in Epidemiological and Clinical 
Research Trials, 19 L. Med. & Health Care 1991, 238. 
735 SCHWARTZ-SOLOVE, Reconciling Personal Information in the United States and European Union, supra, 
896. Emphasis added.  
736 Ibid., 909. Emphasis added.  
737 Ibid., 910. 
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are strictly and solely related to the data subject: medical research is indeed 
not interested in the individual as such, but rather in a group of persons738.  
These positions propose interesting insights as regards the need to find 
possible ways of converging privacy with scientific research burdens, 
opening up to solutions that could be of great interest as regards the 
interpretation of European data protection rules.  
More importantly, the underlying intent is the one of heading towards a 
modulated approach as regards the notion of personal data for scientific 
research purposes. Such an approach, in return, could be decisive for a 
mediation between the ‘inclusive’ European attitude and the ‘exclusive’ 
American trends, according to which the qualification of personal data is to 
be given only to identified data739. 
In this regards, the statements contained in the latest EU-US Privacy Shield 
regarding the move of personal data from the European Union to the 
United States, are of particular interest: the Shield seems in fact to adopt a 
European approach as far as the definition of personal data is concerned740. 
In this way, in case of data transfer, the risk of total loss of protection of 
those data that are only identifiable, and thus protected only under EU law, is 
prevented.  
The basic scheme adopted by the Shield is that in cases of transfer of 
personal data, “EU Member State law applies to the collection of the 
personal data and to any processing that takes place prior to the transfer to 
the United States”, whereas “the Privacy Shield Principles apply to the data 
once they have been transferred to the United States”741.  
Moving from the general considerations deeper into specific sectorial 
branches of regulation, the framework principles issued by the US 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
738 CALLENS, The Privacy Directive and the Use of Medical Data for Research Purposes, supra, 324, 
interestingly noticing how “the fact that there is no mention of misuse ot complaints would confirm 
the assertion that the invasion of the right to privacy is non-existent or very remote”. 
739 This is in fact the definition of personal data to be generally found in a very fragmented and 
sectorial American data protection framework. See SCHWARTZ-SOLOVE, Reconciling Personal 
Information in the United States and European Union, supra, 891.  
740 “"Personal data” and “personal information” are data about an identified or identifiable individual”. 
EU-US Privacy Shield Framework Principles Issued by the US Department of Commerce, Annex II, 
released on the 29th February 2016, online available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/files/privacy-shield-adequacy-decision-annex-2_en.pdf, 3. 
741 Ibid..  
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Department of Commerce state, with specific regards to clinical trials data, 
that “personal data developed in specific medical or pharmaceutical 
research studies often play a valuable role in future scientific research”, and 
that therefore “pharmaceutical and medical device companies are allowed to 
provide personal data from clinical trials conducted in the EU to regulators 
in the United States for regulatory and supervision purposes”742. Hence, in 
light of the above mentioned declarations, the move of trials subjects’ 
personal information is not only allowed, but the personal data themselves 
would receive, according to the rules of the Privacy Shield to be applied 
after the transfer has been carried out, a European styled protection.  
However, a deeper look in the technicalities of the issued clinical trials data 
protection leads to radically opposite conclusions. Indeed, the framework 
principles explicitly refer to research key-coded data- that constitute, as it 
has been stated, the most, if not the entire, part of the personal data 
collected through pharmaceutical testing-, and affirm that “a transfer from 
the EU to the United States of data coded (…) would not constitute a transfer of 
personal data that would be subject to the Privacy Shield Principles”743.   
This statement leads to a few observations.  
First, even if the text refers to data that are “uniquely key-coded at their 
origin by the principal investigator so as not to reveal the identity”744, it has 
been illustrated above how sponsors in practice conduct a very deep 
monitoring over physicians’ activities, weakening in this way the 
confidentiality duties of the same practitioners. It is thus in practice very 
unlikely- contrary to what the text affirms - that the trials sponsors, i.e. 
research companies, do not get in possession of the key. Indeed, it has been 
demonstrated above how clinical key coded data collected through trials are 
exposed to a very high identification risk, rendering these same data 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
742 EU-US Privacy Shield Framework Principles Issued by the US Department of Commerce, Annex 
II, supra, 27, further stating “EU Member State law applies to the collection of the personal data and 
to any processing that takes place prior to the transfer to the United States. The Privacy Shield 
Principles apply to the data once they have been transferred to the United States”.  
743 Ibid., 28. Emphasis added.  
744 Ibid.. 
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absolutely identifiable, and thus, according to the principles and definitions 
adopted by the Shield itself, to be protected also after a transfer to the EU.  
It is thus interesting to notice that the Privacy Shield adopts an opposite 
solution as regards pharmaceutical test data, that do not fall in the scope of 
personal data, and that can consequently be freely processed for research 
purposes. With this regards, the Privacy Shield seems to have perfectly 
internalized the increased attention given by American literature to the need 
to enhance analysis of large key coded data sets for healthcare research 
purposes745. Given that clinical trials data are substantially formed by coded 
personal data, it is clear that a narrower interpretation of the notion of 
personal data, like the one adopted in the United States and finally also by 
the Privacy Shield Framework Principles with specific regards to clinical 
trials data746, removes obstacles to the processing of those data, and more 
precisely to publication of those same data in publicly accessible databases.  
 
Coming back to the European framework, despite the critics coming from 
the lines of various scholars, calling for an adjustment of data protection 
rules to health research purposes747, the European Union appears to include 
pseudonymised data within the scope of personal data. Things won’t change 
with the enactment of the data protection Regulation, where it is remarked 
how on European ground “the principles of data protection should apply to 
any information concerning an identified or identifiable natural person”748. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
745 It has been in fact largely shown how information-based research has enabled very important 
discoveries, in that way shifting the centre of medical research itself, from traditional trialling to 
collected data analytics. Cfr. V.V. A.A., Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Enhancing Privacy, Improving 
Health through Research, 2009, online available from the National Academy Press, 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12458.html, 112 ss.. 
746 EU-US Privacy Shield Framework Principles Issued by the US Department of Commerce, Annex 
II, supra, 1.  
747 Cf. SETHI, The Promotion of Data Sharing in Pharmacoepidemiology, supra, 284, underlining how the 
current regulatory European patterns do not properly address the need of the promotion of scientific 
research, therefore concluding that “a regulatory approach which better promotes sharing data in 
appropriate circumstances is needed”.  
748 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(General Data Protection Regulation), supra, recital 23, further stating that “Data which has undergone 
pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information, should be 
considered as information on an identifiable natural person. To determine whether a person is identifiable, 
account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by 
the controller or by any other person to identify the individual directly or indirectly. To ascertain 
whether means are reasonable likely to be used to identify the individual, account should be taken of 
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In relation to the recent European transparency policies, it is clear that this 
large notion of personal data is likely to have a great impact, as it was with 
the case of commercial confidential data, on the effectiveness of the 
mandatory disclosure rule posed by art. 81(4) of the Clinical Trials 
Regulation. Indeed, as it has been noticed, a significant part of clinical trials 
protocols are exactly made up by personal health data of the volunteers that 
underwent the trials, falling therefore under the scope of the privacy 
exemption provided by the same normative provision.  
However, in the lines of both past and future European data protection 
rules, the lawfulness of the processing for scientific innovation purposes of 
codified data qualified as personal sensitive data, such as health data, can 
still be justified in consideration of the gaps opened up by both informed 
consent determinations and the public interest exemptions contemplated by 
the same data protection provisions.  
 
Indeed, in the management- that is to say collection and eventual release- of 
the volunteers’ personal data a crucial role is played by the informed 
consent conditions to treatment749.  
It is important to recall how the conduction of medical experimentation 
without informed consent is explicitly considered as a human rights 
violation by art. 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights750. 
As far as the informed consent is concerned, international guidelines as well 
as scholars have stressed how the consent forms, to be effective, must 
provide sufficient detail about the product being tested, its risks and its 
intended use751. The handing out of this information necessary for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking 
into consideration both available technology at the time of the processing and technological 
development”. Emphasis added.  
749 GILLON, “Fully” informed consent, clinical trials, and the boundaries of therapeutic discretion, supra, 263-264.  750 Art. 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, “(…) no one shall be subjected 
without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation”. Cf. LEMMENS, Pharmaceutical 
Governance: a Human Rights Perspective, supra, 170.  
751 Cf. SETHI, The Promotion of Data Sharing in Pharmacoepidemiology, supra, 285, recalling the statements 
of the so called “Albrecht Report” for the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 
proposing in 2012 numerous amendments to the Proposed Data Protection Regulation, and 
underlining how the consent must be “specific, informed and explicit”.  Cf. also MCCHARTHY-
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consent to become effectively informed, has been interestingly seen as a 
first disclosure occasion regarding drug’s safety and efficacy data, that are 
transmitted through informed consent leaflets to clinicians, to patients, and 
finally also to research ethics committees752.  
However, a closer look to the practice shows how the information about 
the pharmaceutical product’s features disclosed through informed consent 
forms, are not that detailed, and thus appear to be functional to satisfy the 
clinical trials sponsor’s and conductor’s interest in avoiding responsibility, 
rather than the patients’ interests in the enrolment in effectively safe testing 
procedures753.  
The Clinical Trials Regulation provides a detailed framework for the 
informed consent that data subjects of trials conducted in the European 
Union must provide before participating in a trial754. In particular, art. 29 
requires that “informed consent shall be written, dated and signed by the 
person performing the interview (…)”. 
The English Health Research Authority, coordinating ethical committees, 
has defined “practical steps to promote transparency, including (…) 
guidance in participant information sheets and consent form content to 
ensure consent is not a later barrier to data sharing”755.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
PORTER, Confidentiality: the Protection of Personal Data in Epidemiological and Clinical Research Trials, supra, 
238; International Organizations of Medical Science, International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical 
Research involving Human Subjects, supra, par. 18 and World Health Organization, Handbook for Good 
Clinical Research Practice (GCP) for trials on pharmaceutical products, supra, 106, “The informed consent 
document should describe (1) who will have access to personal data of the research participants, 
including medical records and biological samples; (2) the measures taken to ensure the confidentiality 
and security of research participants’ personal information; and (3) the potential risks to subjects if 
such measures are breached (e.g., stigma, loss of reputation, potential loss of insurability, etc.)”.  
752 LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: the human rights case for clinical trials 
transparency, supra, 81.  
753 This is the assertion of CHALMERS-LINDLEY, Double Standards in informed Consent, in DOYAL-
TOBIAS, Informed Consent in Medical Research, London, supra, 266 ss.. Stressing the point also 
FURNESS-NICHOLSON, Obtaining Explicit Consent for the use of Archivial Tissue Samples: Practical Issues, 
in Journal of Medical Ethics, 20 (2004), 561 ss., considering the difficulties and impracticalities of 
obtaining a consent that is to be regarded as effectively informed, and showing the divergences 
existing on this subject between theory and the practices carried out by trials’ conductors.  
754 Cf. recitals 6, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36 and Chapter V regarding protection of subjects and informed 
consent, artt. 28 ss., of Regulation EU n. 536/2014, supra. SCHULZE STEINEN-BOHN, Data 
Protection in Clinical Studies- Implications of the new EU General Data Protection Regulation, supra, 4.  
755 Cf. Health Research Authority, The HRA Interest in Good Research Conduct, Transparent Research, May 
2013, online available at http://www.hra.nhs.uk/documents/2013/08/transparent-research-
report.pdf, 2.  
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Informed consent to treatment should therefore encourage rather than pose 
obstacles to clinical trials data disclosure756.  
Indeed, if the explicit and legitimate purpose of the publication in 
mandatory scientific databases would be specified in the informed consent 
leaflet, and if the subject would be therefore allowed to subscribe the 
treatment of its personal data for the purposes of scientific transparency, no 
misuse of the sensitive information would be found in light of the relevance 
principle and the purpose-specification rule757. However, it must be stressed 
that consent must explicitly regard public release of the data, and not a 
generic scientific research purpose758. Indeed, as far as the research purposes 
are concerned, consent is generally given with regards to one specific study, 
and further uses are not covered759. Hence, only the consent given to public 
disclosure purposes would be capable of overcoming the problem of 
secondary and further uses of otherwise protected personal data760. With 
this regards however, the Proposed Data Protection Regulation overcomes 
the problem of the data processing for purposes that are different from the 
ones to which the subject has given consent to, by affirming that “the 
further processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, or scientific 
and historical research purposes or statistical purposes should be considered 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  756 BANZI-BERTELE’-GARATTINI, Accessibilità dei dati sui farmaci: Le nuove norme EMA, supra, 12. 
Cf. also V.V.A.A., A Proposal to protect Privacy of Health Information while accelerating Comparative Effectiveness 
Research, in Health Affairs, November 2010, 29, 11, 2082 ss., online available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/29/11/2082.long, stating that “where consent is legally 
required, it should be easy and convenient for patients to volunteer their medical information for 
research. Studies indicate broad public willingness to participate in research if asked”.  757 Cf. recital 28 of the Directive 95/46/EC, supra: “Whereas any processing of personal data must 
be lawful and fair to the individuals concerned; whereas, in particular, the data must be adequate, 
relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are processed; whereas such 
purposes must be explicit and legitimate and must be determined at the time of collection of the data; 
whereas the purposes of processing further to collection shall not be incompatible with the purposes 
as they were originally specified”. Art. 6: “Member States shall provide that personal data must be a) 
processed fairly and lawfully; b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not 
further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. Further processing of data for 
historical, statistical or scientific purposes shall not be considered as incompatible provided that 
Member States provide appropriate safeguards; c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to 
the purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed (...)”.  
758 Cf. LASTIC, Are Clinical Trials Data Transparency and Patient Privacy mutually exclusive, supra.  
759 Ibid.. On this issue also ZARSKY, The Privacy-Innovation Conundrum, supra, 141.  
760 In this sense, THOMAS-WALPORT, Data Sharing Review, issued to the English Government on 
the 11th July 2008, online available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.justice.gov.uk/docs/data-sharing-
review.pdf, 31-33.  
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as compatible lawful processing operations”761. Following these lines, also 
art. 5 of the same Regulation, specifically regarding the principles of data 
processing, after having affirmed the principle of “purpose limitation” of 
the given consent, specifies that “further processing of personal data for 
archiving purposes in the public interest, or scientific and historical research 
purposes or statistical purposes shall, in accordance with art. 83(1), not be 
considered incompatible with the initial purposes”762. 
 
Against this backdrop, one last and decisive remark can be made. Indeed, 
the peculiar public informational value of clinical trials protocols could 
justify the processing of the personal data at stake also in the absence of any 
specific consent expressed by the data subject. The examination of the 
proposal of a general Data Protection Regulation shows how areas of 
compatibility between information goals and the demands of protection for 
research-subjects’ personal data could be expressly taken into consideration 
by law.  
The proposal of the general Data Protection Regulation provides in fact 
precious grounds for the disclosure of clinical trials data, through the 
definition of specific cases in which an information practice is to be 
regarded as fair in a privacy perspective763.  
In this regard, art. 9 of the Proposal, concerning the prohibition of “the 
processing of (…) genetic data or data concerning health”, defines an 
exemption to the general rule, when the “processing is necessary for the 
performance of a task carried out in the public interest, on the basis of Union law, 
or Member State law which shall provide for suitable measures to safeguard 
the data subject's legitimate interests”764.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
761 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(General Data Protection Regulation), supra, recital 40. Cfr. also art. 40, affirming that Derogating 
from the prohibition on processing sensitive categories of data should also be allowed (…)for health 
security, monitoring and alert purposes, the prevention or control of communicable diseases and 
other serious threats to health”.  
762 Ibid., art.5.  
763 GOSTIN, Health Information Privacy, supra, 456.  
764 Emphasis added. 
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Furthermore, Art. 81 of the same Proposal specified that the processing of 
health data is allowed in the cases it is necessary for “(…) b) reasons of public 
interest in the area of public health, such as protecting against serious cross-border threats 
to health or ensuring high standards of quality and safety, inter alia for medicinal 
products or medical device”	  765.	  It is interesting to notice that in the last agreed 
version of the text such provision has been erased, probably because it has 
been considered redundant in respect of the following general provision of 
art. 83. 
Indeed, art. 83 provides a general exemption to the application of the data 
protection rules, in the cases of the processing of personal data for research 
purposes, if “these purposes cannot be otherwise fulfilled by processing 
data which does not permit or not any longer permit the identification of 
the data subject”, and if data “enabling the attribution of information to an 
identified or identifiable data subject is kept separately from the other 
information as long as these purposes can be fulfilled in this manner”.  
These provisions would thus perfectly apply to the case of clinical trials 
disclosure systems related to the safeguarding of public health through the 
sharing of scientific knowledge about drug’s quality and safety 
characteristics. Moreover, it must be bared in mind how the publication, 
and thus processing of clinical trials data for public interest purposes, 
although clearly constituting a derogation of ordinary data protection rules, 
still regards data assets that are key coded, and hence, not actually but only 
potentially identifiable, this still being an important factor to be considered 
when evaluating the actual harm suffered by the data subject.  
 In light of the above made considerations, the enactment of the Data 
Protection Regulation could constitute a great step forward towards the 
orienting of individuals’ data protection instances to broader social scientific 
research demands766. 
Indeed, it must be noticed that Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC or 
Regulation 45/2001, regarding the “processing of personal data by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
765 Emphasis added.  
766 This is what has been observed in literature by ZARSKY, The privacy-innovation Conundrum,supra, 
120 ss.. 
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Community institutions and bodies” 767 , do not provide these specific 
exemptions from general data protection rules.  
Yet, under the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, clinical trials 
transparency platforms could have been still justified in light of the 
exemption provided as regards the processing of personal data, when it is 
necessary to “reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing 
freedom of expression”768. Indeed in the patients’ right to information has 
been expressly linked to the freedom of expression, found at art. 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, guaranteeing freedom of 
expression as defined by the “right to receive and impart information”769. 
Moreover also art. 8.3 of the same Directive mitigates the general 
prohibition as regards the processing of medical data, “where processing of 
medical data is required for the purposes of preventive medicine (…)”770. 
Pursuant to these provisions it is clear how the protection of research-
subjects’ personal data is hardly to be invoked as a direct obstacle for test 
data disclosure. On the contrary, the exemptions to ordinary privacy rules 
appear to override the privacy exemption posed by the Clinical Trials 
Regulation771 , in that way opening up the legal path to transparency 
practices. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
767 Cf. art. 20 Regulation 45/2001/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 
December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the 
Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data, supra. 
768 Art. 9 of Directive 95/46/EC, supra.  
769 Cf. also on the international level, art. 19.2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, stating that “everyone should have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information (…)”.Emphasis added. See infra. 
770 Critically commenting art. 8 of the Data Protection Directive, CALLENS, The Privacy Directive and 
the Use of Medical Data for Research Purposes, supra, 320 ss.. 
771 Art. 81, 4 lett. a) of the Clinical Trials Regulation 536/2014, supra. It is interesting to notice that 
the privacy exemption does not have itself an overriding public interest exemption, such as the one 
provided by the exemption regarding the protection of commercially confidential information, in lett. 
b).  
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Conclusions  	  
1. The public interest in scientific data’s transparency 
 
 
The examination of the controversies surrounding the issue of clinical trials 
data disclosure, together with the analysis of the exemptions to the general 
rule provided by art. 84, 4 par. a) and b) of the recent Clinical Trials 
Regulation772, show how the concealment of drug’s safety and efficacy 
information has been motivated on the basis of the companies’ right to 
shield their commercially confidential information, and of the research 
subjects’ right to see their personal data processed only for very limited and 
expressed purposes.  
The systemic disclosure of these data through the establishment of a clinical 
trials protocols’ database, that is publicly and commonly accessible, has 
been therefore opposed on the grounds that it would allegedly nullify the 
two cited rights.  
In the controversy between the Cochrane Collaboration Research Group 
and the European Medicine Agency, the European Ombudsman has 
nonetheless stressed the need to protect the general right of the public to 
access official documents, functional to the satisfaction of the public’s 
interest to access information about pharmaceutical products.  
Accordingly, also the Clinical Trials Regulation expressly affirms that such 
database has the main purpose of enabling European citizens’ to “have 
access to clinical information about medicinal products”773.  
In order to render the access to these data effective, it is further underlined 
how “all data held in the EU database shall be in an easily searchable 
format, all related data shall be grouped together by way of the EU trial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
772 Regulation EU n. 536/2014 of the European Parliament ad of the Council, of 16 April 2014, on 
clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, and repealing Directive 2001/20/EC, supra.  
773 Art. 81, 2 Regulation 536/2014, supra 
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number, and hyperlinks shall be provided to link together related data and 
documents held on the EU database and other databases managed by the 
Agency”774.  
However, as it has been shown, the legal consistency of this right to access, 
to be mainly found in Regulation EC 1049/2001, and the Rules for 
implementation of the same Regulation, could appear at first sight quite 
weak in light of the intellectual property and privacy framework established 
for the protection of different aspects of information embedded in clinical 
trials protocols, that is to say on the one hand the “sweat of the brow”775 of 
research-based companies, and on the other side the volunteers’ personal 
health data.  
It is only through a deeper analysis of the two disciplines that the so 
opposed legal barriers to disclosure appear to cripple: indeed the data 
exclusivity regime does not seem to prevent disclosure, but provides, on the 
contrary, legal conditions for it, raising a direct defence to the commercial 
use of confidential business information, and nullifying in that way the risks 
of potential misuse of it posed by the publication of clinical trials protocols; 
instead, as regards the privacy concerns, the recalled public interests 
exemptions specifically regarding the public health area, and the research 
purposes, mentioned by the Proposal for a general Data Protection 
Regulation, appear to be perfectly applicable for the case of the 
establishment of a European database regarding drug’s safety and efficacy 
information.   
 
This information is to be considered of great public value for its nature of 
risk information776. 
Disclosure of this information is thus essential for the satisfaction of the 
public interest.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
774 Ibid.. 775 Cf. REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in international intellectual property law: The case 
for a public goods approach, supra, 43; See also ZAHL, Pharmaceuticals and the Law: as Patent Laws converge, 
attention shifts to Data Protection, 12 Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, February 2005, 2, 24 ss.. 776 See LYNDON, Secrecy and access in an innovation intensive economy: reordering information privileges in 
environmental, health, and safety law, supra, 509 ss.. 
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However, once demonstrated that neither the intellectual property nor the 
privacy normative framework are capable of preventing disclosure, and 
shifting from a denstruens to a construens perspective, the public interest of 
transparency and accountability as regards clinical trials information, also 
recognised by an economic cost-benefit analysis777, must be enquired on 
the interpretational level through the lenses of other legal paradigms778.  
Access to risk information regarding pharmaceuticals’ safety appears 
essential to the protection of patients’ health779, and- strictly linked to this-, 
of consumers’ interests in product safety780. Moreover societies’ interests in 
a credible, accountable and public-safety oriented public research781, and 
the need of social groups and institutions to be aware of risks in order to 
make relevant decisions782, have to be taken into account.  
On these premises, three are the legal interpretational tools that are to be 
considered relevant for the definition of the public interest underlying 
clinical trials disclosure: first the human right to health as defined by 
International Human Rights Treatises and the Human rights case law; 
second the doctrine related to the public goods dimension of research and 
knowledge production; and finally the consumer rights framework as 
defined by the correspondent European Directives.  
1.1. The Human Rights to Health and Information as interpretative 
tools for transparency in clinical trials data 
 
As far as the human rights standpoint is concerned, the establishment of 
appropriate health knowledge systems regarding clinical trials information- 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
777 Indeed it has been stated how “the secret’s opportunity costs are likely to be greater on the risk 
management side, than are its benefits on the commercial side”. LYNDON, Secrecy and access in an 
innovation intensive economy: reordering information privileges in an environmental health, and safety law, supra, 510. 
Cf. also LEVINE, Secrecy and unaccountability: Trade Secrets in our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV., 
135, 2007, 157 ss..  
778 Cf. LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: the human rights case for clinical 
trials transparency, supra, 99 ss.. 
779 Ibid..  
780 Cf. BENHÖR, EU Consumer Law and Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 2013, 72 ss..  
781 So ANDANDA, Managing intellectual property rights over clinical trial data to promote access and benefit 
sharing in public health, supra, 152.  
782 LYNDON, Secrecy and access in an innovation intensive economy: reordering information privileges in 
environmental health, and safety law, supra, 510.  
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as provided by the general disclosure rule at art. 84 of the Clinical Trials 
Regulation- is to be linked to the duty of states to assure an adequate level 
of public health783. This goal is in return to be achieved also through the 
creation of reliable information exchange platforms, detecting pre-market 
test results, as well as negative adverse drug reactions784.  
In this perspective, information and health are to be considered strictly 
related to each other, in line with a broad interpretation of the right to 
health, embracing a “variety of human rights as tools to deal with public 
health issues”785, or, more technically speaking, with an understanding of 
the same right to health as “inclusive, incorporating a myriad of freedoms 
and entitlements”786.   
In this light art. 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights provides a definition of the right to health to be referred to the 
“highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”787.  
As it has been underlined, the right to health is to be determined by the two 
essential components of availability and accessibility788.  
An adequate consideration of accessibility as a key component to ensuring 
the right to health789, includes also “reliable information about medicines 
(…) so (patients and health professionals) can take well informed decisions 
and use medicines safely”790, being in that way drug regulation required to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
783 LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: the human rights case for clinical trials 
transparency, supra, 100 ss.; YUN-CHING YEH, Pharmaceutical Data Protection Law and Policy and their 
Effects on the Right to Medicines: a Comparative Analysis, supra, 152 ss..  
784 GIBSON-LEMMENS, Niche Markets and Evidence Assessment in Transition: a critical Review of Proposed 
Drug Reforms, in Medical Law Review, 22, 2, 200 ss.,  
785 LEMMENS, Pharmaceutical Governance: a Human Rights Perspective, supra, 166.  
786 LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: the human rights case for clinical trials 
transparency, supra, 101, citing U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health Paul Hunt.  
787 For the various definitions of the right to health to be found on the international level, see 
SMITH, Human Rights and Bioethics: Formulating a universal Right to Health, Health Care, or Health 
Protection?, 38 Vand. J. Transnat’l L., 2005, 1295 ss., stressing definitional uncertainties surrounding 
the issue of the right to health.  
788 See U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, General Comment 14: the Right to the 
Highest attainable Standard of Health, 11 August 2000, online available at 
http://www.nesri.org/sites/default/files/Right_to_health_Comment_14.pdf, par. 12.  
789 On the issue see KINNEY, The International Human Right to Health: what does this mean for our nation 
and world?, in 34 Ind. L. Rev., 2000.1457 ss.. 
790 U.N. General Assembly, The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of 
Physical and Mental Health- Note by the Secretary General, 10 August 2009, online available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4aa762e30.html, 15. Cf. also U.N. Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization, General Comment 14: the Right to the Highest attainable Standard of Health, supra, 
paragr. 12.  
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“ensure the safety, efficacy, and quality of medicines available (…) as well as 
the accuracy and appropriateness of medicine information”791.  
This position is also shared by the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural rights in the general Comment 14, where it is underlined how 
the right to health is to be defined on the basis of the “underlying 
determinants of health”, including “access to health-related education and 
information”792. 
Thus, according to this perspective, access to information about 
pharmaceuticals’ safety features is to be considered as a fundamental 
determinant of the same right to health793.  
This approach is expressly recognized also by the Human Rights Guidelines for 
Pharmaceutical Companies in relation to access to Medicines, underlining the 
transparency responsibilities of pharmaceutical companies: it is here stated 
that “the principle of transparency not only requires that information be 
made publicly available, but also that the information be made available in a 
form that is accessible, manageable, and useful. In conjunction with other 
companies in the sector, a pharmaceutical company should agree to 
standard formats for the systematic disclosure of company information and 
data bearing upon access to medicines, thereby making it easier to evaluate 
the performance of one company against another, as well as the 
performance of the same company over time. This will enhance public 
accountability and investor confidence”794.  
Furthermore, the peculiar connection between the right to health, and the 
right to information as a component of it, has been stressed by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
791 U.N. General Assembly, The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of 
Physical and Mental Health- Note by the Secretary General, supra, 21.  
792 U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, General Comment 14: the Right to the Highest 
attainable Standard of Health, supra, par. 11.  
793 LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: the human rights case for clinical trials 
transparency, supra, 101, stressing the “connection between the right to health and the need to develop 
appropriate knowledge systems”. The Author argues that “access to critical information about those 
drugs, such as the information created through the scientific community’s use of trial registries and 
result reporting, is also a key determinant to the right”.  
794 See U.N. General Assembly, The right to Health- Note by the Secretary General, 11 August 2008, online 
available at http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/human_rights/A63_263.pdf, 15 ss., 17-18. On the 
issue cf. LEMMENS, Pharmaceutical Knowledge Governance: A Human Rights Perspective, supra, 172 and 
LEE-HUNT, Human Rights Responsibilities of Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to Medicines, in 
Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 2012, 220 ss., 226-227.  
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European Court of Human Rights in the controversy The Sunday Times v. The 
United Kingdom795 specifically regarding the publishing of clinical trials of a 
drug containing an ingredient known as thalidomide that had caused in 
1961 a high number of women to give birth to children suffering from 
serious deformities796 . The Sunday Times wanted to publish an article 
regarding the history of the testing, manufacture and marketing of the drug, 
but received an injunction on the grounds that the publication of this 
information would have resulted in a contempt of court797.  
The plenary European Court of Human Rights rejected the injunction to 
publish clinical trials data, on the assertion that the ban to publish the 
relevant health information would have violated art. 10 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights as regards freedom of expression, posing 
legal grounds for “the right of the public to be properly informed”798. In 
this light the Court stressed the need to satisfy the “vital interest” of “the 
families of numerous victims of the tragedy” in “knowing all the underlying 
facts”799.  
Literature commenting the case has considered the thalidomide tragedy as 
the direct result of the deficiency of the drug regulatory system and at the 
same time the lack of governmental insight as regards the establishment of 
solid knowledge systems based on transparent data800.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
795 The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 26 Aprile 1979, online available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57584#{"itemid":["001-57584"]}.  
796 On the case see FINTEL-SAMARAS-CARIAS, The Thalidomide Tragedy: Lessons for Drug Safety and 
Regulation, published on the 28th July 2009, online available at 
https://helix.northwestern.edu/article/thalidomide-tragedy-lessons-drug-safety-and-regulation. 
797 Cf. LEMMENS, Pharmaceutical Governance: a Human Rights Perspective, supra, 166.  798 The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, supra, par. 66. Cf. art. 19.2 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, according to which “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information (…)”. Numerous 
are the cases of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the link between access to 
information and the freedom of expression. Cf. Guerra and others v. Italy, ECHR, 19 February 1989, 
commented by LEMMENS, Pharmaceutical Governance: a Human Rights Perspective, supra, 166-167.	   
799 Ibid..  
800 LEMMENS-TELFER, Access to information and the right to health: the human rights case for clinical trials 
transparency, supra, 103.  
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1.2 The Human Right to benefit from scientific research and progress 
as interpretative tool for transparency in clinical trials data 
 
Following the human rights discourse, the rule of clinical trials disclosure is 
to be enforced also in light of another human rights-associated interest, 
namely the right to benefit from scientific research and progress, directly 
deriving from the public good dimension of scientific research801.  
The access to the fruits of the latest scientific research is indeed to be 
considered an essential precondition of the stimulation of follow-on 
research and is strictly functional to the guidance of better clinical 
practice802.  
In this light, the right to benefit from research results, has been recently 
recognized at art. 12 of the UNESCO Declaration on the Human Genome 
and Human Rights, declaring that “benefits from advances in biology, 
genetics and medicine, concerning the human genome, shall be made freely 
available to all”, and in art. 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, affirming that “states parties to the present 
Covenant recognize the right of everyone to (…) enjoy the benefits of 
scientific progress and its applications”.  
The sharing of direct research results entailed in clinical trials information is 
thus to be considered relevant from a general scientific progress 
perspective, from a double standpoint.  
Indeed, on the one side, the monitoring of the benefits and risks of all 
centrally approved medicines803  would provide researchers with a clear 
knowledge of the current scientific development level, that is an essential 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
801 This is the standpoint of REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in international intellectual 
property law: The case for a public goods approach, supra, 51, affirming that “it seems clear that the 
information gleaned from the clinical testing of drugs and therapies is a public good in the sense that 
each individual citizen benefits from such information without reducing its value to others”; cf. 
LEMMENS, Pharmaceutical Knowledge Governance: a Human Rights Perspective, supra, 172.  
802 REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in international intellectual property law: The case for a 
public goods approach, supra, 52.  
803 The sharing of information for the benefits of scientific progress, is particularly stressed by 
GØTZSCHE-JORGENSEN, Getting access to unpublished clinical trials at the European Medicines Agency, 
supra, passim.  
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precondition for effective and faster innovation enhancement804; on the 
other side, publicly accessible clinical trials information systems 
undoubtedly count as accountability mechanisms of pharmaceutical 
companies’ responsibilities805. Some scholars have thus argued that this 
could in return function as an incentive for the increase of the standards of 
testing’s accurateness, in virtue of the exposure to civil society’s judgment 
and control806.  
The need to protect and enhance, through relevant information disclosure 
practices, the active role of the public opinion as a “social watchdog” over 
the creation of public health oriented science, can be derived from the 
reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights in another important 
controversy on the issue of the right to access information contained in 
official documents807. Although not directly related to clinical trials data 
disclosure808, the declarations of the Court appear to be relevant for the 
present argumentation.  
Indeed, on this occasion, the Court stressed the right of the public to 
receive information of general interest. The satisfaction of this right is to be 
considered as an essential tool for society to carry out its public control 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  804 EISENBERG, The role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, supra, 383: “public availability of data from 
clinical trials would allow firms to learn from each other’s experience so that they could design better 
products and conduct better trials in the future. (…)It would permit reanalysis of data by skeptical 
competitors in ways that might challenge the spin selected by the product’s sponsor, and facilitate 
meta-analysis of aggregated data from multiple studies of related products”. LEMMENS, 
Pharmaceutical Knowledge Governance: a Human Rights Perspective, supra, 169.  
805 HUNT-KHOSLA, Are Drug Companies living up to their Human Rights Responsibilities? The Perspective of 
the former United Nations Special Rapporteur (2002-2008), in Plos Medicine, September 2010, 7, 9, 3.  806 ANDANDA, Managing intellectual property rights over clinical trial data to promote access and benefit sharing 
in public health, supra, 157. Contra REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in international 
intellectual property law: The case for a public goods approach, supra, 50, affirming that “requiring mandatory 
disclosure of clinical trials will not eliminate the inherent conflict of interest underlying the 
commercial provision of drugs and medicine or the fundamental inefficiencies the current system 
promotes. So long as drug companies retain primary responsibility for conducting or funding clinical 
trials, they will be tempted to selectively disclose information and to avoid research programs that 
could reveal unfavourable outcomes. Nor would a disclosure requirement alone ensure that the 
stakeholding company will conduct all the tests deemed most beneficial to public safety”.  
807 Társaság A Szabadságjogokért (Hungarian Civil Liberties Union) v. Hungary, ECHR, 14 April 2009, 
Case n. 37374/05, online available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{"fulltext":["Társaság"],"documentcollectio
nid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],"itemid":["001-92171"]}. Par. 36. 808 The case was however still related to drug regulation issues: in fact it concerned the request by the 
Hungarian Civil Liberties Union TASZ to Hungary’s Constitutional Court to disclose a 
parliamentarian's complaint questioning the legality of new criminal legislation concerning drug-
related offences. The Constitutional Court refused to release the information. 
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function in the areas of major public concern809, such as health care and 
pharmaceutical industry performance.   
In this light, free access to trials information is immediately functional to 
the increase of scientific community’s awareness over the potential risks of 
marketed medicinal products, this reflecting itself, on the practical level, in a 
stronger degree of patients’ protection.  
Indeed, it has been underlined how the transparency of clinical trial results 
promotes medical practitioners’ surer decisions “about the safety and 
therapeutic value of both single products and product groups”810. 
 
1.3 Consumer Rights as interpretative tools for transparency in 
clinical trials data 
 
However, access to clinical trials data is not only relevant as regards the 
informed decisions of healthcare providers, but it appears to be of crucial 
importance also from a consumer protection perspective.  
Hence, shifting from the collective perspective of the right to health and the 
right to the common enjoyment of research results, to the more particular 
dimension of consumer law, the rule of trials results disclosure can find here 
two further legal justifications.  
Indeed, a consumer’s right to be adequately informed as regards the features 
of the products used, is to be derived from the Directive on the Community 
code relating to Medicinal Products for Human use 2001/83/EC, intending 
to protect consumers’ right to self-determination and to consent to 
therapy811.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
809 On this precise issue see Joint Declaration of HAI Europe, ISDB, AIM, BEUC, Medicines in Europe 
Forum, Relevant Health Information for Empowered Citizens, published on the 3rd October 2006, online 
available at http://www.isdbweb.org/documents/uploads/relevant_health_information_001.pdf.  
810 REICHMAN, Rethinking the role of clinical trials data in international intellectual property law: The case for a 
public goods approach, supra, 52.  
811 FAEH, Pharmaceutical Information: Does the Directive 2001/83/EC Protect such a right for the End User?, 
in Amsterdam Law Forum, 3, 1, 2011, 30 ss..  
	   164	  
Important suggestions in this direction can be inferred from the rules on 
packaging and labelling of pharmaceuticals812, requiring a first, although 
limited in scope, disclosure of information about the products’ features813.  
Some scholars have thus affirmed how these specific rules concerning the 
informational aspects of drugs’ marketing, provide strong interpretative 
grounds for a consumer’s right to pertinent, correct, complete and 
understandable information814, with which the establishment of mandatory 
test data reporting systems clearly comply.   
The consumer protection standpoint provides however another important 
basis for the transparency of test data in light of the right to product safety 
deriving from Directive 2001/95/EC, which is to be considered a direct 
transposition of the human right to health in the consumer law 
dimension815.   
Indeed, recital 19 of the Directive acknowledges the obligation of the 
producer to “supply consumers with information enabling them to assess 
and prevent risks, to warn consumers of the risks posed by dangerous 
products already supplied to them” 816 , whereas recital 27 states that 
“effective supervision of product safety requires the setting up at national 
and Community levels of a system of rapid exchange of information (…)”.  
Moreover, legal grounds for clinical trials’ disclosure systems are to be more 
specifically found in recital 35 of the same Directive expressly affirming that 
“public access to the information available to the authorities on product 
safety should be ensured”, and in art. 16, stating that “information available 
to the authorities of Member states or the Commission relating to risks to 
consumer health and safety posed by products shall in general be available to the public, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
812 Ibid., 32 ss., for a comment on artt. 54 ss.. of the Directive 2001/83/EC.  813 EISENBERG, The role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, supra, 382-383, affirming that “some 
disclosure of data occurs in summary form through the required labelling that must accompany the 
product in the market. The audience to whom these disclosures are directed is clinical decision-
making”. 
814 FAEH, Pharmaceutical Information: Does the Directive 2001/83/EC Protect such a right for the End User?, 
43.  
815 BENHÖHR, EU Consumer Law and Human Rights, supra, 73-74.  816 This is again stressed in art. 5 of the Directive, stating that “within the limits of their respective 
activities, producers shall provide consumers with the relevant information to enable them to assess 
the risks inherent in a product throughout the normal or reasonably foreseeable period of its use, 
where such risks are not immediately obvious without adequate warnings, and to take precautions 
against those risks”.  
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accordance with the requirements of transparency (…)”817 and that “in particular the 
public shall have access to information on product identification, the nature 
of the risk and the measures taken”.  
 
1.4 Conclusionary remarks and suggestions for further research 
 
This considered, it thus becomes clearer how “addressing information 
needs of patients and consumers is not only a matter of content but also of 
communication”818.  
Indeed, at a deeper understanding of the matter, there are different degrees 
of test data disclosure819, and accordingly, different are the intersections 
with the mentioned fundamental right to the enjoyment of “a high level of 
human health protection”, as recalled by art 35 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.  
On the one side, given its informational value, disclosure of test data would 
directly satisfy the interests of individuals- patients and healthcare 
practitioners- and of society as a whole to be adequately informed of 
pharmaceutical products risks and hidden side effects.  
Access to information about medicines’ features is thus highly relevant in 
order to address public safety concerns.   
However, on the other side, the consideration of the regulatory significance 
of trials information, shows how the systemic disclosure of it could have 
broader implications also as regards access to medicines820. 
Indeed, as it has been shown, disclosure of clinical trials data turns out to 
have direct effects also on competition and innovation mechanisms, 
enabling generic competitors to gain greater knowledge of pharmaceutical 
design’s “state of the art”, and fostering in that way generic products’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
817 Emphasis added.  
818 Joint Declaration of HAI Europe, ISDB, AIM, BEUC, Medicines in Europe Forum, Relevant Health 
Information for Empowered Citizens, supra, 3.  
819 In this sense LIETZAN, A new framework for assessing clinical data transparency initiatives, supra, 12. 
820 Cf. YUN-CHING YEH, Pharmaceutical Data Protection Law and Policy and their Effects on the Right to 
Medicines: a Comparative Analysis, supra, 156-157.  
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market entrance, as soon as the period of data exclusivity has expired and 
the marketing license can be granted.  
Also from this further standpoint, the interpretational tool of the right to 
health strongly supports the public interest of information disclosure, as a 
means to fulfil fundamental market freedoms, that are in return functional 
to the enjoyment of a higher standard of health. 
Indeed, in the pharmaceutical sector, the connection between competition 
and health concerns is very strong, since the earlier generic companies enter 
the market, the sooner prices decreases, with clear gains in patients’ 
welfare821. 
However, the consideration, through the lenses of the right to health 
protection demands, of the anticompetitive effects of the sui generis 
protection of data exclusivity assured to innovators’ trials data could 
possibly lead to more drastic consequences.  
Indeed, it is exactly from the data exclusivity regime that research-based 
companies have intended to derive a non-disclosure obligation regarding 
the same test data, as well as strategies to increase the degree of protection, 
both for patented and non-patented products, for the purpose of enforcing 
market predominance.  
From this latter perspective, generics’ entrance in the market is delayed in 
the more direct sense of blocking the entry of second comers through the 
barrier of a patent like protection regarding pharmaceuticals’ information.  
The anticompetitive outcomes of the data exclusivity regime have been 
stressed by literature822, invoking legislative reforms, and proposing more 
public friendly layouts for a data protection still needed to shield 
originators’ commercial investments from the threat of inefficient free-
riding practices by competitors. Yet, it has also noticed how a change in the 
law is for now very difficult to envisage823. 
However, the evaluation of this sui generis intellectual property protection in 
light of the European fundamental right to health could possibly boost the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
821 See MUZAKA, Politics of Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines, supra, 35-36. 
822 Cf. supra chapter 2.  
823 FACKELMAN, Clinical data, data exclusivity and private investment production in Europe, supra, 181.  
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amendment process, by revealing the crippling “constitutional” legitimacy 
of such a strong form of safety information propertization.  
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